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CROWN PRINCE HIROHITO 
He has recently been named Regent of Japan with the approval of the Council of 
Princes, the Imperial Family and the Privy Councilors. His marriage to a princess 
of Satsuma will take place this spring, 



ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

JAPAN : KOREA : CHINA : 
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 



BY 

Ei ALEXANDER POWELL 

AUTHOE OF "the LAST FRONTIER," "FIGHTING IN FLANDERS,'' 

"where the strange trails go down," etc. 



ILLUSTRATED 




iVi^f^ ^W ' iHii ii 



NEW YORK 

THE CENTURY CO. 

1922 






Copyright, 1922, by 
The Century Co. 



Printed in U. S. A. 

MAR 27 1922 
0)CI.A659301 



Av^ / 



To THE 

Honorable 
WARREN G. HARDING 

President of the United States 
who, by his vision and statesmanship 
in calling the Wasliington Conference, 
has done more than any man of our time 
to preserve the peace of the Pacific 
and to further the friendship and 
mutual understanding of the peo- 
ples dwelling upon its shores 



FOREWORD 

Most writers on Far Eastern politics make the mis- 
take of crediting their readers with a profounder 
knowledge of the subject than they in fact possess. 
They take too much for granted. They talk in terms 
of algebra instead of arithmetic. On the assumption 
that those who read their books already understand 
the meaning of such phrases as "spheres of influence," 
"extraterritoriality," the Shogunate, the Genro, the 
tuchuns, the Anfu Club, the Consortium, the Gentle- 
men's Agreement, the Twenty-one Demands, they 
make repeated use of them without pausing long 
enough to explain precisely what they mean. As a 
result, the casual reader, who usually has only a 
vague idea of the subject to start with, either becomes 
bewildered and gives up in despair, frankly admitting 
that he does not understand what it is all about, or 
he forms conclusions which, being based on miscon- 
ceptions, do not agree with the facts. 

So, though the shelves of the public libraries sag 
beneath the volumes that have been written on various 
phases of Oriental politics, it seems to me that there is 
still a place for a clear, concise, simply written, un- 
prejudiced explanation of the various problems, po- 
litical, economic, and financial, which, taken together, 

vii 



viii FOREWORD 

form what is commonly referred to as the Far Eastern 
Question. Therefore, even at the risk of covering 
ground with which some of my readers are doubtless 
already familiar, I have endeavored to sketch in 
outline, using simple, every-day language, the condi- 
tions and events which have combined to produce 
the present complex situation. Those who have the 
patience to follow me to the end will have gained, I 
hope, a sound, if rudimentary, understanding of one 
of the most perplexing subjects in the whole field of 
international politics. 

I am perfectly aware that, so far as the chapters 
dealing with Japan and China are concerned, this 
book does not cover much new ground historically, 
nor is it marked by any special originality of presen- 
tation. I am also aware that much of the material 
has been used repeatedly in recent years by other 
writers on Japanese and Chinese questions. But, 
in spite of this, the book has, I believe, the merits of 
being clear, comprehensive, accurate, and up-to-the- 
minute. It was written, in the main, while the Wash- 
ington Conference was still in session — an advantage 
in that it enabled me to discuss the mooted questions 
with the very men best qualified to discuss them; a 
disadvantage, perhaps, in that certain of the condi- 
tions which I have described, particularly in China, 
will necessarily be modified by the conferees' deci- 
sions. 



FOREWORD ix 

A certain number of errors inevitably creep into the 
pages of any book of this nature, no matter how 
carefully it may be written and edited, but, in order 
to keep the errors to a minimum, the proof-sheets of 
the various chapters were submitted for correction 
to gentlemen who are universally recognized as among 
the highest authorities on the subjects treated in them. 
The proofs of the chapters on Japan and Korea were 
read and corrected by His Highness Prince Toku- 
gawa, President of the Japanese House of Peers, and 
by His Excellency Baron Shidehara, Japanese Am- 
bassador to the United States, both members of the 
Japanese Delegation to the Washington Conference, 
and by the Honorable Roland S. Morris, formerly 
American Ambassador to Japan. The chapters on 
China were revised by Dr. J. C. Ferguson, Adviser 
to the President of the Chinese Republic, a distin- 
guished educator and probably the leading foreign 
authority on Chinese affairs. The chapters on the 
Philippines were corrected by the Honorable Wil- 
liam H. Taft, Chief Justice of the United States and 
formerly Governor- General of the Philippine Islands ; 
by the Honorable Cameron Forbes, also a former 
governor-general and a member of the Wood-Forbes 
Mission, and by Major-General Frank Mclntyre, 
Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs. It should 
be clearly understood, however, that the opinions ex- 
pressed in the following pages do not necessarily 



X FOREWORD 

reflect the views, nor in all cases meet with the ap- 
proval, of the gentlemen in question. The opinions 
expressed in this book are my own. 

Some of the things which I have written will prob- 
ably give offense to those governments and individuals 
from whom I received many courtesies. Those who 
are privileged to speak for governments are fond 
of asserting that their governments have nothing to 
conceal and that they welcome honest criticism, but 
long experience has taught me that when they are 
told unpalatable truths governments are usually as 
sensitive and resentful as friends. Yet, were I to 
attempt to retain the good-will of the governments 
and officials of the countries under discussion by re- 
fraining from unfavorable comment, this book would 
be little more than propaganda. Perhaps it is 
too much to expect, but I would like those who showed 
me so many kindnesses in Japan, China, Korea, and 
the Philippines to believe that I have leaned back- 
ward in an effort to keep these pages free from bias 
and injustice, that I have tried to tell the truth as I 
understand it and because I believe that it is to the 
best interests of all the peoples concerned that the 
unvarnished truth should be told. If those of my 
country people who honor me by reading this book 
obtain from it a clearer understanding of the problems 
and perplexities which confront our trans-Pacific 
neighbors, if it teaches them to regard the short- 



FOREWORD xi 

comings of the peoples of Eastern Asia a little more 
leniently and their national aspirations a little more 
sympathetically, then I shall feel that my purpose in 
writing it has been accomplished. 

E. Alexander Powell. 
Washington, January, 1922. 



AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT 

I welcome this opportunity of expressing my ap- 
preciation of the innumerable courtesies extended to 
me by the governments of Japan, Korea, China, and 
the Philippine Islands, and of the many personal 
kindnesses shown me by individuals in those countries. 

My studies in the Japanese Empire were greatly 
facilitated by the hearty cooperation of the late 
Premier Hara, whose tragic death at the hands of an 
assassin in November, 1921, was a profound shock to 
all who knew him. For the assistance and hospitality 
which I received everywhere in Japan and Korea I 
am also grateful to His Excellency Baron Shidehara, 
Japanese Ambassador to the United States; to His 
Highness Prince Tokugawa, President of the House 
of Peers; to His Excellency Masanao Hanihara, 
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs; to Major-General 
G. Tanaka, formerly Minister of War ; to His Excel- 
lency Admiral Baron Saito, Governor-General of 
Korea, and to Dr. Kentaro Midzuno, the Vice-Gov- 
ernor-General; to Viscount Kaneko; to Dallas 
McGrew, Esq., and Frederick Moore, Esq., of the 
Japanese Foreign Office ; to Dr. T. lyenaga, of New 
York City; to the Hon. Ransford Miller, American 
Consul-General at Seoul; and in particular to the 

xiii 



xiv AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT 

Hon. Roland S. Morris, formerly American Ambas- 
sador to Japan. 

Of the many persons who assisted me in China my 
thanks are due to Dr. J. C. Ferguson, Adviser to the 
President of the Chinese Republic ; to the Hon. Paul 
R. Reinsch, formerly American Minister to China; 
to Ray Atherton, Esq., Secretary of the American 
Legation at Peking; to I. Tokugawa, Esq., Secretary 
of the Japanese Legation at Peking; to P. Loureiro, 
Esq., Assistant Financial Secretary of the Salt Rev- 
enue Administration; and to Bertram Lennox-Simp- 
son, Esq. ("Putnam Weale"). 

For the great trouble to which they put themselves 
in rendering my visit to the Philippines instructive 
and enjoyable I am very grateful to the Hon. Francis 
Burton Harrison, formerly Governor-General of the 
Philippine Islands; to the Hon. Manuel Quezon, 
President of the Philippine Senate; to the Hon. 
Sergio Osmena, Speaker of the House; to the Hon. 
Frank C. Carpenter, Governor of the Department 
of Mindanao and Sulu; to the Hon. P. W. Rogers, 
formerly Governor of Jolo; to Colonel Ralph W. 
Jones of the Philippine Constabulary; to Major Ed- 
win C. Bopp, Chief of Police of Manila, and to army, 
scout, and constabulary officers all the way from 
northern Luzon to Zamboanga. 

This also affords me an opportunity to acknowl- 
edge my indebtedness for many suggestions and much 



AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT xv 

valuable material which I have derived from the fol- 
lowing sources : "Modern Japan," by A. S. Hershey ; 
"What Shall I Think of Japan?" by George Gleason; 
"The Japanese Empire," by Philip Terry; "The Far 
East Unveiled," by Frederick Coleman; "The New 
Far East," by T. J. Millard; "The Mastery of the 
Far East," by Arthur Judson Brown; "China, Japan 
and Korea," by J. O. P. Bland; "These from the 
Land of Sinim," by Sir Robert Hart; "China in 
Transformation," by A. B. Colquhoun; "Peking 
Dust," by Ellen La Motte; "Modern China," by S. 
G. Cheng; "Korea," by Angus Hamilton; "In Korea 
with the Marquis Ito," by George T. Ladd ; "Korea's 
Fight for Freedom," by F. A. McKenzie; "The Pass- 
ing of Korea," by H. B. Hm'lbert; "The Truth About 
Korea," by C. W. Kendall; "The Rebirth of Korea," 
by Hugh H. Cynn; "The Case for the Filipinos," 
by Maximo M. Kalaw; "The Philippine Islands and 
Their People" and "The Philippines, Past and Pres- 
ent," by Dean C. Worcester, and particularly the 
extremely able despatches of the New York Tribune's 
Far Eastern correspondent, Mr. Nathaniel Peffer. 

E. Alexander Powell. 



CONTENTS 

PART PAGH 

I Japan 3 

II Korea 101 

1. The Peninsula and Its People . . . . . 101 

2. The Japanese in Korea 127 

III China 181 

IV The Philippine Islands 273 

Appendix A 345 

Appendix B 348 



ILLUSTRATIONS 

Crown Prince Hirohito Frontispiece 

PACINQ PAGE 

Map of the Japanese Empire 32 

Fujiyama, the Sacred Mountain, and Fuji River ... 48 

Sunset in Shiba Park, Tokyo 48 

A Religious Procession in Kioto 49 

Map of Chosen (Korea) 112 

Korean Peasant Taking Farm-Products to Market . . 128 

Korean Peasant Woman and Child 128 

Funeral of the Ex-Emperor of Korea 129 

Devil-Posts Outside Korean Village to Keep Away Evil 

Spirits 160 

Transporting Fodder on the Backs of Bulls in Korea . . 160 

Ancient Korean Temple in Seoul 161 

Palanquin of Prince Li 161 

Map of China 181 

The Great Wall of China 188 

Another View of the Great Wall ........ 188 

Camels under the Walls of Peking 189 

The Tartar Wall and a Portion of the Tartar City in 

Peking 189 

The Jade Pagoda near Peking 196 

A Pagoda of the Summer Palace 197 

xix 



XX ILLUSTRATIONS 



FACING PAGE 



The Temple of Heaven^ Peking 197 

Hsu Shih-Chang 204 

Dr. Sun Yat-Sen 204 

In the Forbidden City 205 

Canal Scene in Canton 228 

The Pawnshops of Canton 228 

View from the Terrace of the Summer Palace .... 229 

Bridge in the Gardens of the Summer Palace^ Peking . . 229 

A Funeral Procession in Peking 240 

Funeral Procession of a High Official 240 

An Itinerant Mendicant of the Northern HiU . . . .241 

Tibetan Priests at the Entrance to the Lama Temple^ 

Peking 241 

Chinese Railway Guards 272 

Japanese Railway Guard 272 

A Feast Given by a Boy of 13 Years and His 12-Year-Old 

Wife on the Anniversary of the Death of Their Son 273 

The 1911 Eruption of Taal Volcano 276 

The Little River that Flows Through the Town ... 277 

A Bit of Zamboanga 277 

A Kalinga Man and Woman . 284 

A Kalinga Dancing-Girl 285 

A Kalinga Family 285 

Map of the Philippine Islands . 288 

Rice Terraces Built by the Ifugaoesi in the Mountain Prov- 
ince, Luzon 292 

Filipinos Threshing Rice with Their Feet 293 



ILLUSTRATIONS xxi 

FACING PAGE 

Plowing and Harrowing the Zacate Fields ..... 293 

Roasting a Dog at an Igorot Caniau in the Mountains of 

Luzon 300 

An Igorot Burial Cave 300 

Fruit-Bats in Flight, Lagangilang 301 

Boobies on Tubbataja Reef 301 

Moros of Zamboanga 304 

A Negrito 304 

A Monobo-Manguangan from the Upper Agusan, Mindanao 305 

A Bagobo Youth 305 

A Moro Enlisted Man 320 

A Moro Dato 320 

An Ifugao Soldier 320 

The Famous "Zigzag" on the Benguet Road . . . . 321 

The Pasig River, Manila 321 



ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 



ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 



PART I 
JAPAN 



IT is too early by many years to assess at their 
true value the achievements and failures of the 
Washington Conference for the Limitation of Arma- 
ments. We are standing too near the picture to esti- 
mate with accuracy its merits and its faults. But, 
when history has lent it the justice of perspective, 
the assembly of nations which convened on the banks 
of the Potomac in November, 1921, will assuredly 
be recognized as one of the most remarkable episodes 
of our time. No matter what else it accomplished, or 
failed to accomplish, it provided the world with a 
striking object-lesson in the efficacy, as applied to 
international relations, of the policy of let's-sit-down- 
and-talk-it-over. 

It would be idle to deny that, when the Confer- 
ence was called by President Harding, Japan was 
regarded as a potential enemy by a majority of 

Americans. I, for one, am convinced that, had the 

3 



4 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

mutual suspicions and misunderstandings of the two 
peoples been permitted to continue, had their respec- 
tive governments clung to the policies which they 
were then pursuing, the situation would have ended 
in war. Yet their mutual suspicions were so largely 
allayed, their misunderstandings so successfully com- 
posed by the frank discussions which characterized the 
Conference, that, when it ended, the sentiment of 
most thoughtful persons, Americans and Japanese, 
was expressed by Prince Tokugawa, President of the 
House of Peers, when he said upon his departure 
from our shores: "The United States has learned 
that Japan entertains no aggressive designs in the 
Pacific and Japan has learned that she has nothing 
to expect from this side of the Pacific except friendly 
cooperation." 

The near-hostility which until recently embittered 
the relations of the United States and Japan, and 
which threatened at one time to break into an open 
sore, was due, I am convinced, not to any inherent 
ill-will on the part of either people for the other, but 
to a mutual lack of knowledge and sympathetic un- 
derstanding. In other words, both Americans and 
Japanese had shovni themselves unable, or unwilling, 
to think the other's mind. It was not enough for 
groups of more or less representative Americans and 
Japanese to gather about banquet tables and indulge 
in sonorous protestations of mutual friendship and in- 
ternational good-will, or to cable each other hands- 



JAPAN 5 

across-the-sea greetings couched in terms of fulsome 
praise. The possibihties of a cordial relationship and 
a harmonious cooperation between the two nations 
are so tremendous, the interests at stake are so vast 
and far-reaching, the consequences of an armed con- 
flict would be so catastrophic and overwhelming, that 
it is unthinkable that the two peoples should ever 
again permit themselves to drift into the frame of 
mind which existed in both countries prior to the Con- 
ference at Washington. 

Yet, if such a perilous situation is not again to 
arise, each people miist make an earnest endeavor to 
gain a better understanding of the temperament, tra- 
ditions, ambitions, limitations, and problems of the 
other, and to make corresponding allowances for 
them — in short, to cultivate a more tolerant and sym- 
pathetic state of mind. Japan is, and probably al- 
ways will be, one of the most important countries, if 
not the most important, on our political horizon. 
Summoned from obscurity by an American commo- 
dore, adopting with avidity the devices of Western 
civilization, advancing as in seven-league boots to 
her present position as one of the five greatest mih- 
tary and naval powers in the world, our closest com- 
petitor in the race for the trade of Eastern Asia, one 
of our most profitable customers, the key that can 
lock the Open Door — it is imperative for every Amer- 
ican to learn more about this great Ocean Empire on 
the other side of the Pacific and to obtain a clearer 



# 

6 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

understanding of what has taken place in those nine- 
and-sixty amazing years — less than the span of life 
which the Scriptures allot to man — since the anchors 
of Perry's frigates rumbled down in the Bay of Yedo. 

The Japanese Question is an extremely compli- 
cated one. Its ramifications extend into the realms 
of politics, industry, commerce, and finance. It 
stretches across one hundred and fifty degrees of 
longitude. It affects the lives and destinies of six 
hundred millions of people. Its roots are to be found 
as far apart as a Japanese military outpost in Siberia 
and the headquarters of a labor union in Sacramento, 
as a Korean village and a Californian farm, as an 
obscure harbor on the coast of Mexico and a cable- 
station on a lonely rock in the Pacific, as the offices 
of a firm of international bankers in Wall Street and 
the palace of the President of China in the Forbidden 
City. 

To understand algebra, you must have a knowl- 
edge of arithmetic. To understand the Japanese 
Question, you must have at least a rudimentary 
knowledge of the various factors which have combined 
to produce it. It grew to its present dimensions so 
silently, so stealthily, that the average well-informed 
American has only a vague and frequently erroneous 
idea of what it is all about. He has read in the 
newspapers of the anti-Japanese agitation in Califor- 
nia, of the Gentlemen's Agreement, of picture-brides. 



JAPAN 7 

of mysterious Japanese troop-movements in Siberia, 
of Japan's "special interests" in Manchuria, of Japa- 
nese oppression in Korea, of the Shantung contro- 
versy, of the dispute over Yap ; but to him these iso- 
lated episodes usually had about as much significance 
as so many fragments of a complicated jig-saw puz- 
zle. Moreover, the avalanche of information, near- 
information, and misinformation about Japan which 
filled the columns of the daily papers prior to and 
during the Washington Conference bewildered rather 
than enlightened him. Therefore, even at the risk of 
repeating some facts with which you are doubtless 
already familiar, I will endeavor to piece the puzzle 
together, so that you may view the picture in its 
entirety mid in the light of the Conference's decisions. 
But, before I proceed, let me make it amply clear 
that I hold no brief for Japan. I am an American 
and, because I wish to see my country morally in the 
right, I deplore the unjust, intolerant, and provoca- 
tive attitude toward the Japanese adopted by certain 
elements of our population. I believe that the poli- 
tician or publicist who deliberately inflames public 
opinion against a nation with which we are at peace, 
and with which we wish to remain at peace, is an 
enemy to the best interests of his country and should 
be treated as such by all decent citizens. It is to the 
great mass of reasoning and fair-minded people in 
both countries, who, I am convinced, wish to learn 
the unvarnished truth, no matter how unflattering 



m 

8 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

it may be to their national pride, how disillusionizing, 
that I address myself. In order that they may have 
the clearest possible understanding of a situation 
which vitally concerns the future well-being of both 
the United States and Japan, I propose, in the fol- 
lowing pages, to discard all euphemism and diplo- 
matic subterfuge and to tell as much as possible of 
"nothing but the truth." 

II 

Some fruths, more half-truths, many untruths have 
been said and written in each country about the other. 
The clear waters of our old-time friendship have been 
roiled by prejudice and propaganda. Much of our 
appalling ignorance of Japanese character, aims, 
and ideals is traceable to our national propensity for 
generalization — always an inexact and dangerous 
method of estimating another people, and doubly 
dangerous in the case of a people as complex as the 
Japanese. Let us not forget that we were accus- 
tomed to think of the French as a volatile, excitable, 
easy-going, pleasure-obsessed, decadent people until 
the Mame and Verdun taught us the truth. Such a 
misconception was deplorable in the case of a people 
from whom we had nothing to fear ; it is inexcusable, 
and might well prove disastrous, in the case of the 
Japanese. I have heard Americans who pride them- 
selves on being well-informed, men whose opinions 
are listened to with respect, betray ignorance of Japan 



JAPAN 9 

and of Japanese institutions which would be ludicrous 
under other conditions. 

And the ignorance of many intelligent Japanese in 
regard to ourselves is no less disheartening. Their 
way of thinking is not our way of thinking; many 
of their institutions and ideas and ideals are diametric- 
ally different from ours. Believe it or not, as you 
choose, the great majority of intelligent Japanese 
are unable to understand our thinly veiled distrust 
and dislike of them. That many of our people do dis- 
trust and dislike the Japanese there can be no gainsay- 
ing. Yet the average American usually finds some 
difficulty in giving for his attitude toward the Jap- 
anese a definite and cogent reason. This unreasoning 
antipathy was illustrated by an educated and charm- 
ing American woman, who had been traveling in 
Japan, whom I met on a homeward bound liner. 

"How did you like the Japanese?" I asked her. 

"I did n't like them," she replied. 

"Were you ill-treated in Japan? Did you meet 
with any discourtesy or injustice?" 

"No," she admitted, with some embarrassment. "I 
have no complaints whatever to make of the treat- 
ment I received. I found them universally courte- 
ous." 

"Then why did n't you hke them?" I persisted. 

"Well," she explained, "I just made up my mind 
before I went to Japan that I was n't going to like 
the Japanese, and I did n't." 



10 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

That is an extreme case, I admit, but if you will 
take the trouble to go into the matter you will find 
that that is about as cogent a reason as many Amer- 
icans can offer for their dislike of the people of 
Nippon. 

Underlying all the misunderstandings between the 
two nations is race prejudice. Our racial antipathy 
for the Japanese is instinctive. It has its source in 
the white race's attitude of arrogant superiority 
toward all non-white peoples. We inherited it, along 
with our Caucasian blood, from our Aryan ancestors. 
It is as old as the breed. The Japanese do not 
realize that they are meeting in this an old, old prob- 
lem; that the American attitude is not dictated by a 
wish to place a stigma of inferiority on them, but is 
merely the application to them of the Caucasian's his- 
toric attitude toward all peoples with tinted skins. If 
the Japanese question this, let them observe the atti- 
tude of the Americans resident in the Philippines 
toward the Filipinos, that of the English toward the 
natives of India and Egypt, that of the French 
toward their brown-skinned subjects in Indo-China. 
But this racial prejudice is by no means one-sided. 
The Japanese consider themselves as superior to us 
as we consider ourselves superior to them. Make no 
mistake about that. The Japanese are by no means 
free from that racial dislike for Occidentals which 
lies near to the hearts of all Orientals ; but they have 



JAPAN 11 

the good sense, good manners, and tact to repress 
their feelings. That is where they differ from Amer- 
icans. 

Another reason for American dislike of the Jap- 
anese is the latter's assertion of equality. We don't 
call it that, of course. We call it conceit — cockiness. 
The reason that we get along with another yellow 
race, the Chinese, is because they, by their abject 
abasement and submissiveness, flatter our sense of 
racial superiority. Our pride thus catered to, we 
give them a condescending pat of approval, such as 
we would give a negro who always "knows his place," 
holds his hat in his hand when he addresses a white 
person, says "sir" and "ma'am," and shows no sign of 
resenting ill- justice or mistreatment. The Japanese, 
on the contrary, stands up for his rights; he is not 
at all humble or submissive or in the least awed by 
threats, and if an irate American attempts to "put 
him in his place," as he is accustomed to do with a 
Chinese or a Fihpino or a negro, he is more likely 
than not to find himself on the way to jail in the 
grasp of a small but extremely efficient and unsym- 
pathetic policeman. 

I asked an American whom I met in Yokohama 
if he had enjoyed his stay in Japan. 

"Not particularly," he answered. "I don't care 
for the Japs ; give me the Chinese every time." 

"Why?" I queried. 

He pondered my question for a moment. 



12 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

"I'll sum it up for you like this," he replied. "The 
Chinese treat you as a superior; the Japanese treat 
you as an equal." 

Until Commodore Perry opened Japan to western 
civilization and commerce, we held all Mongolians in 
contempt, being pleased to consider them as inferior 
peoples. But in the case of the Japanese this con- 
tempt changed in a few years to a patronizing con- 
descension, such as a grown person might have for 
a precocious and amusing child. We congratulated 
ourselves on having discovered in the Japanese a 
sort of infant prodigy ; we took in them a proprietary 
interest. We watched their rapid rise in the world 
with almost paternal gratification. And the Japanese 
flattered our self-esteem by their open admiration 
and imitation of our methods. 

I think that our national antipathy for the Japanese 
had its beginnings in their victory over the Russians. 
Up to that time we had looked on the Japanese as 
a brilliant and ambitious little people whom we had 
brought to the notice of the world and for whose 
amazing progress we were largely responsible. But 
when Japan administered a trouncing to the Russians, 
who are, after all, fellow-Caucasians, American sen- 
timent performed a volte-face almost overnight. We 
were as pro-Russian at Portsmouth as we had been 
pro-Japanese at Port Arthur. This sudden change in 
our attitude toward them has always mystified the 



JAPAN 13 

Japanese. Yet there is really nothing mystifying 
about it. We were merely answering the call of the 
blood. As long as we believed Japan to be the under 
dog, we were for her ; but when she became the upper 
dog, the old racial prejudice flamed up anew. A 
yellow people had humbled and humiliated a Cau- 
casian people, and we, as Caucasians, resented it. 
It was a blow to our pride of race. (A somewhat 
similar manifestation of racial prejudice was observ- 
able throughout the United States when the negro 
pugilist. Jack Johnson, defeated Jim Jeffries. ) That 
a yellow race could defeat a white race had never 
occurred to us, and we were correspondingly startled 
and alarmed. We abruptly ceased to think of the 
Japanese as a third-rate nation of polite, well-mean- 
ing, and harmless little men, drinkers of tea and 
wearers of kimonos. They became the Yellow Peril. 
Though the Japanese are of Asia, they cannot be 
treated as we are accustomed to treat other Asiatics. 
To attempt to belittle or patronize a nation that can 
put into the field three million fighting men and send 
to sea a battle fleet not greatly inferior to our own, 
would be as ridiculous as it would be short-sighted. 
Japan is a striking example to other Oriental races of 
the power of the Big Stick. She has never been 
subjugated by the foreigner. In spite of, rather than 
by the aid of, the white man, she has become one of 
the Great Powers, and at Versailles helped to shape 
the destinies of millions of Europeans. Yet when she 



14 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

claims racial equality we deny and resent it. Our 
refusal to treat the Japanese as equals, while at the 
same time showing a wholesome respect for the armed 
might that is behind them, reminds me of an Amer- 
ican reserve heutenant, a Southerner, on duty at a 
cantonment where there was a division of colored 
troops, who refused to salute a negro captain. He 
was called before the commanding officer, who gave 
him his choice between saluting the negro or being 
tried by court-martial. 

"I suppose I '11 have to salute the uniform," he 
muttered rebelliously, "but damned if I '11 salute the 
nigger inside it." 

HI 

I have already said that racial prejudice is at the 
bottom, the very bottom, of the friction between the 
two countries. Immediately overlying it is our fear 
of Japanese economic competition. For, if you will 
look into it, you will find that there has hardly ever 
been a conflict between nations into which some 
economic question has not entered as the final and 
essential factor. Never was this truer than in the 
American-Japanese situation. In considering the 
question of Japanese economic competition, it would 
seem that Americans fail to realize the extent to 
which Japanese business is aided,, controlled, and 
directed by the Japanese Government. 

The Japanese business man does not have to fight 



JAPAN 15 

unaided for foreign trade, as does the American. 
He has his government solidly behind him. Govern- 
ment-subsidized steamship lines and government- 
owned railways give him every possible advantage. 
The government's ambassadors, ministers, consuls, 
and commercial agents lend him encouragement and 
assistance. Allied industries support him. Virtu- 
ally all of the industries of the empire belong to trade 
guilds, which, like their European prototypes of the 
Middle Ages, are licensed by the government and are 
granted special privileges and immunities. In short, 
the Japanese business man is really a part of a 
gigantic trust, which differs from our American 
trusts only in that it is a government instead of a 
corporation. 

The Japanese long since realized that their ma- 
terial resources were greatly inferior to those of other 
first-class powers, and that the realization of their 
national ambitions required great wealth as much as 
a great mihtary establishment. They could not 
obtain this wealth by agriculture, for not only is 
Japan a comparatively small country territorially, 
but not more than fifteen per cent, of its area is 
capable of profitable cultivation. Moreover, there 
are already three hundred and fifty inhabitants to 
the square mile, and the birth-rate, hke the cost of 
Hving, is steadily rising. 

In Japan, as in the United States, to quote the 
words of a popular song: "The rich get richer and 



16 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

the poor get children." Now the Japanese were 
fully conscious of the handicap under which they were 
struggling in their race for wealth and power. So 
they set about overcoming it by embarking upon a 
carefully planned campaign of industrial develop- 
ment and commercial expansion which, in its inten- 
sity and thoroughness, has no parallel save that which 
was waged by Germany prior to August, 1914. Per- 
ceiving that they could never hope to overtake their 
Western rivals by wading cautiously into the sea of 
commercial competition, they resolved to risk every- 
thing by plunging boldly into deep water. They 
risked everything — and they won. By utilizing to 
the utmost what they already possessed, by taxing 
themselves until they staggered under the burden, 
by borrowing from the Occidental nations until their 
credit was stretched to the breaking-point, by speed- 
ing up the industrial machine until it was running 
twenty-four hours a day and three hundred and sixty- 
five days a year, by hard work, rigid economy, and 
self-denial, they succeeded in raising the huge sums 
which they required for mills, factories, and power- 
plants, for railway and steamship hues, for docking 
and terminal facilities, for postal and telegraph sys- 
tems. To-day, as a result of their courage and amaz- 
ing energy, the Japanese are running neck-and-neck 
with the United States and England in the race for 
the commerce of the world. They are making matches 
at a price that has virtually closed the Asiatic markets 



JAPAN 17 

to their Western competitors. They can deliver 
sashes, doors, blinds, and woodenware in North and 
South America at so low a rate that our manufac- 
turers would be driven out of business were it not 
for the protection afforded by our tariif wall. Though 
the Japanese do not themselves grow large quantities 
of cotton, they purchase the poorer and cheaper 
grades of the raw material in India and Egypt, trans- 
port it by their government-subsidized steamers and 
government-owned railways to their government- 
assisted factories, where, as the result of low wages 
and long hours, it is spun into piece goods which are 
sold to the cotton-clad millions of the East at prices 
with which American and British manufacturers are 
finding profitable competition almost out of the ques- 
tion. 

In competing with Western nations for the trade of 
the Orient, Japan possesses several important advan- 
tages. Government control of transportation lines 
by land and sea, government subsidies and bounties, 
and, in the trade with Asia, short hauls, are vital 
factors. The Japanese are so near to the great, rich 
markets of the Asian mainland that they can fill 
orders from Eastern Siberia, Korea, Manchuria, and 
Eastern China before the American manufacturer 
could get his shipment aboard a vessel at San Fran- 
cisco or Seattle. Furthermore, it is a cardinal prin- 
ciple of Japanese commercial policy to constantly 
keep in touch with the changing tastes and fashions 



18 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

of their Asiatic customers and to give them exactly 
what they want, which American manufacturers, all 
too frequently, do not. It must also be kept in mind 
that the Japanese Government and the Japanese man- 
ufacturers work hand in hand in furthering their 
commercial ambitions. Several of the greatest indus- 
trial enterprises in Japan, as I shall show further 
on, are controlled directly or indirectly by the govern- 
ment, large blocks of stock being held by members 
of the imperial family and by high officials. Strug- 
gling enterprises are frequently assisted by govern- 
ment bounties, and money at low rates of interest is 
often loaned for the same purpose. The principal 
Japanese steamship lines are so liberally subsidized 
by the government, and pay their seamen such low 
wages, that it is impossible for American-owned ves- 
sels, with highly-paid white crews and no govern- 
ment subsidies, to compete with them. As a result, 
the carrying trade of the Pacific is in Japanese hands. 
Thus it will be seen that, in their struggle for the 
trade of the Orient, American firms are not merely 
competing against Japanese firms. In effect, they 
are competing against the Japanese Government. 

And here is another point which should be empha- 
sized. American business men bear no such relation 
to their government as Japanese business men bear 
to theirs. Unhke Japan and Germany, in both of 
which countries foreign politics and foreign com- 
merce are closely interrelated, the United States does 



JAPAN 19 

not utilize the commercial ventures of its citizens to 
advance its foreign policies. Indeed, beyond giving 
half-hearted and usually inefficient protection in case 
of menace to their lives and property, the government 
at Washington does not concern itself at all with the 
business interests of its citizens oversea. When an 
American firm makes a foreign loan, or establishes 
a bank, or leases harbor or shore rights, or secures a 
contract, or obtains a concession, every one knows that 
the venture is without political significance, present 
or prospective. On the other hand, every move made 
by Japanese commercial interests abroad has some 
degree of political significance. If a Japanese firm 
leases harbor or shore rights in a foreign country, 
that lease is to all intents and purposes a government 
one, and may be controlled as such whenever the 
government chooses. Hence the alarm which was 
felt by well-informed Americans when it was reported 
that a Japanese business house was negotiating with 
the Mexican Government for the lease of a harbor 
on Magdalena Bay — for they recognized how simple 
a matter it would be for the Japanese Government to 
take over that lease and transform an innocent com- 
mercial harbor into a coaling station or naval base. 
Again, the Japanese Government has not hesitated 
to utilize the concessions held by its subjects in China 
to coerce the government at Peking. In short, every 
Japanese merchant who establishes himself abroad 
automatically becomes a listening-post for the Tokio 



20 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

Foreign Office, a point dfcdppui for Japanese aggres- 
sion, a picket eternally on the alert to serve the polit- 
ical interests of Nippon.^ 

No one can travel in the Far East without being 
struck by the bitterness and unanimity with which 
foreign business men, American and European alike, 
condemn Japanese business methods. Whether jus- 
tified or not, this feeling of disapproval and distrust 
has done more than anything else, save only the racial 
prejudice to which I have already referred, to em- 
bitter the relations between the United States and 
Japan. Therefore, dehcate as the question is, I pur- 
pose to discuss it with the utmost frankness. To 
ignore it in order to avoid offending Japanese suscep- 
tibilities would be tantamount to permitting a wound 
to fester because opening it would cause the patient 
pain. 

I will give the foreigner's side first. Here is the 
way an American importer, whom I met in Yoko- 
hama, expressed himself: 

"The Japanese business man has two great faults 
— conceit and deceit. In his business relations he is 
overbearing and underdeveloped. In order to make 
an immediate profit, he will lose a life-long and valu- 
able customer. Though it frequently happens that 

*A high Japanese official, to whom I submitted the proofs of this 
chapter for correction, professes to see a parallel to this situation in the 
Siems-Carey and American International Corporation railway contracts in 
China. In this I do not agree with him. E,. A. P. 



JAPAN 21 

he does not understand what the foreign buyer is 
talking about, his vanity will not permit him to admit 
his ignorance; instead, he will accept the order and 
then fill it unsatisfactorily. He will accept an order 
for anything, whether he can deliver it or not. He 
would accept an order for the Brooklyn Bridge, f .o.b. 
next Thursday, Kioto — hoping that something might 
turn up in the meantime that would enable him to 
fill it." 

An Englishman doing business in Japan said to 
me: 

"The Japanese has his nerve only on a rising 
market. As soon as the market shows signs of falling, 
he hesitates at nothing to get from under. When 
the silk market rose, hundreds of Japanese firms de- 
faulted on orders which they had already accepted 
from foreign importers, as they would have lost 
money at the old prices. When, on the other hand, 
there was a slump in the money market in the spring 
of 1920, the customs warehouses at Yokohama and 
Kobe were piled high with goods ordered from 
abroad for which the consignees refused to accept 
delivery." 

Another American importer, who has made semi- 
annual buying trips to Japan for more than a quarter 
of a century and who has a genuine liking for the 
Japanese, told me, with regret in his tone, that, of all 
the firms with whom he did business, those upon 



22 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

whom he could rely implicitly to send him goods of 
the same quality as their samples could be numbered 
on the fingers of one hand. 

I cite these complaints because they are typical of 
many I heard while I was in the Far East. That does 
not mean, however, that I consider them entirely 
justified, for I do not. Their very bitterness reveals 
the prejudice which gave birth to some of them and 
added exaggeration to others. But I concluded that 
where there was so much smoke there must be some 
flame, so I made it my business to question as many 
foreign business men as I could, as well as commer- 
cial attaches and consuls, both European and Amer- 
ican. From their replies I gathered that a trademark, 
copyright, or patent does not, as a rule, prevent a Jap- 
anese manufacturer from appropriating any idea of 
which he can make use; though I am glad to say 
that recent legislation, combined with an awakening 
national conscience, has done much to protect the 
foreigner from such abuses. For example, "Bentley's 
Code," which sells in the United States for thirty 
dollars and which is fully protected by copyright, has 
been copied by a Japanese publishing house, which 
sells it for ten dollars. A famous brand of safety 
razor, which sells in the United States for five dollars, 
is copied by the Japanese in everything save quality, 
and is marketed by them, under the originator's name 
and in a facsimile of the original package, for one- 
fifth of the price charged for the genuine article. 



JAPAN 23 

The same is true of widely advertised brands of soap, 
tooth paste, talcum powder, perfume, and other toilet 
preparations. An imitation of Pond's Extract, for 
instance, is sold in a bottle exactly like that contain- 
ing the American-made article except that a faint 
hne, scarcely discernible, turns the P into an R. This 
infringement was fought in the Japanese courts, how- 
ever, which decided in favor of the plaintiff. A par- 
ticularly flagrant example of these questionable com- 
mercial methods came to light in the spring of 1920 
at Tientsin, when the American consul-general 
made an official protest against the action of the Jap- 
anese chamber of commerce of that city, which had 
sent broadcast thousands of hand-bills intimating that 
a certain American trading company, which had be- 
come a dangerous competitor of Japanese firms, was 
on the verge of insolvency — a statement which was en- 
tirely without foundation in fact. The Japanese 
chamber of commerce refused to retract its allega- 
tions and the American house was nearly ruined. 

These are only a few examples of those Japanese 
business practises to which foreigners object. I heard 
similar stories from almost every American business 
man whom I met in the East. Indeed, I cannot 
recall having talked with a single foreigner (with a 
solitary exception) doing business with the Japanese, 
who did not have some complaint to make of their 
practise of imitating patented or copyrighted articles, 
of substituting inferior goods, of giving short weight, 



24 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

and of not keeping their engagements when it suited 
them to break them. That the Japanese Government 
recognizes and deplores the methods of certain Jap- 
anese business men is shown by the following quota- 
tion from the report of the Japanese consul-general 
at Bombay, as quoted in the Japan Weekly Chron- 
icle: 

Although I am confident that the credit of Japanese mer- 
chants in general is not so low as is represented by a small 
section of the foreign merchants, yet it is to be deplored 
as an indisputable fact that there is one sort of short- 
sighted dishonest Japanese merchants who are always eager 
to obtain a temporary profit just before their eyes, who 
resort to extremely detestable and crafty expedients. They 
will send samples of goods far superior in quality in com- 
parison with the price quoted, and when they receive orders 
according to these samples, they never manufacture goods 
equal to the samples in quality, but manufacture and ship 
inferior goods suitable to the price. 

This commercial unscrupulousness has worked 
great injury to the friendly relations of Japan and 
the United States. It has engendered in American 
business men a distrust and a dislike which it will take 
years to eradicate. This was strikingly illustrated one 
evening in the smoking-room of a trans-Pacific liner. 
While chatting with a group of returning American 
business men I casually mentioned the case of a fel- 
low-countryman who had recently brought American 
commercial methods into disrepute by giving "exclu- 
sive" agencies for certain widely advertised articles to 
several firms in the same city. Instead of deploring 



JAPAN 25 

such trickery, my auditors applauded it almost to a 
man. "Fine!" they exclaimed. "Good work! Glad 
to hear of a Yankee who can heat the Japs at their 
own game!" They were as jubilant over that dis- 
honest American's success in turning the tables on 
the Japanese as was the American public when it 
learned that we had perfected a poison gas more hor- 
rible in its effects than any in use by the Germans. 

I heard other criticisms, too, which, if they are jus- 
tified, would indicate that the Japanese Government 
itself sometimes aids Japanese business by methods 
which are not generally considered fair. These in- 
cluded charges that the government-owned railways 
give rebates to Japanese shippers; that Japanese 
freight is expedited by railway and steamship lines 
while that shipped by foreign firms is subjected to 
ruinous delay; that, owing to the South Manchuria 
Railway being under Japanese control, Japanese mer- 
chants shipping their goods into Manchuria have fre- 
quently been able to evade the customs, whereas goods 
of foreign origin are subject to full duties; that im- 
portant commercial messages sent over Japanese 
cables have been revealed to the senders' Japanese 
competitors, the messages in some cases not having 
been delivered to the addressees at all.^ 

Foreign business men in the East often assert that 

^ I am informed by an official of the Japan^e Foreign Office that 
Japanese business men in the United States are making precisely the 
same complaints in regard to the handling of messages by American 
cable companies. E. A. P, 



26 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

the amazing commercial success of the Japanese is 
mainly due to such methods. On the contrary, it 
has been achieved in spite of them. Japan's com- 
mercial rise is due, as I have already shown, to the 
courage, energy, industry, and self-denial of the Jap- 
anese nation. It should be added, however, that the 
tremendous commercial boom which reached its zenith 
in 1919-20 was largely the result of artificial and tem- 
porary conditions. At a period when the rest of the 
world was engaged in a life-and-death struggle, 
Japan, far from the battlefields, was free to engage 
in commerce, and she possessed, moreover, certain 
articles which other nations must have and for which 
they had to pay any price she demanded. Nor could 
the Japanese merchant, any more than the American, 
realize that this was a purely temporary condition and 
could not continue indefinitely. 

Now, mind you, I do not wish to be understood 
as suggesting that commercial trickery is character- 
istic of Japanese business men as a class. There are 
business houses in Japan — ^many of them — which meet 
their obligations as punctiliously, which fill their com- 
mitments as scrupulously, which maintain as high a 
standard of business honor, as the most reputable 
firms in the United States. But, unfortunately, there 
are many — altogether too many — which do not. It 
seems a thousand pities that the honest and far- 
sighted business men of Japan and the Japanese trade 
guilds and chambers of commerce do not take ener- 



JAPAN 27 

getic steps to stamp out commercial trickery, if for 
no other reason than the effect it would have on for- 
eign opinion. The series of conferences held in Tokio 
in 1920 between a self-appointed delegation of Amer- 
ican bankers and business men and a number of rep- 
resentative Japanese offered a splendid opportunity 
for a candid discussion of this delicate and irritating 
question. If the Americans, instead of confining 
themselves to hands-across-the-sea sentiments and 
platitudinous expressions of friendship, had had the 
courage to tell the high-minded Japanese who were 
their hosts how objectionable such methods are to 
Americans and what incalculable harm they are caus- 
ing to Japanese- American relations, it would have 
worked wonders in promoting a better understanding 
between the two peoples. 

Despite what I have felt compelled to say about 
the methods of a section of the Japanese commercial 
class, I am convinced that the Japanese people, as a 
race, are honest. Though pocket-picking is said to be 
on the increase in Japan, burglary and highway rob- 
bery are extremely rare, while the murders, shooting 
affrays, daylight robberies, and hold-ups which have 
become commonplaces in American cities are virtually 
unknown. I should feel as safe at midnight in the 
meanest street of a Japanese city as I should on Com- 
monwealth Avenue in Boston — ^considerably safer, 
indeed, than I should on certain New York thorough- 
fares after nightfall. I asked an American woman 



28 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

who has lived for many years in Japan if she consid- 
ered the Japanese honest. 

"I never think of locking the doors or windows of 
my house in Yokohama," she replied, "yet I have 
never had anything stolen. But when I was staying 
last winter at a fashionable hotel in New York, I was 
robbed of money, jewels, and clothing the very night 
of my arrival." 

Nor could I discover any substantiation of the 
oft-repeated assertion that fiduciary positions in Jap- 
anese banks are held by Chinese. Certainly this is 
not true of Japanese-controlled institutions, such as 
the Yokohama Specie Bank, the Bank of Japan, and 
the Dai Ichi Ginko, as I can attest from personal 
observation. It is true that Chinese are employed in 
considerable numbers in minor positions of trust in 
the Japanese branches of foreign banks, such as the 
Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation and 
the Bank of India, Australia & New Zealand, but 
these have generally come over from China with the 
banks' European officials, their employment denoting 
no lack of faith in Japanese integrity. Yet such 
stories, spread broadcast by superficial and usually 
prejudiced observers, have helped to give Americans 
a totally erroneous impression of the Japanese. 

My personal opinion is that the commercial trickery 
practised in Japan is not due to any inherent dis- 
honesty in the Japanese character, but rather to the 
contempt in which merchants were held in that 



JAPAN 29 

country for centuries. Until recent years the position 
of the merchant in Japan was analogous to that of 
the Jew in the Europe of the Middle Ages. He was 
at the bottom of the social scale. At the top was the 
noble ; then came the samurai, or professional fighting 
man ; followed in turn by the farmer and the artisan ; 
and last of all came the merchant. The farmer and 
the artisan have always held a higher place than the 
merchant because they are producers, whereas the 
merchant was looked upon as a huckster, a haggler, a 
bargainer, who made his living by his wits. As a 
result, business was in the hands of a low class of 
Japanese. Trading was regarded as beneath the dig- 
nity of a gentleman. Furthermore, the Japanese 
merchant has had less than seventy years in which to 
learn the rules of the business game as it is played 
in the West. Coming from a despised and down- 
trodden class, is it any wonder that in that brief 
span he has not wholly eradicated his ancient methods, 
that he has not yet acquired all our Western virtues 
and ideals ? The Jew has been under the influence of 
the West for two thousand years, yet his business 
ethics are not always beyond reproach. Let us, then, 
be charitable in judging the Japanese. 

Nor should we forget that barely a score of years 
have passed since American business houses com- 
monly practised the very methods of which we com- 
plain so bitterly when they are practised by the Jap- 
anese. It is within the memory of most of us when 



30 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

rebates, discriminatory freight rates, infringements 
of copyrights and patents, substitution, adulteration, 
evasion of customs, and the ruthless crushing of com- 
petition by unfair methods were so common in the 
United States as scarcely to provoke comment. If 
you question this, read the early history of the Stand- 
ard Oil Company, of the sugar, beef, and steel trusts, 
or of certain of our great railway systems. The truth 
of the matter is that the Japanese to-day are about 
where we were two decades ago. Not having entered 
the commercial contest until long after we did, it is 
not surprising that their commercial ethics are still 
several laps behind our own. Business ethics in the 
island empire are at present undergoing the same 
rehabilitation and purification that were forced upon 
American business by an outraged public opinion. 
And, according to most unprejudiced observers, 
that transformation is being effected with remarkable 
rapidity. So why not stop throwing stones and give 
the Japanese a chance? Rome was not built in a day. 

There is yet another explanation of the question- 
able business usages practised by certain Japanese 
merchants. And that explanation, curiously enough, 
points straight at ourselves. It remained for the late 
Premier Hara — ^himself a business man and the first 
commoner to hold the position of prime minister — 
to bring that embarrassing fact to my attention. 

"You should not forget that my people learned 
what they know of modern business methods from 



JAPAN 31 

your own countrymen," he reminded me. "It was 
your Commodore Perry who, in the face of Japanese 
opposition, opened Japan to American commerce. It 
was from the American traders who followed him 
that the Japanese received their first lessons in the 
business ethics of the West. The early American 
traders, in the methods they practised, provided the 
Japanese with anything but a laudable example. If 
they could cheat a Japanese, they considered it highly 
creditable; they took advantage of his ignorance by 
selling him inferior goods and by driving sharp bar- 
gains; they constantly bamboozled him. Is it any 
wonder, then, that the Japanese merchant, patterning 
his methods on those pursued by the Americans, 
adopted American commercial trickery along with 
other things? But mind you," he added, "I am not 
condoning commercial trickery among my people. I 
am only explaining it." 

IV 

In the preceding pages I have endeavored to show 
how important are the racial and economic elements 
in their effect on American-Japanese relations. We 
now come to a consideration of the political factor. In 
order to estimate this factor at its true importance, it 
is necessary to envisage the trying political situation 
in which Japan finds herself. 

Since their victory over the Russians in 1904! the 
Japanese have seen themselves gradually encircled 



32 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

by a ring of unsympathetic and suspicious, if not 
openly hostile peoples. Overshadowing the island 
empire on the north is the great bulk of Bolshevist 
Russia, still smarting from the memories of the Yalu 
River and Port Arthur, and bitterly resentful of 
Japan's military occupation of Eastern Siberia and 
Northern Sakhalin. Every patriotic Russian feels 
that Japan, in occupying these territories, has taken 
unfair advantage of Russia's temporary helplessness ; 
he listens cynically to the protestations of the Jap- 
anese Government that it has occupied them merely 
in order to keep at arm's length the menace of Bol- 
shevism and that it will withdraw its troops as soon 
as this menace disappears. 

To the west, the Koreans, though now officially 
Japanese subjects, are in a state of incipient revolt, 
to which they have been driven by the excesses of the 
Japanese military and the harshness of Japanese 
rule. To the southeast, China, huge and inert, loathes 
and fears her island neighbor, their common hatred 
of Japan being the one tie which binds the diverse 
elements of the repubhc together. As a protest 
against Japanese aggression in Manchuria and Shan- 
tung the Chinese have instituted a boycott of Japanese 
goods, which is gravely affecting Japanese commerce 
throughout the Farther East. In regions as remote 
from the seat of the controversy as the Celebes and 
Borneo, as Siam, the Straits Settlements, and Java, I 
found Japanese merchants being forced out of busi- 



JAPAN 33 

ness because the Chinese living in those countries re- 
fused to trade with them or to purchase goods of any 
one else who traded with them. In Formosa, taken 
from China as spoils of war in 1895, the head-hunting 
savages who inhabit the mountains of the interior 
remain unsubjugated, only the Guard Line, a series 
of armed blockhouses connected by electrically 
charged entanglements, standing between the Jap- 
anese settlers and massacre. 

In the Philippines there is always present the bogey 
of Japanese imperialism, both the Filipinos and the 
American residents being convinced that Japan is 
looking forward to the day when she can add those 
rich and tempting islands to her possessions. In far- 
distant Australia and New Zealand the Japanese are 
distrusted and disliked, stringent legislative measures 
having recently been adopted to prevent further Jap- 
anese immigration into those commonwealths. On 
the Pacific coast of the United States and Canada a 
violent anti-Japanese agitation is in full swing, new 
and severer legislation being constantly directed 
against them. In Hawaii, where the Japanese out- 
number all the other elements of the population put 
together, the Americans and Kanakas view the situa- 
tion with acute apprehension.^ 

Influenced by the frankly hostile attitude of her 
great overseas dominions, and fearful of its effect on 
her relations with the United States, England eagerly 

* There were 109,274 Japanese in Hawaii in 1920. 



34 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

seized the opportunity, afforded by America's offer 
at the Washington Conference, of substituting the 
Four-Power Treaty for the Anglo-Japanese Al- 
liance. Holland, having ever in the front of her 
mind her great, rich colonies in the East Indies, looks 
with a suspicious eye on Japan's steady territorial 
expansion and on the suggestive augmentation of her 
naval and military establishments. France, con- 
stantly seeking new markets, views with thinly veiled 
apprehension Japan's attempts to attain political and 
commercial domination in China. Nor is Germany 
likely either to forget or forgive the conquest of 
Tsingtau and her former insular possessions in the 
Pacific. Not only has Japan aroused the suspicions 
of the white races, but she has antagonized and 
alienated the yellow races who are her nearest 
neighbors. As a result she found herself, at the open- 
ing of the Washington Conference, as completely 
isolated, as universally distrusted, as was Germany 
at the beginning of 1914. 

The Japanese have been hurt and bewildered by 
this world-wide suspicion. Yet, instead of attempting 
to win back the good-will of the West, which was 
theirs until little more than a decade ago, by giving 
convincing proofs of their peaceable intentions; in- 
stead of making an effort to regain the confidence of 
half a billion Chinese and Russians by a prompt with- 
drawal from their soil and abstention from further 
interference in their affairs, the Japanese made 



JAPAN 35 

the psychological blunder of adopting an attitude of 
stubbornness and defiance. They rephed to criticisms 
by embarking on a military program which, had it 
been adhered to, would have made them the greatest 
military power on earth. Their naval plans called 
for a neck-and-neck shipbuilding race with the United 
States; they had steadily strengthened their occupa- 
tional forces on the mainland of Asia, instead of show- 
ing a disposition to withdraw them. They seemed 
utterly incapable of realizing that the world has, in 
its millions of soldier dead and its billions of war 
debt, the very best of reasons for being suspicious of 
imperialistic nations ; that it is in no mood to tolerate 
anything savoring of militarism. The peoples of the 
world had hoped that those dread specters, militarism 
and imperiahsm, had passed with the Hohenzollerns, 
never to return. Is it any wonder, then, that they 
viewed with distrust a nation which, judged by its 
actions, seemed bent on recalling them? This distrust 
of Japanese intentions was largely dispelled, however, 
by Japan's concurrence in the Hughes program for 
the limitation of naval armaments. 



The key to Japanese militarism and imperialism is 
to be foimd in the dual government that exists in 
Japan. It is another case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. 
Hyde, but the victim of this dual personality, instead 



36 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

of being an individual, is a nation. There is the con- 
stitutional government, functioning in the open, 
normal, aboveboard, conciliatory, presumably sincere. 
But behind it, in the shadows, lurks a cloaked and 
mysterious government, furtive, untrustworthy, pre- 
dacious, wholly evil. Unfortunately for Japan and 
for the world, this invisible government is the more 
powerful of the two. Times without number the Dr. 
Jekyll government has adopted some altruistic course 
of action only to have the Mr. Hyde government step 
in and, by an exertion of its mysterious power, set it 
all at naught. It is a most curious and complicated 
situation, without parallel in any other country in 
the world. Let me see if I can explain it, for its clear 
and complete comprehension is absolutely essential 
to an intelligent understanding of those tortuous and 
seemingly contradictory policies pursued by Japan in 
her relations with foreign nations, which have so per- 
plexed and alarmed the world. 

To begin with, you must understand that Japan is 
nominally governed by a constitutional government, 
consisting of a cabinet, a legislative assembly known as 
the Diet, and a civil bureaucracy composed of the 
chiefs of the various administrative departments and 
their subordinates. This is the government with which 
the world is familiar. But there is also an invisible 
government, an unseen empire, composed of a clique 
of officers holding high rank in the army and navy, 
certain statesmen with military sympathies and 



JAPAN 37 

affiliations, and a few representatives of big business 
and finance. The constitutional government functions 
through the cabinet, and, in its relations with foreign 
nations, through the foreign office, being represented 
abroad by regularly accredited ambassadors, ministers, 
and consuls. The invisible government functions 
through the general staff, its activities abroad being 
carried on by a great number of secret agents, whose 
identities can only be guessed at, and by the military 
attaches attached to the various embassies and lega- 
tions, who, though ostensibly under the orders of their 
respective ambassadors and ministers are, in reality, 
answerable only to the general staff. Japanese 
policy, particularly in foreign affairs, is invariably 
shaped by this unseen government, whose wishes are 
generally translated into action by the constitutional 
government, on which it is able to exert powerful pres- 
sure. The two governments, whose interests are by 
no means always opposed, are of necessity more or less 
closely correlated, like interlocking directorates. For 
example, many of the permanent civil officials of the 
constitutional government, such as bureau chiefs and 
the members of their staffs, are drawn from the mili- 
taristic clique, which is identical with the unseen gov- 
ernment, with which, as might be expected, they work 
in harmony. Thus it will be seen that, whereas the 
militarists who compose the invisible government form 
a bloc bound together by their mutual interests and 
ambitions and working always in unison, the constitu- 



38 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

tional government is weakened by the militarists who 
have insinuated themselves into its organization and 
who, in the event of a conflict between the constitu- 
tional government and the unseen government, in- 
variably lend their power and influence to the latter. 

At the head of the Japanese State stands the em- 
peror, generally spoken of by foreigners as the 
Mikado ("Honorable Gate," a title comparable with 
Sublime Porte) , and by his own subjects as Tenno, or 
Heavenly King. According to Japanese history, 
which reckons from 660 B.C., when Jimmu ascended 
the throne, the present Emperor, Yoshihito, is the 
one hundred and twenty-second ruler of his line.^ But 
as written records do not carry us back further than 
712 A.D., the reigns and periods of the early monarchs 
are more or less apocryphal. Still the fact remains 
that Japan has been ruled by an unbroken dynasty 
ever since the dawn of her history, in which respect 
she is unique among the nations of the world. 

The whole scheme of government in Japan is based 
on the recognition of the divine origin of the emperor. 
According to popular belief, he is directly descended 
from the Deity. By the terms of the constitution he 
combines in himself the rights of sovereignty and 
exercises the whole of the executive powers, with the 

advice and assistance of the ten ministers who compose 

* In December, 1921, owing to the mental condition of the emperor. 
Crown Prince Hlrohito was proclaimed Regent of Japan. 



JAPAN 39 

his cabinet. Supplementing the cabinet is the Privy 
Council, a purely advisory body of thirty-nine mem- 
bers (including the ten cabinet ministers), which is 
only consulted upon important matters and policies. 
The emperor is the supreme commander of the army 
and the navy. He alone can declare war, make peace, 
and conclude treaties. He convokes the Imperial 
Diet, opens, closes, and prorogues it, and dissolves 
the House of Representatives. Should a national 
crisis or an urgent necessity arise when the Diet is 
not in session, the emperor may issue imperial edicts 
which take the place of laws, though such edicts must 
be submitted to the Diet at its next session, when, if 
not approved, they become invalid. Thus it will be 
seen that, though Japan is, in theory, a constitutional 
monarchy, the emperor is vested with virtually abso- 
lute power. But it should be added that his abso- 
lutism has never degenerated into despotism or 
tyranny. In fact, he is more or less a figurehead so 
far as the administration of the government is con- 
cerned, dwelling in Olympian aloofness and ruling 
by proxy. He is regarded by his people not as a 
temporal ruler, but rather as a patriarch, a demigod, 
a direct representative of Heaven. In order to 
strengthen their own position, the militarists who sur- 
round the emperor have assiduously encouraged the 
people in this delusion. They have fostered among 
the masses the belief that the emperor can do no 
wrong, that no sacrifice is too great for a son or 



40 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

daughter of Nippon to make for him, that to so 
much as question his Heaven-bestowed authority is 
the apotheosis of sacrilege. From the bhnd obedience 
to the sovereign thus created, which involves a curious 
mixture of religion and patriotism difficult for the 
Western mind to comprehend, the militarists derive 
their power. 

I have said that, according to the terms of the con- 
stitution, the emperor is supposed to exercise the ex- 
ecutive power with the advice and assistance of his 
cabinet. But between the cabinet and the crown 
stand a rapidly diminishing body of men who are 
known as the Genro, or Elder Statesmen. This 
sacred and secret inner circle, as at present consti- 
tuted, has only two members: Marquis Saionji and 
Marquis Matsukata. This duumvirate of old men is 
the mentor and mouthpiece of divinity itself; they, 
with Field Marshal Uyehara, the chief of the general 
staff, constitute the occult power which hedges the 
imperial throne ; they are the real rulers of Japan. 

Now let me make it clear that the Elder Statesmen 
are neither appointed nor elected. They have no legal 
status. They are not recognized by the Japanese con- 
stitution or in the laws of Japan. You will find no 
mention of them in the Japan "Year Book" or other 
official publications. Indeed, there is no such office 
as that of Elder Statesman per se. Though they 
control the government, form cabinets, and shape the 
national policy, they are not officials, save as they are 



JAPAN 41 

members of the Privy Council and the House of Peers. 
They are merely a little group of veteran counselors, 
representatives of the great clans, who have grown 
by mere survival and the confidence reposed in them 
by the emperor to be the most powerful influence in 
Japan. 

Imagine, if you can, a pair of American statesmen 
— Elihu Root and Henry Cabot Lodge, let us say 
— attaining such unlimited political power that the 
President of the United States was their mouth- 
piece and the heads of the executive departments 
of the government their obedient instruments, and re- 
taining such power, irrespective of which political 
party was in the saddle, through administration 
after administration. That is by no means an 
exact parallel, but it is the best that I can offer of a 
situation that is without parallel in any other coun- 
try. 

When the shogunate was abolished in 1868 and the 
unification of the country under the youthful Em- 
peror Mutsuhito begun, the task of reconstruction 
was undertaken by the dcdmyos, or feudal nobles. 
They became the officials of the new government and 
directed the transformation of Japan into a modern 
state. The present Genro, then young men, played 
minor parts in the restoration. But, as the years 
passed, they gradually ascended the political ladder 
and, as the older men died or retired from office, they 
automatically succeeded them, themselves eventually 



42 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

becoming ministers of the crown. More years slipped 
by, and they, now old themselves, in turn gave way 
to younger men. But, in relinquishing office, they 
did not relinquish their power. Autocrats by 
training, brought up in an atmosphere of mili- 
tarism, contemptuously believing with Hegel 
that "the people is that portion of the state which 
does not know what it wills," they viewed with deep 
misgivings the democratic tendencies which were 
gradually manifesting themselves in the new Japan. 
They were sincere in their convictions that the safety 
of the empire was being jeopardized by the growing 
spirit of democracy among certain elements of the 
population. They felt that they alone stood between 
the nation and ruin. Conservatives and reactionaries 
to the very marrow, they might have said with the 
French king, ''Apres moi le deluge." So, instead of 
retiring from public affairs and contenting them- 
selves with an existence of innocuous desuetude, like 
superannuated European statesmen, they merely 
shifted their position, withdrawing from the fierce 
glare that beats upon the front of the throne to the 
shadows at its rear. From there, themselves unseen, 
they can see all that happens ; they are always at the 
elbow of the sovereign, who, because he trusts them 
implicitly, willingly issues as commands the sugges- 
tions which they whisper in his ear. 

The prerogatives of the crown, as I have already 
shown, are very great, and they are exercised as the 



JAPAN 43 

Elder Statesmen "advise." Ministers rise and fall, 
but the Genro abide, independent of cabinet and diet 
alike and beyond the reach of either. There you find 
the explanation of why the Japanese cabinet does not 
wield the power of European ministries and why 
changes of cabinet seldom result in changes of national 
policy. For, though parties come and go, the Genro 
remain forever — and the emperor does as they tell 
him to do. No further explanation is needed, surely, 
of why Japan, whose government is under the control 
of a little group of self-appointed and reactiona,ry 
dictators, is, though greatly advanced for an Asiatic 
power, still far behind those Western nations whose 
governments are in the hands of individuals and 
bodies chosen by the people. 

So closely associated with the Elder Statesmen 
that he might almost be considered one of them is 
the chief of the general staff, who, everything con- 
sidered, is probably the most powerful single indi- 
vidual in the empire to-day. His title is really a 
misnomer, for, whereas in other countries the chief 
of the general staff is the executive head of the army 
alone, in Japan the chief of the general staff exercises 
as much influence in naval, colonial, and foreign affairs 
as he does in those of the army. He is the actual head 
of all the armed forces of the empire on land and sea. 
He occupies much the same position in the invisible 
government that the premier does in the constitutional 
government. The only superior authority recognized 



44 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

by the premier is the emperor; the only superior 
authority recognized by the chief of the general staff 
is the Genro. And, as the emperor accepts without 
question the decisions of the Genro, it follows that 
the chief of the general staff occupies a position of 
altogether extraordinary power. I have heard it 
asserted, indeed, that he can override the decisions 
of the premier and even force him and his cabinet 
to resign, but this is probably an exaggeration. 

That the chief of staff might be able, with the 
concurrence of the Elder Statesmen, to wreck a min- 
istry is due to the curious constitution of the Japanese 
cabinet. Of the ten members of the cabinet, two — the 
minister of war, who must always be an army officer 
of a grade not lower than major-general, and the min- 
ister of marine, who must always be a naval officer of 
a grade not lower than rear-admiral — are not answer- 
able for their actions to the premier and frequently 
act independently of him, being responsible only to 
the emperor, which, translated, means the Elder 
Statesmen and the chief of the general staff. As a re- 
sult of this anomalous situation, these ministers, tak- 
ing their orders from the chief of the general staff, 
who has the support of the Genro, who in turn have 
the support of the emperor, can, and frequently do, 
defy the premier and block legislation. Due to the 
constitutional provision that these posts can be held 
only by military and naval men of high rank, their 
incumbents always represent the military party and 



JAPAN 45 

can be depended upon to consistently oppose any pol- 
icy of an anti-militaristic nature. 

As the members of the cabinet are appointed by 
the emperor, instead of, as in most European 
countries, by the premier, it is self-evident that the 
ministers of war and marine are always persona 
gratissima to the Elder Statesmen and the chief of 
the general staff. The remaining members of the 
cabinet, including the premier, though they may not 
always be persona grata, or even entirely acceptable, 
to that august and all-powerful quartet, are rarely 
openly hostile to it, for the very good reason, as the 
Jiji Shimpo, the Times of Japan, puts it, that "In 
this country the work of cabinet-making is at present 
in the hands of the Elder Statesmen." It is scarcely 
probable, then, that the Genro, whose advice the 
sovereign invariably accepts in such matters, would 
give their approval to the appointment of a minister 
who was likely to antagonize them. This is not say- 
ing, however, that all of the present members of the 
cabinet meet with the unqualified approval of the 
Genro, or that they represent the latter's views. Cer- 
tain of them, indeed, are supposed to be in opposition 
to the principles for which the Genro stand. But the 
Genro are fully awake to the growing power of pub- 
lic opinion and are far too shrewd to alienate it by 
refusing to sanction the appointment as minister of 
a man possessed of a powerful popular backing, even 
if his views do not concur with their own. But this 



46 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

much can be said : If a cabinet minister dared to defy 
the Elder Statesmen or the chief of the general staff 
on some really vital question, if he consistently ob- 
structed their policies, he would almost certainly be 
forced to resign. For, in a contest between the cab- 
inet and the militarists, the latter always win. 

The procedure followed by the military party in 
wrecking a cabinet is as simple as it is effective. If 
it does not approve of the cabinet's policy, the Genro 
and the chief of the general staff send for the min- 
ister of war and tell him to resign. The premier, who, 
as I have already explained, is limited by law in his 
selection of a successor to the retiring minister, offers 
the portfolio in turn to one after another of the small 
group of army officers who, by virtue of their rank, 
are eligible to accept it under the provisions of the 
constitution. Having been coached in advance by the 
chief of the general staff, each of them politely de- 
clines. Thereupon the prime minister is compelled 
to admit his inability to complete his cabinet. In 
Japan such an admission is tantamount to withdrawal 
from public life, whereupon the emperor offers the 
vacant premiership to some statesman more willing 
to accept the dictation of the militarists. 

The correspondent of the New York Herald, Mr. 
Louis Seibold, has quoted "one of the most progres- 
sive of Japanese leaders" as saying, in this connec- 
tion: 



JAPAN 47 

The general staff of Japan is quite as powerful as was the 
general staff that induced the German kaiser to make war 
upon the rest of the world. The Japanese General Staff 
controls the mental processes of the emperor to an even 
greater extent than was true in Germany in 1914. It, in 
turn, controls the cabinet. The minister of war, instead of 
being the master of the general staff, is its servant. It 
says to him, "You provide us with the recruits, war material, 
and supplies, and we will decide what to do with all these 
things. It is not for you to say." That is precisely what 
the general staff, with the consent of the emperor, told 
Premier Hara's cabinet a few weeks ago, when the wisdom 
of deferring to universal sentiment regarding the military 
activities of the government in Shantung and Siberia was 
broached. In other words, the general staff told the gov- 
ernment to mind its own business, which it did not consider 
to be of a military character. 

It might be supposed that, when the militarists thus 
attempt to dictate to the constitutional government, 
the Diet would promptly bring them to terms by re- 
fusing to vote the appropriations necessary for the 
maintenance of the military establishment. And that 
is exactly what would happen in most Western 
countries. But not so in Japan. For the militarists 
long since foresaw and guarded against just such a 
contingency by inserting in the constitution an 
article providing that budgets can be automatically 
reenacted from year to year. Article 71 of the Jap- 
anese Constitution reads as follows: "When the Im- 
perial Diet has not voted on the Budget, or when 
the Budget has not been brought into actual existence, 
the Government shall carry out the Budget for the 
preceding year." 



48 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

Moreover, as the militarists have direct access to the 
emperor and to the funds of the imperial household, 
which is the richest in the world, they never lack for 
money. Indeed, when all is said and done, it is they 
who hold the national purse-strings. It will be seen, 
therefore, that the late progressive premier, Mr. 
Hara, was in a trying and none too strong position. 
The military party and the forces of reaction, as typi- 
fied by the Genro and the chief of the general staff, 
had too much power for him. Nothing is more indica- 
tive of the increasing strength of democracy in Japan 
than the fact that Premier Hara, himself a progres- 
sive and a man of the people, remained in oifice as 
long as he did. 

The effect on foreign opinion of the constant 
usurpation of power by the invisible government is 
clearly recognized by the liberal element in Japan, as 
witness a recent editorial in the Yomi-Yuri Shimhun: 

It is regrettable that the declarations of the Japanese 
Government are often not taken seriously. The Powers 
regard Japan as a country that does n't mean what it says. 
The most important reasons for this will be found in the 
actions of the militarists, whose utterances are the cause 
of the Government's attitude being misunderstood abroad. 
Unless the militarist evil is stamped out, a hundred declara- 
tions disavowing territorial ambitions will not be able to 
convince the Powers. 

The repeated failures to keep her agreements, 
which have cost Japan the confidence of other nations. 




FUJIYAMA, THE SACRED MOUNTAIN, AND FUJI RIVER 





s^m^^^s-^m^^wmmA:- 




SUNSET IN SHIBA PARK, TOKYO 




A RELIGIOUS PROCESSION IN KIOTO 



JAPAN 49 

are not due to hypocrisy or insincerity on the part 
of the Japanese Government. They are due to the 
fact that the government is constantly flouted and 
overridden by the mihtary party. Japan's failure to 
abide by her promise to evacuate Siberia upon the 
withdrawal of the American and European troops 
provides a case in point. This commitment was made 
to the United States and her European associates by 
the constitutional government of Japan as repre- 
sented by Premier Hara. But the militarists wished 
Japan to remain in Siberia for reasons of their own, 
so, at the very time the premier was notifying the 
Western Powers of Japan's intention to withdraw 
her Siberian garrisons, the general staff, unknown to 
the premier, was rushing troops north to reenforce 
them. 

The militarists placed the constitutional govern- 
ment in an almost equally embarrassing situation in 
Korea. Premier Hara, stirred to action by the ex- 
cesses of the Japanese soldiery, issued orders that the 
military forces in Korea should be subordinated to 
the civil authorities, but the military men, secure in 
a knowledge of their power, virtually refused to obey 
these orders, doing everything that they dared to 
obstruct the newly appointed governor-general. 
Baron Saito, in carrying out the promised reforms. 

It is the mihtary party, again, that applies the 
screws to the distracted government of China, com- 



50 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

pelling it to grant to Japanese firms concessions of 
one kind and another which give Japan virtually com- 
plete control in the regions where the concessions 
are operative. It is the military party that buys up 
the Chinese generals and politicians, hatches the plots, 
and directs the propaganda that produce the sporadic 
revolutions which are tearing China to pieces. 

This continued exercise of irresponsible authority 
by the military party is the most impdrtant and the 
most dangerous factor in the whole Japanese Ques- 
tion. Until the invisible government is suppressed 
in favor of the constitutional government, there can 
be no real hope of a satisfactoiy understanding be- 
tween the United States and Japan. A democracy 
like ours cannot do business with a government that 
is masked ; we must know with whom we are dealing. 
The high-minded and progressive statesmen who com- 
posed the Japanese Delegation to the Washington 
Conference were unquestionably sincere when they 
disavowed for their country any militaristic ambi- 
tions. But it remains to be seen whether the mili- 
tarists will support them. For we can no more trust 
the militarists of Tokio than we could trust the mili- 
tarists of Potsdam. We do not speak the same lan- 
guage. Our standards of honor are not the same. If 
Japan sincerely desires the friendship of the United 
States, then she must give valid assurances that the 
promises of her government will henceforward be 
binding on her military, as well as her civil agents. 



JAPAN 51 

Let me resume, now, my explanation of the struc- 
ture and mechanism of the Japanese Government. 
The Diet, Hke the American Congress, consists of 
two branches— the House of Peers and the House 
of Representatives. The House of Peers, which, ac- 
cording to the late Marquis Ito, is intended to "repre- 
sent the higher grades of society," is composed of the 
members of the imperial family, the nobility, and one 
hundred and twenty-four imperial nominees, the lat- 
ter including forty-five representatives of the largest 
taxpayers. These last, who are mostly rich merchants 
and wealthy landowners, are elected for seven years, 
one from each prefecture, by the fifteen male inhabit- 
ants thereof who pay the greatest amount of taxes. 
The balance of the imperial nominees are for the most 
part government ofiicials appointed by the emperor 
for life upon the recommendation of the cabinet. As 
might be expected, they are strongly bureaucratic in 
their sympathies. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
moneyed element of the empire is well represented, 
the House of Peers is not a plutocratic body. Neither 
is it a stronghold of the landed interests, like the 
British House of Lords. Essentially aristocratic, it 
represents the interests of the clans, the nobles, the 
bureaucrats, and the military classes. 

The members of the House of Representatives, 
which is the lower branch of the Diet, are elected by 
the people. By the provisions of the election law, as 
revised in March, 1919, every male Japanese who is 



52 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

not less than twenty-five years of age and who pays 
a direct annual tax of not less than three yen ($1.50) 
— ^instead of fifteen yen ($7.50), as formerly — can 
vote for the members of the lower house, who are 
known as deputies. This law increased the number 
of possible voters from about half a million to nearly 
three million ; that is, about one out of every nineteen 
Japanese now possesses voting privileges, instead of 
one in every eighty-seven, as was the case under the 
old statute. The astonishing increase in the number 
of qualified voters effected by a reduction of six dol- 
lars in the tax franchise provides a striking illustra- 
tion of the dire poverty of the Japanese masses. Even 
more astonishing, from a Western viewpoint, is the 
utter indifference to the franchise displayed by both 
the voting and the non-voting population. The truth 
of the matter is that the great mass of the people are 
too heavily burdened with taxation, too busily en- 
gaged in the struggle for the bare necessities of life, 
to concern themselves with politics. This explains 
why there is almost no public opinion, as we under- 
stand the term, in Japan. Though, under the pro- 
visions of the constitution, the Japanese taxpayer has 
a voice in the government of the country, he is seldom 
able to raise it above a whisper. 

Again, those of the masses who do take some in- 
terest in politics are, generally speaking, quite sat- 
isfied with the present situation. Looking back, they 
compare the Japan of feudal days with the present 



JAPAN 53 

powerful empire, and, marking the progress that has 
been made, they are quite content to let it continue. 
As a result of this indifference on the part of the 
masses, there is no check on the ruling classes, which, 
believing with von Rochow in "the limited intel- 
ligence of subjects," find no difficulty in keeping the 
reins of power in their own hands. It must be ad- 
mitted, however, that in the main they have ruled in 
the national interest. Everything considered, the 
present organization of the state is a great advance 
from the feudalism which it supplanted, and it gives 
Japan a remarkably efficient and flexible administra- 
tion. But, without taking an unpardonable liberty 
with the truth, present-day Japan cannot be called 
democratic. It is a government for rather than hy 
or of the people. 

VI 

I have now sketched in outline the double-barreled 
administration which rules Japan, where two distinct 
governments — one constitutional and aboveboard, the 
other unconstitutional and unseen — exist and func- 
tion side by side. I have also made it reasonably 
clear, I hope, that the constitutional government, 
were it free from outside influences, would be demo- 
cratic in its tendencies and pacific in its policies, 
whereas the invisible government is autocratic, mili- 
taristic, aggressive, and reactionary. Broadly speak- 



54 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

ing, one stands for the ballot, the other for the bullet. 

It might be supposed that the former, having the 
constitution behind it, would be in the strongest posi- 
tion. But such is not the case. For the unseen gov- 
ernment has behind it the Elder Statesmen, who, 
through their influence with the emperor, are able to 
override the constitution. Furthermore, as its moving 
spirits include the highest officers of the army and 
the navy, it has complete control of the armed forces 
of the empire ; it has the allegiance of the great cap- 
tains of industry and finance; and it represents the 
clans. The position of the unseen government is still 
further buttressed by the attitude of the proletariate, 
in whose eyes it stands for military glory and natural 
expansion — a bulwark against foreign aggression. 

This invisible government is not a modern develop- 
ment ; it goes back into Japanese history for centuries. 
It dates from the days of the shogunate, when the 
emperor was the titular ruler and the shogun the 
actual ruler of Japan. The power of the shogun 
was made possible by the support of the great military 
clans, which were the forerunners of the military party 
of to-day. When it is remembered that the 
Elder Statesmen, all the officers of the army and 
navy, and most of the higher officials of the govern- 
ment are members of these clans, it is not difficult to 
understand the ascendancy of the militarists in Japa- 
nese politics. For example, nearly all the members of 
the military clique belong to the Chosu clan, while 



JAPAN 55 

the navy clique is recruited from the Satsuma clan. 
Thus it comes about that the policy of the govern- 
ment in fundamental matters is dictated and con- 
trolled by men who represent the warrior clans, 
abetted by a few men who, though not themselves 
clansmen, are in sympathy with the policies for which 
they stand. 

Though close observers have detected of late a 
noticeable change in the attitude of the younger gen- 
eration of Japanese toward the emperor, who is no 
longer venerated as he was by past generations ; and 
though, with the spread of education and the conse- 
quent growth of democratic ideas, the anti-militarist 
party is steadily — though slowly — ^gaining ground, to 
talk glibly, as certain American visitors to Japan have 
done, of Japanese militarism being on its last legs 
is to betray profound ignorance of actual conditions. 
Were the system of unseen government merely transi- 
tory, it might easily yield before the pressure of edu- 
cation and enlightened public opinion. But it is not 
transitory. Its tentacles sink deep into the traditions 
of the nation. It would be strange, indeed, if the mili- 
tarists were not dominant in Japan, for the whole 
history of the country is punctuated by wars, feuds, 
and rebellions;^ it climbed to its present position as 
one of the great powers on the guns of its battleships 

* It should be noted, however, that for two hundred and fifty years, 
under the Tokugawa shogunate, Japan had no wars, civil or foreign. 
Perhaps no other nation of virile character can boast a period of such 
length entirely free from strife. E. A. P. 



56 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

and the bayonets of its soldiers; it has always been 
ruled by military men. Though in the last fifty years 
the Japanese have reared an imposing governmental 
structure, apparently built on constitutional lines, you 
will find upon examination that it is founded on the 
bed-rock of stern and uncompromising militarism.^ 
In order that you may have a clear comprehension 
of how this came about, let us take a hasty survey 
of the events leading up to the Restoration of 1868. 
Until that time, you will understand, the politico-so- 
cial conditions prevailing in Japan approximated 
those which characterized the Europe of the Middle 
Ages. The emperor was a spiritual rather than a tem- 
poral ruler, a sort of high priest, an object of awe and 
veneration, dwelling in his great moated castle in 
Kioto in magnificent seclusion. In certain respects 
his position might be likened to that now occupied 
by the Pope at Rome. So far as the practical work 
of government was concerned, he was only an abstrac- 
tion. The real power was in the hands of a military 
dictator, known as the shogun. This title originated 
in 1192, when the Emperor Takahira made one of 
his generals, Yorimoto, a S ei-i-tai-shogun (literally, 
"barbarian-subjugating generalissimo"), or comman- 
der-in-chief, and this office became stereotyped in the 
persons of successive great military leaders until, in 
1603, lyeyasu Tokugawa became shogun and estab- 

* A high Japanese official to whom I submitted the proofs of this 
chapter writes, "Instead, we think it was Western militarism that made 
us militaristic." E. A, P. 



JAPAN 57 

lished the dynasty which bore his name. For more 
than two centuries and a half the shogunate remained 
in the Tokugawa family, the shoguns, though jn 
theory subordinate to the emperor, exercising the de 
facto sovereignty in Japan. 

Ruling under and with the permission of the sho- 
gun, who held them in subjection with an iron hand, 
were the daimyos, the chieftains of the various clans. 
In the course of centuries these great feudal chief- 
tains had become as powerful as the Norman barons 
who crossed with William the Conqueror into Eng- 
land. They lived in fortress-like castles in medieval 
arrogance and splendor; they maintained miniature 
armies; they made and executed their own laws; 
they exercised the rights of high justice, the middle, 
and the low ; they grew rich from the labors of an op- 
pressed and exploited peasantry; in their own terri- 
tories their will was supreme. Each of these feudal 
lords collected the revenues of his fief and used them 
as he saw fit, subject to the sole condition that he 
maintain a body of troops proportionate to his hold- 
ings and income. The daimyos recruited these mili- 
tary contingents from the samurai, or fighting men, 
of their respective clans. These retainers occupied a 
position in the social scale somewhat below that of 
the knights of the Middle Ages but considerably above 
that of the men-at-arms. Armed, armored, and 
highly trained for war, each of them was entitled to 
wear two swords as a symbol of his station, very 



58 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

much as the European knights were distinguished by 
their golden spurs. Enjoying innumerable preroga- 
tives, they formed a class by themselves, shaping their 
conduct in strict accordance with the rules laid down 
in the celebrated code of Bushido — the Ways of the 
Fighting Man. But for the common people there was 
no Bushido. They had no rights, save the right to 
work. They were looked upon merely as machines 
for grinding out wealth for the support of the daimyos 
and the pay of the samurai. 

Japan has made such amazing progress along mod- 
em lines in the last fifty years that it is difficult for 
us to realize that these medieval conditions persisted 
until well past the middle of the last century. Gen- 
eral William Verbeck, the son of that Dr. Guido 
Verbeck who was the most celebrated of the early 
American missionaries sent to Japan, has told me 
that one of the clearest recollections of his boyhood 
is of a force of samurai, clad in full armor, encamp- 
ing on his father's grounds. At about the time that 
the revolver and the repeating rifle were making their 
appearance in the West, the arms and armor of the 
Middle Ages were still in use by the fighting men of 
Nippon. 

When the nineteenth century reached the halfway 
mark, therefore, the actual government of the coun- 
try was still in the hands of a Tokugawa shogun. 
Satsuma and Chosu were the two most powerful 
clans. But the arrival in 1853 of Commodore Perry's 



JAPAN 59 

squadron with the demand that Japan open her gates 
to foreign commerce; followed in 1861 by the bom- 
bardment of the Satsuma capital, Kagoshima, by 
British men-o'war; and by the destruction in 1864 of 
the Chosu ships and fortifications at Shimonoseki by 
a fleet of British, French, Dutch, and American war- 
ships, brought the great feudal chieftains to an abrupt 
realization of the nation's weakness and of the sho- 
gunate's inability to successfully resist foreign aggres- 
sion. This unwelcome discovery was accompanied 
by a recognition of the fact that Japan's only hope of 
preserving her independence lay in the immediate 
abolition of the shogunate and the reorganization of 
the government under the emperor along modern 
lines. The hopelessness of the situation, if the dual 
form of government was persisted in, was made clear 
in a memorial addressed to Yoshinobu, the last of 
the shoguns, who, on October 14, 1867, gave con- 
vincing proof of his patriotism by placing his resigna- 
tion in the hands of his sovereign, the fifteen-year-old 
Mutsuhito. The young emperor was brought from 
Kioto, the old capital, to Tokio, the new capital, where 
the daimyos laid their privileges and possessions at 
his feet. This act of self-renunciation has been de- 
servedly applauded by the historians, yet, as a matter 
of fact, it was a sacrifice of form rather than of sub- 
stance. For the youthful sovereign, thus suddenly 
restored to power, must have ministers, so, in the very 
nature of things, the higher offices of the new govern- 



60 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

ment were allotted to the former daimyos — now be- 
come, under the new order of things, princes, mar- 
quises, counts, and barons — while the less important 
posts went to their samurai retainers. It could hardly 
have been otherwise, for at that period the daimyos 
and samurai — that is, the nobles and the fighting 
men — ^were the only classes possessed of the necessary 
education and training. Thus the leaders of the 
great clans stepped almost automatically into posi- 
tions of leadership and power in the reorganized state, 
while their retainers, now become subordinate officials 
in the new government, continued to give allegiance 
to their former chieftains and to obey their commands, 
just as they did in the old feudal days. But, though 
the ex-daimyos and the former samurai laid aside 
their armor with the dawning of the new era, though 
they exchanged the pike for the pen, they remained 
at heart military men. For a leopard cannot change 
its spots. Thus was born the military autocracy which 
rules Japan to-day, and the no less mihtary bureau- 
cracy which supports it. 

With such training and traditions, it was not sur- 
prising that the Japanese of the ruling classes early 
became convinced that the development of a powerful 
nation depended upon the development and main- 
tenance of a powerful army and navy. It would 
have been more surprising had they thought otherwise. 
Now the militarists realized that they would have no 
difficulty in carrying out their policies as long as they 



JAPAN 61 

could keep the reins of power in their hands, but 
they also realized that, should the people ever get 
control of the government, their schemes for building 
up a great military machine were certain to meet with 
serious opposition. For the people could be counted 
on to grudge the vast sums which the militarists 
deemed necessary for an adequate system of national 
defense. Let it be clear, however, that in working 
for the upbuilding of a huge military machine, the 
militarists were working for what they firmly believed 
to be the highest interests of the nation. For, what- 
ever else may be said of them, it must be admitted that 
they are genuinely patriotic men, even if their ideas 
of what constitutes patriotism are not the same as 
ours. They are perfectly sincere in their conviction 
that Japan's safety from foreign aggression requires 
the maintenance of military and naval establishments 
second to none. Compared with this question, all 
other questions, to their way of thinking, are of 
negligible importance. In order to make certain, 
therefore, that, in the event of the people gaining 
control of the government, the nation should always 
have adequate means of defense, they devised a 
scheme which has proved as effective as it is ingenious. 
At the direction of the Elder Statesmen (whose 
doyen. Prince Yamagata, was regarded as the head of 
the military party) the emperor issued a decree pro- 
viding that laws relating to certain phases of the na- 
tional defense need not be submitted to the Diet, but 



62 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

could become operative upon receiving the approval 
of the crown. It was likewise provided that regard- 
ing such matters the members of the Diet did not even 
have the right to ask questions. This freed the min- 
ister of war and the minister of marine from the neces- 
sity of consulting the premier on military and naval 
matters. Instead, they can carry such matters 
straight to the emperor, who, guided by the Elder 
Statesmen, is certain to do as the militarists advise. 
In other words, the militarists in some degree enjoy 
a law-making power of their own. Not only that, 
but they are able to carry out their plans in absolute 
secrecy, for under such a system not even the premier 
himself knows what is going on within the inner circle. 
The militarists guard their secrets from those mem- 
bers of their own government who are not in sympathy 
with them as zealously as they guard them from the 
agents of foreign nations. So fearful are they, in- 
deed, lest their plans should become known to the 
constitutional government that, when the military 
leaders are received in audience by the emperor, the 
precaution is taken of substituting a military aide-de- 
camp for the civilian court chamberlain who is cus- 
tomarily in attendance on the sovereign. Thus the 
premier, the cabinet, the Diet, and the people are 
kept in profound ignorance of many important de- 
cisions. For example, it is asserted that the Chinese 
Government has frequently made representations to 
the foreign office in Tokio relative to the actions of 



JAPAN 63 

Japanese officials in China, only to find that the 
foreign office was totally ignorant of the whole mat- 
ter, 

"The result," as Professor Yoshino, one of the fore- 
most political students and publicists in Japan, has 
said, "is that the cabinet and people of Japan are 
held responsible for things done in China, Korea, and 
other places of which the government and the people 
have not the slightest knowledge. Because of this 
dual government, Japan has been greatly misunder- 
stood by America and other foreign nations, as the 
military, being the most powerful, is the Japan known 
to the outside world." 

Let me see, now, if I can give you a concrete illus- 
tration of how this system of dual government works 
in practice. Let us suppose that the American Gov- 
ernment favors the withdrawal of Japanese troops 
from Siberia, leaving the Russians to work out their 
own salvation. A note to this effect is despatched by 
the secretary of state to the American Ambassador at 
Tokio, who in turn transmits it to the premier, as the 
responsible head of the Japanese Government. The 
premier calls a meeting of his cabinet and submits the 
note for consideration. If the cabinet agrees to the 
American suggestion the premier directs the minister 
of war to issue the necessary orders to the chief of 
the general staff for the withdrawal of the troops in 
Siberia, at the same time instructing the Japanese 
Ambassador in Washington to inform the secretary of 



64 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

state that the suggestion of the American Government 
has been approved and that the troops will be with- 
drawn forthwith. Had Japan a normal system of 
government, like that of England or France or Italy, 
that would end the matter. But Japan has not a 
normal system of government. For the invisible gov- 
ernment now steps in. The minister of war, who, as 
I have already explained, is always a general, loses 
no time in informing the Elder Statesmen and the 
chief of the general staff of the cabinet's action. 
They disapprove of what the cabinet has done. Being 
militarists, they believe that the best interests of Japan 
will be served by strengthening, rather than relaxing, 
her grip on Siberia. So the emperor, acting on the 
advice of the Elder Statesmen, sunmions the minister 
of war and directs him to despatch an additional di- 
vision of troops to Siberia forthwith. The minister 
of war so directs the chief of the general staff, who 
promptly issues the necessary orders, and the deed is 
done. All this is done, mind you, without consulting 
the premier and without his knowledge. The first 
intimation that he has that his policy has been reversed 
by the militarists, and his promise to the American 
Government broken, is when he reads the news de- 
spatches from Washington announcing that the Japa- 
nese Government has gone back on its word and that, 
instead of withdrawing its garrisons in Siberia, as it 
had solemnly agreed to do, it is secretly pouring more 
troops into that region. It is obvious that the con- 



JAPAN 65 

stitutional government of Japan cannot justly be 
blamed for this sort of thing. The men who make the 
promises are not those who break them. It is not Dr. 
Jekyll who is insincere ; it is Mr. Hyde. 

To again quote Professor Yoshino: 

"Of course this scheme of a double government is 
not constitutional. It ought to be easily broken up. 
As a matter of fact, in the government itself, cer- 
tainly in the present cabinet and among the people, 
the opposition to this scheme is very strong and very 
pronounced. But it is very difficult to be undertaken. 
The stronger the opposition among the people be- 
comes, the stronger the opposition of the militarists. 
Their whole attitude is that whatever is best for Japan 
is the thing that is to be done, no matter who or what 
is sacrificed. Their aim is to make Japan powerful 
and to insure her influence as a nation. If that means 
that China or Korea is to be sacrificed, it is unavoid- 
able." 



VII 

Though the Japanese are gradually becoming 
more democratic in their tendencies; though the 
number of young men, mostly students, who realize 
where the militarists are leading the nation, is steadily 
increasing; let us not delude ourselves into thinking 
that the disappearance of militarism is a probability 
of the near future. That it will eventually dis- 



66 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

appear is as certain as that dawn follows the dark. 
But it may take a generation or even longer. At 
present the militarists are too strongly intrenched for 
a public opinion as feeble as that of Japan to dis- 
turb, much less dislodge them. Certainly there seems 
to me httle justification for the prediction recently 
made by Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, American Min- 
ister to China, that Japan will be a democracy in 
twenty years. That the militarists will remain in the 
ascendant during the lifetime of the Elder States- 
men there can be but little doubt. Not until the grip 
of those aged dictators has been relaxed by death is 
the power of the militarists likely to wane. Nor is 
there any certainty that it will wane then; for in re- 
cent years their power has been immensely strength- 
ened by a force far mightier and more sinister than 
that of the Genro. I refer to the force of organized 
capital, of big business. As Mr. Nathaniel Peffer, 
one of the shrewdest and best-informed students of 
Far Eastern politics has pointed out, it is big business 
which has reinforced and is keeping in power the un- 
seen government — the military party. 

Only recently has modern industrial Japan awak- 
ened to a realization of its own strength. But it is now 
fully alive to the almost unlimited power, the endless 
possibilities, to be realized by the great business inter- 
ests of the country joining hands with the militarists 
and working with them for a common purpose. One 
who could trace through the political structure of the 



JAPAN 67 

empire the ramifications of the great industrial and 
trading companies would be in a position to analyze 
Japanese politics, domestic and foreign. Those ac- 
tions of the Japanese Government which are usually- 
attributed by foreigners to the ambitions of the mili- 
tarists are in reality quite as frequently due to the 
predacity of the capitalists. Here you have the key 
to the annexation of Korea, to Japanese aggression in 
Manchuria and Siberia, to the unreasonable demands 
made on China, to the opposition to the restoration of 
Shantung. All of those regions are immensely rich 
in natural resources, they offer unlimited opportuni- 
ties for profitable exploitation. And it is Japanese 
big business which proposes to do the exploiting. So, 
in order that it may obtain control of the territories 
which it proposes to exploit, it has joined forces with 
the land-hungry militarists. It is the most sinister 
combination of high politics and big business that the 
world has ever seen. 

Consider for a moment what similar but far less 
powerful combinations have achieved in other parts 
of the world. It was the influence of the Rhodes-Beit- 
Barnato interests, remember, that was chiefly instru- 
mental in inducing England to embark on her con- 
quest of the Transvaal, thereby bringing under the 
unchallenged control of British capitalists the dia- 
mond mines of Kimberley and the gold-diggings of 
the Rand. It was the interests of the great West- 
phalian firm of Mannesmann Brothers in the mines 



68 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

of Morocco which led to Germany's naval demonstra- 
tion off Agadir. It was the greed of Muscovite cap- 
italists for further concessions in Manchuria and 
Korea which precipitated the war between Russia and 
Japan. It was the avarice of French capitalists, far 
more than the persecutions of French missionaries, 
which led to the tricolor being raised over Indo-China. 
It was American sugar interests which brought about 
the annexation of Hawaii and American oil interests 
which have helped to shape our policy toward Mexico. 
And in the ambition of Japanese big business to con- 
trol and exploit the mines, forests, grain-fields, rail- 
ways, and markets of Eastern Asia is found the ex- 
planation of Japan's policy of expansion by military 
force. The expansion may be commercial or terri- 
torial, and the force may be used or merely threat- 
ened, but the policy, and the influences which shape 
the policy, are the same. 

Dominating Japanese business and finance are a 
few great corporations — Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Suzuki, 
Okura, Sumimoto, Kuhara, Takata, Furukawa. So 
much larger than the others that they are in a class by 
themselves are the Mitsui and Mitsubishi companies, 
owned respectively by the Mitsui and Iwasaki families. 
Indeed, it is a common saying in Japan that no one 
knows where Mitsui ends and the government begins. 
Their tentacles sink deep into every phase of national 
life — commercial, industrial, financial, political. They 
own banks, railways, steamship lines, mills, factories, 



JAPAN 69 

dockyards, mines, forests, fisheries, plantations, insur- 
ance companies, trading corporations. They and the 
leaders of the unseen government — the military party 
— are as closely bound together by political, financial, 
and family ties as were the Chicago packers before the 
dissolution of their monopoly. They are as inter- 
twined by marriage, mutual interests, and interlock- 
ing directorates as President Wilson boasted that the 
Treaty of Versailles was intertwined with the Cove- 
nant of the League of Nations. 

Each of these great companies, according to Mr. 
Peffer, has its political, financial, or family alliance 
with the leaders of the unseen government. For ex- 
ample, the late Marquis Okuma, one of the Elder 
Statesmen, was related by marriage to the Iwasakis, 
who, as I have said, own the great house of Mutsu- 
bishi. Another of the Elder Statesmen, Marquis 
Matsukata, is adviser to one of these industrial dy- 
nasties, while his third son, Kojiro Matsukata, is the 
head of the great Kawasaki shipbuilding plant at 
Kobe, where more than one dreadnought has been 
built for the government. The late Marquis Inoue, 
who held in turn the portfolios of agriculture and 
commerce, home affairs, finance, and foreign affairs, 
was closely connected with the house of Mitsui. The 
late Field-Marshal Terauchi, at one time Prime Min- 
ister of Japan and one of the .foremost leaders of the 
military party, was equally close to Okura, a relation- 
ship which explains that house's success in obtaining 



70 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

highly profitable army contracts as well as important 
concessions in the Japanese spheres of influence on the 
mainland. Baron Shibusawa, whom they call "the 
Rockefeller of Japan," has long been on the most in- 
timate terms with Prince Tokugawa, the President of 
the House of Peers, having gone to Europe as the 
companion of the prince and his brother as long ago 
as 1868. And so with the highest mihtary men of the 
empire and the leading statesmen. Each has his rela- 
tionship to some great financial house, to some captain 
of industry. Big business uses these affiliations with 
the militarists to obtain for their schemes the support 
and cooperation of the unseen government. And by 
the same token the unseen government is enormously 
strengthened by the support of big business. It is like 
a crossruff at bridge. 



VIII 

"Japan's future lies oversea." In those four 
words is found the policy of the military-finan- 
cial combination which rules the empire. The an- 
nexation of Formosa and Korea and Sakhalin, the 
occupation of Manchuria and Siberia and Shantung, 
are not, as the world supposes, examples of hap- 
hazard land-grabbing. They are phases of a vast 
and carefully-laid scheme which has as its ultimate 
object the control of all Eastern Asia. Ostensibly to 
solve the problems with which she has been confronted 



JAPAN 71 

by her amazing increase in population and produc- 
tion, but in reality to gratify the greed of big business 
and the restless ambitions of the military party, Japan 
has embarked on a campaign of world-expansion and 
exploitation. Convinced that she requires a colonial 
empire in her business, she has set out to build one up 
as she would build a dry-dock or a bridge. The fact 
that she had nothing, or next to nothing, to start with 
did not discourage her at all. Having once made up 
her mind that the realization of her political, economic, 
and territorial ambitions necessitated the acquirement 
of overseas dominions, she has permitted nothing to 
stand in the way of her getting them. Land and 
trade-hunger and the lust for power have whipped 
her on. So, wherever a pretext can be provided for 
raising a flag-staff, whether on an ice-floe in the Arctic 
or on an atoll in the Pacific, there the Rising Sun 
flag'shall flutter ; wherever trade is to be found, there 
Yokohama cargo-boats shall drop their anchors, there 
Osaka engines shall thunder over Kobe rails, there 
Kioto silks and Nagoya cottons shall be sold by mer- 
chants speaking the language of Dai Nippon. It is a 
scheme astounding in its very vastness, as methodi- 
cally planned and as systematically executed as an 
American presidential campaign ; and already, thanks 
to Japanese audacity, aggressiveness, and persever- 
ance, backed by Japanese banks, battleships, and bay- 
onets, it is much nearer realization than the world 
dreams. 



72 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

In China, Siberia, and the Philippines, in Cali- 
fornia, Canada, and Mexico, in the East Indies, Aus- 
tralia, and New Zealand, on three continents and on 
all the islands of the Eastern seas, Japanese mer- 
chants and money are working twenty-four hours a 
day to build up that overseas empire of which the 
financiers and the militarists dream. The activities of 
these outposts of trade are as varied as trade itself. 
Their voices are heard in every Eastern market-place; 
their footsteps resound in every avenue of Oriental 
endeavor. Their mines, in Siberia and Manchuria and 
China rival the cave of Al-ed-Din. The railways that 
converge on Peking from the north and east, the great" 
trunk-line across Manchuria, and the eastern section 
of the trans-Siberian system are already in their 
hands. They work tea plantations in China, coffee 
plantations in Java, rubber plantations in Malaya, 
cocoanut plantations in Borneo, hemp plantations in 
the Philippines, spice plantations in the Celebes, sugar 
plantations in Hawaii, prune orchards in California, 
apple orchards in Oregon, dairy-farms in British Co- 
lumbia, coal-mines in Manchuria, gold-mines in 
Korea, forests in Siberia, fisheries in Kamchatka. 
Their argosies, flying the house-flags of the Toyo 
Kisen Kaisha, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, the Osaka 
Shosen Kaisha, and a score of other lines, bear Japa- 
nese goods to Japanese traders on every seaboard of 
the world, while Japanese warships are constantly 
aprowl up and down the Eastern seas, ready to pro^ 



JAPAN 73 

tect the interests thus created by the menace of their 
guns. 

In regions where Japanese banks have been estab- 
lished and Japanese traders have settled, it is seldom 
difficult for Japan to find an excuse for aggression. 
It may be that a Japanese settler is mistreated or a 
Japanese consul insulted, or that a Japanese bank has 
difficulty in collecting its loans. So the slim cables 
flash the complaint to Tokyo ; there are secret consul- 
tations between the leaders of the military party and 
the chieftains of big business ; a spokesman of the un- 
seen government rises in the Diet to announce that in 
Siberia or China Japanese interests have been imper- 
illed or Japanese dignity affronted; the newspapers 
controlled by big business inflame the national resent- 
ment ; the aged trio behind the throne, speaking in the 
name of the emperor, issue the necessary orders to the 
ministers of war and marine and to the chief of the 
general staff ; and before the offending country awak- 
ens to a realization of what is happening, Japanese 
transports are at anchor in her harbors and Japanese 
troops are disembarking on her shores. Before they 
are withdrawn, — if they are withdrawn, — Japan 
usually succeeds in extorting a concession to build a 
railway, or to work a coal-mine, or to contract a loan, 
or a ninety-nine year lease of a harbor which can be 
converted into a naval base, or the cession of a more 
or less valuable strip of territory — and so the work 
of building up an overseas empire goes steadily on. 



74 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

This territorial expansion (or rather, the spirit of 
aggression which has inspired it and the readiness to 
advance it by the employment of military force) has 
naturally aroused foreign suspicion of Japan's inten- 
tions. In less than a quarter of a century we have 
seen the area of the empire increased by nearly eighty 
per cent. — and every foot of this new territory was 
won by the sword. We have seen Formosa and the 
Pescadores filched, as spoils of war, from a helpless 
China. We have witnessed the annexation of Korea 
against the wishes of its people. We have seen Man- 
churia become Japanese in fact, if not in name. We 
have watched first Southern and then Northern Sak- 
halin brought under the rule of Tokyo. We have seen 
Japan, not content with the seizure of the German 
possessions on the Shantung Peninsula, push her gar- 
risons two hundred and fifty miles into the interior 
of China. We have noted Japan's reluctance to per- 
mit the neutralization of Yap. We have even heard 
of Japanese agents at work in Outer Mongolia, at the 
court of the Living Buddha. To-day Japan has a 
chain of forts, garrisons, naval bases and coaling sta- 
tions stretching from the mid-Pacific to mid-Asia, 
from the ice of the Arctic to the fierce heat of the 
Line. Her guns watch the whole eastern seaboard 
of the continent. The strategic railways converg- 
ing on Peking, the Manchurian trunk-line, and the 
eastern section of the trans-Siberian system are in her 
hands. Sakhalin and Hokkaido on the north guard 



JAPAN 75 

the approaches to Kamchatka and tlie rich basin of the 
Amur. Port Arthur, Chemulpo, and Tsing-tau are 
Japanese watchdogs at the gateways to the vast un- 
developed wealth of Northern China. Kyushu and 
Formosa look out on the populous and fertile littoral 
which stretches from Shanghai to Canton. Her naval 
bases in the Pescadores are within easy striking dis- 
tance of the Philippines. And, a thousand miles out 
in the Pacific, the Marshall, the CaroHne, and the 
Bonin groups form her eastern skirmish line. Is it a 
matter for surprise, then, that our suspicions and ap- 
prehensions have been aroused by this steady and 
implacable Japanese advance? The Japanese resent 
these suspicions and apprehensions as unjustified. 
My answer to that is: Let them look at the map. 



IX 

Japan finds herself to-day in a most difficult and 
perplexing situation. With her population increasing 
at the rate of nearly three quarters of a million an- 
nually, and with less than fifteen per cent, of her soil 
capable of cultivation, her government finds itself 
faced by three grave and pressing problems : the first, 
that of finding sources from which to obtain the raw 
materials with which to keep her factory-wheels turn- 
ing ; the second, that of finding markets for her manu- 
factured products ; the third, that of finding room for 



76 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

the expansion of her surplus population. Barred by 
legislation from North America and Australia, she 
has found on the mainland of Asia — in China proper, 
in Manchuria, and to a lesser degree in Mongolia and 
Siberia — suitable fields for colonial, industrial, and 
commercial expansion. But the energetic, aggressive, 
and at times unscrupulous methods which she has pur- 
sued in these regions have brought her into sharp con- 
flict with American interests, with American moral 
sentiment, and particularly with the American policy 
of the Open Door. American opinion appears to be 
fairly evenly divided as to the attitude which should 
be adopted by the United States in regard to Japan's 
claims of preponderant rights and "special interests" 
on the Asian mainland, one section (which is strongly 
pro-Chinese) insisting that she must be forced to 
withdraw unconditionally from Chinese and Russian 
territory ; the other holding that, so long as she makes 
no attempt to shut us out from the markets of those 
regions which she considers within her sphere of in- 
fluence, it would be impractical and impolitic for the 
United States to interfere with her activities on the 
mainland. These diametrically opposed views are 
admirably summed up in the following extracts, the 
first being taken from an editorial in a well-known 
periodical :^ 

As long ago as the time of the Paris Conference we urged 
the necessity of giving the Japanese a reasonable outlet in 

^ Town and Country, January 1, 1922. 



JAPAN 77 

Northern China and Eastern Siberia. We held that it was 
manifestly impossible to bar the Japanese from the western 
coast of the twin American continents and all of Australia 
and New Zealand and the larger islands of the Pacific which 
are controlled by the English-speaking peoples, and also 
to prevent her from overflowing onto the mainland of Asia. 
At least, it was impossible to do this without eventually 
going to war. We also disagreed entirely with the outcry 
against the assigning at Paris of the German leases in 
Shantung to Japan. Japan had exactly the same right 
to those German assets, which she seized by process of war, 
as we had to the German ships which we seized in the North 
River. When, therefore, the Washington Conference takes 
a course which gives Japan a fairly clean bill of health in 
the Far East, tacitly allows her a wide field for expansion 
there, and, in addition, does away with the Anglo-Japanese 
AUiance, which, in our view, was a real stumbling block in 
the way of peace, we need hardly say that our sympathy is 
all with the action of the Conference. ... It is entirely 
reasonable, to our view, that we should give the Japanese a 
fairly free hand in Northern China and Siberia ; at least, it 
is the business of China, with her four hundred million popu- 
lation, to stop Japan, and not our business. 

This is manifestly the expression of a narrow and 
selfish point of view, being in striking contrast to 
the following extract from a letter written me, shortly 
before the opening of the Washington Conference, by 
a former American diplomatist, a gentleman of dis- 
tinguished attainments, and, by reason of his long 
residence in Japan, a recognized authority on Fan 
Eastern affairs: 

For us to acknowledge unreservedly Japan's preponderant 
rights on the Asian mainland and to recognize that Eastern 
Asia is her political sphere of influence would mean not only 
a general recognition by us of the validity of spheres of in- 



78 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

fluence which would be fatal to our foreign policy, but might 
involve us in a practical approval of what would amount to 
a partition of China. Such an approval would mean a re- 
versal of our whole attitude toward China, which would be 
a tragedy to the people of China and would furthermore be 
a serious political blunder, as we would thus acquiesce in the 
practical elimination of all our trade with the Orient. Our 
choice has always seemed to me reasonably simple. We 
must either maintain our disapproval of spheres of influ- 
ence or we must surrender our ideals of an open market and 
play the game with the other Powers, demanding our par- 
ticular spheres as they demand theirs. This latter position 
I am confident our people would never support. I realize 
that Japanese propaganda has endeavored to find an an- 
alogy between the Monroe Doctrine and their claim of a 
paramount interest on the mainland of Asia, but in my 
judgment there is no such analogy. There is one final rea- 
son why I think that this method of averting a conflict 
between the United States and Japan is not only impractical 
and impolitic, but also what I venture to term immoral. In 
eff^ect, it would be appropriating the rights and property of 
China and Russia and then using them to complete a bargain 
in the interest of our own exclusion policy! What right 
have we to bargain away China's sovereignty in Manchuria 
in order to solve our own controversy with Japan.? It strikes 
me as a form of international embezzlement. And then, 
worst of all, it simply wouldn't work. It would not leave 
peace in Asia. It would create problems in the future in 
which we would be viewed by the Russian and Chinese peoples 
as co-conspirators in Japan's aggression. ... Of course, 
you realize that such a solution is the one that the Japanese 
ruling class most earnestly desire. 

Now it seems to me that, speaking in the language 
of practical politics, the only feasible solution lies 
somewhere between these views. For I do not believe 
that the majority of Americans are selfish enough to 
endorse the first view any more than I believe that 



JAPAN 79 

they are altruistic enough to insist on the latter. 
Moreover, we must recognize the existence of certain 
conditions and be prepared to accept them, whether 
we approve of them or not. For example, we might 
as well realize first as last that there is not the slight- 
est probability of Japan evacuating the Kwantung 
peninsula — that is, the leased territories of Dalny and 
Port Arthur. She is there to stay — make no mistake 
about that — at least until the expiration of the ninety- 
nine-year lease which she took over from Russia. 
This great stronghold at the entrance to the Gulf of 
Chihli forms a vital link in Japan's scheme of national 
defense, it has cost her thousands of lives and millions 
of yen, and there is no more likelihood of her restoring 
it to China than there is of Great Britain restoring 
Gibraltar to Spain. 

As regards Shantung, the situation is entirely dif- 
ferent. The possession of Kiauchau is not vital to the 
Japanese scheme of national defense nor are the Japa- 
nese people particularly attached to it by sentiment. 
Ever since the Peace Conference at Paris, Japan has 
realized that, in remaining on the peninsula, she was 
defying world opinion. Moreover, her statesmen 
have proclaimed over and over again, in the most un- 
equivocal of terms, that it was Japan's intention to 
restore the German leasehold to China, and it is 
hardly conceivable that the nation intends to break 
the pledge thus given. The truth of the matter is 
that the delay in the withdrawal of the Japanese has 



80 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

been largely due to the obstinacy and excessive pride 
shown by both parties and to petty bickering over the 
form and details of the transaction. Prophecy in in- 
ternational affairs is always unwise, but I think it safe 
to predict that the Japanese evacuation of Shantung 
will have begun before this book is published. 

The greatest obstacle in the path of a friendly un- 
derstanding between Japan and China is provided by 
Manchuria, where Japan has extensive, varied, and 
valuable interests — railways, mines, timber, and other 
concessions — some of which she took over from Rus- 
sia by the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth and 
others which she has acquired since. She has ex- 
pended millions of yen on the development of these 
concessions and there have settled in Manchuria, 
moreover, a very considerable number of Japanese 
subjects. And finally, the borders of Manchuria are 
conterminous with the borders of Korea for nearly a 
thousand miles. Now, in view of the notorious weak- 
ness and instability of the Peking government, which 
has shown itself powerless to make its authority felt 
throughout the Eighteen Provinces of the Chinese 
homeland, much less in the outlying territories, it 
seems to me too much to expect Japan to renounce 
her enormously valuable interests in Manchuria, with- 
draw the guards from her railways, and abandon her 
nationals and their properties to Chang Tso-lin and 
his fellow-bandits, who, once the firm hand of Japa- 
nese control was removed, would have the land at 



JAPAN 81 

their mercy. 'No one who has a first-hand knowledge 
of the conditions which prevail in Manchuria can 
truthfully assert that the substitution of Chinese for 
Japanese control in that region at this time would be 
for the best interests of the inhabitants themselves. 
But this should not be interpreted as meaning that I 
believe in perpetuating Japan's claims to "special in- 
terests" in Manchuria, for I do not. Let the Chinese 
give convincing proof of their ability to establish a 
strong and efficient central government, let them put 
an end to the civil war which is disrupting the repub- 
lic, let them suppress the misrule, corruption, and 
brigandage which prevail throughout the Eighteen 
Provinces, and then they will have substantial 
grounds for demanding that Japan's privileged posi- 
tion in Manchuria shall be terminated. Manchuria 
is indubitably Chinese territory, and its complete con- 
trol should be restored to her as soon as she is in a 
position to exercise it. 

But Japan has not the same justification for her 
conduct in the Eighteen Provinces that she has had 
for her policy in Manchuria. Her behavior in the 
Chinese homeland has been characterized by inexcus- 
able selfishness, arrogance, discrimination, and greed. 
If she wishes to convince the world that she is sincere 
in her protestations that she has no designs on Chinese 
sovereignty, no desire to shut the Open Door, then 
she should lose no time in withdrawing her troops 
(she has a garrison as far inland as Hankow) and 



82 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

her police, in abandoning her post-offices, and in ter- 
minating certain offensive agreements which she has 
coerced the Chinese into accepting. In short, she 
must conduct herself henceforward like a guest in a 
friend's house, rather than like a burglar. 

On the other hand, so long as Japan confines her- 
self to strictly legitimate methods I fail to see how 
exception can be taken by the Chinese, or by any one 
else, to Japanese commercial expansion in China. By 
commercial expansion I mean the establishment of 
banks, the flotation of loans, the construction of rail- 
ways, the operation of mines, and similar industrial 
activities, provided always that they meet with the 
approval of the Chinese Government and are con- 
ducted in a fashion which in no way imperils the sov- 
ereignty of China or infringes on the rights of other 
nations. Japan must obtain raw materials for her 
home industries, and I can see no more objection to 
her obtaining them from China than I can to the 
United States obtaining oil from Mexico. Japan 
must find markets for her products, and I can see no 
more objection to her seeking those markets in China 
than I can to the United States seeking markets in 
Latin- America. Japan mu^t provide for her surplus 
population, and I can see no more objection to Japa- 
nese emigrants settling in China — ^provided they are 
willing to abide by Chinese laws — ^than I can to Euro- 
pean emigrants settling in the United States. But 
Japan must abandon for good and all her old policy 



JAPAN 8a 

of monopolization and coercion. There must be no 
further ahenation of Chinese territory on any pretext 
whatsoever. There must be no further attempts to 
intimidate the Chinese Government into granting con- 
cessions, accepting Japanese "advice," or signing ob- 
noxious treaties. If Japan will give convincing proof 
of her sincerity by putting an immediate end to these 
abuses, then there is no reason why the two great 
Oriental nations should not become friends and allies, 
thereby dispelling for all time the ominous cloud that 
has so long overshadowed the Farther East. 

I am of the opinion that the Japanese pohcies in 
China which have caused so much uneasiness abroad 
are dictated by imperative economic necessity rather 
than by a spirit of wanton aggression. If you will take 
the trouble to look into the matter you will find that 
Japan's territorial expansion on the Asian mainland 
is not due, as her enemies would have you believe, to 
greed for mihtary glory, to an insatiable lust for 
power. It is due, as I have already pointed out, 
to the necessity of providing food for a popula- 
tion which is already greater than the soil of 
the homeland can support, and which is de- 
barred by exclusion acts or racial hostility from 
seeking its livelihood on the American or Australian 
continents. Consider the facts. With a birth-rate of 
32 per 1000, the population of Japan is increasing 
at the rate of approximately 750,000 a year. Though 



84 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

much of its surface is so mountainous as to be unin- 
habitable, or at least unsusceptible to cultivation, 
Japan already has nearly four hundred inhabitants 
to the square mile, and this number is steadily rising. 
Though, during the last decade, the area of land 
under cultivation has been increased by five per 
cent, and the production of rice by four per cent., the 
number of mouths that must be fed have increased 
by twelve per cent. In the same period the cost of 
living in Japan has increased nearly four hundred 
per cent. With emigration to America and Aus- 
tralia out of the question, the nation is faced, then, by 
three alternatives: (1) a reduction of the birth-rate; 
(2) an increase in food production; (3) territorial 
expansion into the thinly populated regions of East- 
em Asia. As a reduction of the birth-rate is not 
to be expected, and as food production in Japan itself 
has already reached the maximum, Japanese states- 
men have been compelled by sheer economic necessity 
to adopt the third alternative — expansion on the 
Asian mainland. There you have in tabloid form the 
true expansion of Japan's political and military activ- 
ities in Shantung, Manchuria, Mongolia, and Siberia 
and her claims to "special interests" in all those 
regions. In short, Japan has reached the point where 
she must overflow or perish, just as the congested 
countries of Europe overflowed into the Americas and 
Africa. But in her case there is no New World, no 
Dark Continent, in which her surplus millions can 



JAPAN 85 

find homes and livelihoods. The waste lands were 
long ago parceled out among the Western nations. 
Japan came into the world a century too late. De- 
barred from expanding to the eastward or the south- 
ward, she is expanding westward into the loosely held, 
thinly peopled, undeveloped fringes of China and 
Siberia. That her expansion should be at the ex- 
pense of other and weaker nations is unfortunate but, 
under the circumstances, unavoidable. As a Japanese 
writer in "The World's Work" has put it: "The 
Japanese people must either die a saintly death in 
righteous starvation, or expand into the neighbor's 
backyard — and Japan is not that much of a saint." 



We now come to the most delicate, the most 
difficult, and the most dangerous of all the ques- 
tions in dispute between America and Japan — ^that 
of Japanese immigration into the United States. Now 
I have no intention of embarking on a discussion of 
the pros and cons of this question. But because I have 
found that most Americans have only an inexact and 
fragmentary knowledge of it, and because a rudi- 
mentary understanding of it is essential to a clear 
comprehension of the larger question, our relations 
with Japan, I trust that you will bear with me while 
I sketch in outline the events which led up to the 



86 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

present immigration situation. I will compress them 
into tabloid form. 

Under the administrative interpretation of our 
naturalization laws, Japanese aliens are ineligible to 
American citizenship. But down to the summer of 
1908 there was no restriction on Japanese immigra- 
tion. Up to that time, in other words, a Japanese 
could enter and settle in the United States, but he 
could not become an American citizen. In that year, 
however, the much-discussed "Gentlemen's Agree- 
ment," whereby Japanese laborers are excluded from 
the United States, went into effect. That agreement 
is not in the shape of a formal treaty or undertaking. 
The term applies simply to the substance of a num- 
ber of informal notes exchanged between the then 
Secretary of State, Elihu Root, and Mr. K. Takahira, 
at that time the Japanese Ambassador in Washing- 
ton. The terms of this agreement provided that no 
Japanese could enter our ports from Japan or from 
Hawaii without a proper passport from his own gov- 
ernment, and Japan promised to give no passports 
to prospective emigrants of the coolie, or laboring 
class. There has been no charge that Japan has failed 
to keep both letter and spirit of this agreement with 
absolute integrity. In fact, the Japanese Foreign 
Office has at times leaned backward in its endeavor 
to keep faith. But the labor elements in California, 
unable to meet Japanese industrial competition and 
jealous of Japanese success, continued their anti- 



JAPAN 87 

Japanese agitation, being aided by politicians seeking 
the labor vote, and in 1913 laws prohibiting the pur- 
chase of land by Japanese in that state were placed 
on the statute books of California. 

But there were certain loopholes left by this law. 
These loopholes permitted of agricultural land being 
leased by Japanese for three years ; of land being pur- 
chased by corporations in which Japanese were inter- 
ested ; and of land being purchased by American-born 
children of Japanese parents. To block up these 
loopholes the Oriental Exclusion League circulated a 
petition to place an initiative act — known as the Alien 
Land Act — on the ballot in 1920. To bolster up its 
arguments in favor of this act, the League called at- 
tention to the rapid increase in the Japanese birth- 
rate in California. This increase in the birth-rate was 
due, it was claimed, to the custom followed by many 
of the poorer Japanese settlers in California of having 
sent to them from Japan pictures of eligible girls. In 
this manner the Japanese in America selected their 
wives, to whom they were married in absentia. These 
so-called "picture brides," being thus legally married, 
had the right under our laws to join their husbands in 
the United States, which they did in considerable 
numbers. And the more picture brides, the more chil- 
dren. And the more children, the more land passing 
under Japanese control; for the Japanese circum- 
vented the prohibition against their holding land by 
purchasing land in the name of their American-born 



88 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

children, who were automatically American citizens 
and of whom the parents were the legal guardians. 
This method of circumventing the law created such 
an uproar among the anti-Japanese elements in Cali- 
fornia that in February, 1920, Japan, in order to re- 
move another source of controversy, ceased to issue 
passports to picture brides. But this did not satisfy 
the Californian agitators, who succeeded in having the 
adoption of the Alien Land Act put to a popular vote. 
This act— perhaps the most stringent measure ever 
directed against the civil rights of residents in the 
United States — ^provides : 

1. Prohibition of land-ownership by Japanese. 

2. Prohibition of leasing of agricultural lands by Japa- 
nese. 

3. Prohibition of land-ownership by companies or cor- 
porations in which Japanese are interested. 

4. Prohibition of land-ownership by Japanese children 
born in the United States, by removing them from the 
guardianship of their parents in such cases. 

At the elections in November, 1920, this measure 
was carried by a majority of the registered voters and 
by a three-to-one vote of those who expressed an opin- 
ion on the subject. The vote stood 668,483 in favor 
and 222,086 opposed. 

There you have the Japanese immigration situation 
up to date. 

Right here let me interject the remark that, in re- 
senting the American attitude of racial superiority, 
the restrictions imposed by the United States on 



JAPAN 89 

Japanese immigration, and the prohibition of land- 
ownership by Japanese in Cahfornia, the people of 
Nippon are not consistent. They refuse to see that 
the American attitude toward the Japanese is almost 
identical with the Japanese attitude toward the 
Chinese — but with this difference: we do not hold 
the Japanese in contempt, as the Japanese hold the 
Chinese. The Japanese regard the Chinese as an in- 
ferior race, considering themselves immeasurably su- 
perior to them intellectually in culture and in effi- 
ciency. His supreme contempt for the Chinese ex- 
plains why the Japanese so bitterly resents being 
placed in the same category with them by our immi- 
gration laws. The Japanese see nothing anomalous 
in the fact that their own laws prohibiting Chinese 
from settling in Japanese territory are fully as rigid 
as the restrictions placed on Japanese immigration 
into the United States. Indeed, they have carried 
their exclusion policy to far greater lengths than we 
have ours, for unskilled foreign laborers are not per- 
mitted to settle in those regions on the Asian main- 
land which, though they do not belong to Japan, are 
under Japanese control. In other words, a Chinese 
coolie cannot settle in the Chinese province of Shan- 
tung, because, forsooth, Japan regards it as within 
her own sphere of influence. The subjects of the em- 
peror admit of no inconsistency in the fact that, 
though approximately 27,000 acres are owned by 
Japanese settlers in California, not a single foot 



90 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

of Japanese soil can be owned by a foreigner. They 
fail to recognize anything anomalous in the fact that, 
though nearly 48,000 acres in California are owned by 
American corporations controlled by Japanese capi- 
tal, very few, if any, foreigners are represented in 
corporations holding land in Japan. There are, it is 
true, a few foreigners in Japan who hold land under 
perpetual leases, but these holdings, insignificant in 
number and extent, have come down from the days 
when the Western nations exacted extraterritorial 
privileges. As a people, the Japanese are not blessed 
with a sense of humor. If they were, they would see 
the humor of their insistence on being accorded the 
same rights which they deny to another Oriental race, 
the Chinese. 

But the point I wish to emphasize is this: the 
Japanese Government is not clamoring for the re- 
moval of any of the present restrictions on the immi- 
gration of its nationals into the United States. The 
Japanese consider these restrictions offensive and 
humiliating, — ^that goes without saying, — but they 
concede our right to decide who shall enter our doors 
and who shall stay out. Not for a moment, however, 
have the Japanese been blinded by our assertions that 
our exclusion of them is based purely on economic 
grounds. They are far too shrewd not to recognize 
that this explanation was advanced to soothe their 
wounded vanity, as a sop to their pride. They know, 
and we know, that the real cause of their exclusion is 



JAPAN 91 

racial. No one realizes more clearly than the Japanese 
themselves that, in excluding them from the United 
States, we have in effect stigmatized them as an in- 
ferior race. I repeat, however, that they concede our 
right to exclude whom we please. But what they do 
not concede, what they will not agree to, is the right 
of the United States, or of any state in the United 
States, to discriminate against those Japanese who 
are lawfully resident in this country. To attempt to 
deprive those Japanese legally dwelling within our 
borders of those personal and property rights which 
we grant to all other aliens is so obviously unjust that 
it scarcely merits discussion. The Japanese have ex- 
cellent grounds for believing that such discriminatory 
legislation is unconstitutional ; they know that it con- 
stitutes an open defiance of equity and justice. They 
feel — and their feeling is apparently shared by the 
222,000 Californians who voted against it — ^that such 
legislation makes ridiculous and hypocritical our oft- 
repeated boast that we stand for the square deal. 

The bitterness of Japanese resentment over the 
immigration question is not entirely due, however, to 
wounded racial pride, but quite as much, I think, to 
the rudeness and lack of tact which have characterized 
the anti-Japanese agitation in California. For it 
should be remembered that in no country is the code 
of social courtesy or consideration for foreigners so 
rigidly observed as in Japan. In dealing with the 
Japanese, nothing is ever gained by insults or bully- 



92 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

ing. Politeness is the shibboleth of all classes, and 
the lowest coolie usually responds to it instantly. Is 
it to be wondered at, then, that the Japanese are irri- 
tated and resentful at the lack of courtesy and ordi- 
nary good manners which we have displayed in our 
handling of so peculiarly delicate a matter as the im- 
migration question? 

It may be that local conditions justify the wave of 
anti-Japanese hysteria which is sweeping the Pacific 
Coast. It may be that the people of the Western 
states can offer valid reasons for their constant pin- 
pricking and irritation of Japan. But I doubt it. I 
am no stranger to California — I have lived there off 
and on for years — nor am I ignorant of the relations 
between labor and politics in that state. That is why 
I refuse to become excited over the threatened "con- 
quest" of California by a little group of aliens which 
comprises only two per cent, of the population of the 
state and which owns or leases only one and six tenths 
per cent, of its cultivated lands. The last census 
shows that there are 111,010 Japanese — men, 
women, and children — in the United States. And no 
more are coming in. Surely this is not a very serious 
menace to a nation of 110 millions of people! 

The Californians assert that their anti-Japanese 
legislation is a matter for them to decide and does not 
concern the rest of the country. Therein they are 
wrong. For in the unwished-for event of war with 
Japan, it would not be a war between California and 



JAPAINT 93 

Japan, but between the United States and Japan. 
Therefore, in its treatment of the Japanese, it be- 
hooves California to take the rights and interests of 
the rest of the country into careful consideration. So, 
because we must all share in the responsibility for 
California's treatment of the Japanese problem, let 
us make certain beyond doubt or question that that 
treatment is based on equity and justice. Under no 
conditions must racial prejudice, economic jealousy, 
or political expediency be permitted to serve as an 
excuse for giving the Japanese anything save a square 
deal. 



Just and permanent solutions of the various ques- 
tions at issue between the United States and Japan 
have been greatly retarded by trouble-making and 
dangerous elements in both countries: in Japan, by 
the arrogant, avaricious, unscrupulous militarists who 
shape the policies of the government ; in America by 
jingoes with selfish aims to serve, irresponsible gossip- 
mongers, professional alarmists, and yellow journal- 
ists. For example, not a little of the American dis- 
trust of Japan is directly traceable to the highly 
circumstantial stories told by returning tourists, 
whose opportunities for observation have usually 
been limited and whose opinions are generally super- 
ficial, of Japan's secret designs against the Philip- 



94 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

pines. In substantiation of these stories they point 
to Japan's imperative need for an outlet for her ex- 
cess population, to the temptation offered by the Phil- 
ippines, which form a prolongation of the Japanese 
archipelago ( Formosa, the southernmost island under 
the Japanese flag, can be seen from the highlands of 
Luzon on a clear day), and to the alleged alarming 
increase in the number of Japanese settlers in the 
Philippines, most of whom, so the gossips will assure 
you earnestly, are military reservists disguised as 
laborers. Before proceeding, let me dispose of the 
latter assertion by saying that investigations con- 
ducted by American intelligence officers have proved 
conclusively that there are less than ten thousand 
Japanese in the entire archipelago, and that, though 
the men have doubtless had military training, they 
are simple farmers, traders, and artisans, who are in 
the Philippines for the purpose of making a living. 
That the Philippines would be the first objective 
of Japanese attack in the event of war between the 
United States and Japan is a foregone conclusion. 
That the Japanese General Staff is in possession of 
accurate and detailed information as to our scheme of 
defense and the strength and disposition of our forces 
in the islands, goes without saying. Our own general 
staff is presumably equally well informed about 
Mexico. That, in the event of war, the Japanese 
could seize the islands with little difficulty, and hold 
them indefinitely, is conceded by most military men. 



JAPAN 95 

But I am convinced that, as things stand to-day, 
Japan is as innocent of designs against the Philippines 
as we are of designs against Mexico. (What her 
attitude might be were we to withdraw from the 
islands, leaving the natives to manage their own af- 
fairs, is quite another question. ) It is true that Japan 
objects to the fortification of the Philippines, regard- 
ing it as an implied threat against herself, but I 
imagine that we would object to, and probably would 
prohibit, the establishment of a fortified Japanese 
naval base on the coast of Mexico. Those persons 
who talk so loosely of Japan's determination to seize 
the Philippines at the first opportunity that offers are 
doubtless unaware that she once had an opportunity 
to purchase them at a bargain price — and declined it. 
Viscount Kaneko told me that, some years prior to 
the Spanish- American War, representatives of the 
Spanish Government inquired whether Japan would 
care to purchase the Philippines for the equivalent of 
eight milhon dollars gold, and that Japan refused to 
consider the proposal on the ground that the Philip- 
pines were too far away for her to administer easily 
and that Japanese do not thrive in tropical climates. 
It has long been a popular pastime among certain 
of our people to prophesy an eventual war between 
the two countries. Let us look at this question from 
the viewpoint of common sense. Neither the Jap- 
anese Government nor the Japanese people want war 
with the United States. It is possible that some of 



96 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

the younger and more hot-headed military men might 
welcome such a conflict because of the opportunities 
it would afford them for winning promotion, decora- 
tions, and glory. But you may be quite certain that 
the older and wiser men who direct the military 
policies of the empire have no desire to embark on 
such an adventure. Confident as they are of Japan's 
prowess, they do not blind themselves to the fact 
that such a conflict could have only one conclusion. 
The lessons taught by America's achievements 
in the World War have not been lost on them. 
When the United States in less than eighteen months 
raised an army of five million men and equipped them, 
and put nearly half of them down on a battle-line 
three thousand miles away, it gave the Japanese mili- 
tarists much food for thought. They were as 
astounded by this revelation of the republic's military 
might as were the Germans. Though it is entirely 
possible that the Japanese might be victorious in 
the earlier stages of a conflict with the United States, 
the Japanese strategists know perfectly well that, in 
view of America's immensely superior man-power, 
wealth, and natural resources, such a struggle would 
be hopeless for Japan from the beginning. They 
have not forgotten how desperate was their plight 
when President Roosevelt's intervention brought the 
war with Russia to a close, nor do they shut their 
eyes to the certainty that, in a war with the United 
States, the- nations of the world, including those of 



JAPAN 97 

the Orient, would infallibly give their moral support 
to America. Even were the militarists mad enough 
to embark on such an enterprise, which they are not, 
they could never obtain the support of Japan's cap- 
tains of finance and industry. These shrewd, far- 
seeing business men do not forget that America is 
Japan's largest customer; that more than one lihird of 
all the products of the empire go to the United States. 
Practically all of Japan's exported tea, seventy per 
cent, of her raw and manufactured silk and large 
quantities of her other products are sold in American 
markets. I have heard it declared, indeed, that were 
the United States to double her import duties on tea 
and silks it would bring Japan to the verge of ruin. 
Nor do the Japanese overlook the fact that the United 
States is now the greatest reservoir of capital in the 
world. Japan needs money. Europe, impoverished 
by the war, cannot supply it. America can. I repeat, 
Japan does not want war with the United States. 

And it is equally certain that the United States 
does not want war with Japan. We want, and expect 
to get, our fair share of the trade of the Far East, 
but we have not the remotest desire for territorial ex- 
pansion in those regions. We shall continue to insist 
on the Open Door in China remaining open, but we 
freely concede that the Japanese have as much right 
to use that door as ourselves. We shall continue to 
insist that our rights in the Pacific be recognized, but 
this implies no hostility toward Japan. A sugges' ion 



98 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

that any considerable section of the American people 
cherishes sentiments hostile to the Japanese would 
be greeted with derision anywhere in the United 
States, save perhaps in a few local communities on 
the Pacific Coast, whose sentiments are in no wise 
indicative of the attitude of the country as a whole. 
I do not believe that the majority of fair-minded 
Americans object to Japanese commercial expansion 
on the Asian mainland — so long as that expansion 
is legitimately conducted. But we do object to ex- 
pansion by intrigue or force. We can sympathize 
with Japan's undeniable need for more elbow-room, 
but we cannot countenance the plans of the Tokio 
militarists for extending Japanese dominion by the 
sword. Though we conceded, through the Lan- 
sing-Ishii Agreement, that Japan possesses "special 
interests" on the Asian mainland, we cannot see 
those interests multiplied until they block the Open 
Door.^ For sentimental, political, and economic rea- 
sons we are averse to the expansion of Japan at the 
expense of China and Russia, but we have no thought 
of actively opposing such expansion so long as it 
takes the form of peaceful penetration of thinly peo- 
pled, undeveloped, and misgoverned regions, partic- 
ularly as we believe that those regions will be im- 
proved by scientific development and their peoples 
benefited by decent government. I am myself of 

'^One of the first acts of Mr. Hughes, upon becoming Secretary of 
State, was to make it amply clear to the Japanese Government that 
the United States no longer recognizes these "special interests." 



JAPAN 99 

the opinion that the future policy of Japan will tend 
rather in the direction of economic penetration than 
of territorial expansion. Several recent events have 
contributed to bring about this change in policy. To 
begin with, the sudden collapse of Prussian militarism 
was a staggering blow to the Japanese mihtarists. 
It brought them to an abrupt realization of the fact 
that the world was heartily sick of militarism and im- 
perialism, and that their dreams of building up a Pan- 
Asian empire by conquest could never be fulfilled. 
They realized that America, now the greatest mili- 
tary-naval-financial power on earth, would never 
consent to the Japanese making themselves masters 
of the Pacific or overlords of Asia. Again, they 
recognized the growing strength of public opinion in 
Japan itself — a public opinion which is beginning to 
make itself heard and which demands peace and 
friendship with the rest of the world. And lastly, 
but by far the most important, came the Washington 
Conference, with its full, frank, and friendly discus- 
sions of all pending questions, its clarification of 
Japan's and America's position, and the correspond- 
ing enlightenment of public opinion in both countries. 
From talks that I have recently had with many of 
the leading men of Japan, including the premier, 
several members of his cabinet, and the president of 
the House of Peers, I am convinced that there is not 
a single question pending between the two countries 
on which an understanding cannot be reached, pro- 



100 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

vided we go about it in a courteous manner and a 
sympathetic frame of mind. My conversations with 
the Japanese leaders showed me that they have a 
much clearer understanding of our difficulties and 
perplexities than I had supposed. It might be well 
for us to remember that the Japanese Government is 
itself in an isxtremely trying position, and that its 
leaders are extremely apprehensive of the effect on 
public opinion of any settlement of the questions at 
issue which might be interpreted as an affront to 
Japanese national dignity or racial pride. But of 
this I can assure you: Japan is genuinely, almost 
pathetically, anxious for American confidence and 
good-will, and, in order to obtain them, her responsible 
statesmen are prepared to make almost every con- 
cession that self-respect will permit and that a fair- 
minded American can demand. 



PART II 
KOREA 

1. THE PENINSULA AND ITS PEOPLE 



KOREA is the Ireland of the East. The more 
I consider the comparison the better I hke it, 
for between the two countries, one on the eastern 
edge of the Old World, the other on the western, there 
is a most singular and striking analogy. Ireland is 
separated from the nation which is its suzerain by 
a narrow, landlocked sea. So is Korea. Ireland is 
a land of surpassing beauty. So is Korea. The 
Irish are an agricultural people, as are the Koreans, 
the national industries of both being connected with 
the tilling of the soil. The peasantry of both coun- 
tries are ignorant, simple, patient, industrious, good- 
natured. Both are prone to use intoxicants to excess 
on occasion. Both are extremely superstitious, with 
a terrified belief in the existence of spirits, goblins, 
and demons. Both are desperately poor, dwelling in 
wretched hovels amid filth and squalor. The Irish are 
turbulent and fond of intrigue. The same character- 
istics are found in the Koreans. The histories of both 

101 



102 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

nations are punctuated by invasions, rebellions^ and 
internecine wars. Both have been the victims of 
cruelty, injustice, and oppression. Cromwell's inva- 
sion of Ireland in 1649, with its accompanying mas- 
sacres and systematic devastation, had its counterpart 
in the shocking scenes which marked Hideyoshi's in- 
vasion of Korea in the preceding century. The Irish 
have been held in subjection by a people of alien race 
and religion. The Koreans still are. Irish distrust 
and detestation of England is equalled only by Ko- 
rean distrust and detestation of Japan. Heretofore 
the Irish have failed to give convincing proof of their 
ability to maintain a just and stable government. 
This is likewise true of the Koreans. Most English- 
men are convinced that an independent Ireland would 
prove a menace to the safety of the British Empire. 
Most Japanese are equally convinced that an inde- 
pendent Korea would threaten the safety of the 
Empire of Japan. 

Korea, or, to give it its official Japanese name. 
Chosen, "Land of the Morning Calm," though 
scarcely larger than the state of Kansas, has a popula- 
tion equal to that of Spain. Its immense importance 
to Japan will be better realized when I add that it 
comprises one third of the total land area of the 
empire and that its seventeen millions of inhabitants 
form one fourth of the empire's total population. One 
of the oldest nations in the world, its early history 



KOREA 103 

is lost in the mists of antiquity. But this much we 
know: it maintained its independence for three thou- 
sand years and for nine centuries its frontiers never 
changed. The ignorance, insularity and intolerance 
of its peasantry, the degeneracy and corruption of 
its ruling classes, and its misfortune in lying between 
two powerful and predatory empires, proved its 
undoing. 

Korea is essentially a mountain land. Rising 
abruptly from its northern boundary, like a great 
buttressed wall striving to hold back the flowing Si- 
berian steppes, is a sinuous range of towering peaks. 
Running south from this chain is a lofty central range 
which forms the backbone of the country, its lateral 
spurs corrugating the entire surface of the peninsula. 
Ancient lava streams and craters of long-extinct vol- 
canoes are constantly met with, the appearance of 
the country being strongly suggestive of the Rand, 
with all its mineralogical possibilities. Like the 
Transvaal, Korea is extremely rich in minerals. 
There are numerous coal deposits, both anthracite 
and bituminous, and the natives claim that gold is 
found in every one of the three hundred and sixty-five 
prefectures. This is an exaggeration, but it is near 
enough to the truth to explain why for centuries 
Korea has aroused the cupidity of her powerful 
and avaricious neighbors. Indeed, I have been as- 
sured by American mining engineers that the penin- 
sula is as highly mineralized as Mexico. 



104 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

Sandwiched between the rugged range which forms 
the spine of the country and the eastern coast is a 
narrow strip, fertile but comparatively inaccessible, 
which slopes sharply to the Japan Sea. But by far 
the greater part of the arable land of Korea lies 
on the western side of this watershed; all the 
long and navigable rivers are there or in the south; 
almost all the harbors are on the Yellow Sea. Thus 
it may be said that Korea has her back to Japan 
and her face turned toward China, a topographical 
circumstance which has had no inconsiderable effect 
on the history of the country. Though the moun- 
tains along the northern border are densely wooded 
— ^the timber concessions along the Yalu, it will be 
remembered, were one of the contributing causes of 
the Russo-Japanese War, — ^those to the south are 
so bare and desolate that the Japanese often refer 
to the peninsula as "the land of treeless mountains." 
One of the causes of this lack of timber may be found 
in the history of Korea, which records that during 
the terrible days of the Hideyoshi invasion the peas- 
ants, fleeing to the mountains for their lives, were 
forced to burn the trees to keep from freezing. As 
a result of this widespread deforestation, great areas 
are to-day as bare as a bald man's head or clothed only 
with low, straggling, discouraged-looking vegetation. 
But the Japanese Bureau of Forestry has displayed 
commendable foresight and energy in systematically 
reforesting the country, and every year sees more 



KOREA 105 

and more of the bare brown slopes covered with young 
trees. 

Though Korea possesses an extensive river sys- 
tem, the country consequently being well watered, 
the streams are, with but few exceptions, too shal- 
low to permit of navigation. The largest of the 
rivers, the Yalu, called by Koreans, Am Nok, "Green 
Duck," from the bluish-green tinge it assumes after 
the melting of the snow and ice near its mountain 
birthplace, forms part of the boundary between Korea 
and Manchuria. It is navigable for sixty miles above 
its mouth and is much used for rafting the timber 
cut on its upper reaches down to the Yellow Sea. 
The cold Tumen, which rises in the Ever White Moun- 
tains and empties into the Japan Sea, is likewise a 
frontier river, being bordered on the south by Korea 
and on the north by Siberia and Manchuria. But, 
though upwards of two hundred miles in length, it 
is of little benefit to the Koreans, for it is frozen 
solid throughout the fierce Siberian winter, and in 
the spring, when the snows melt, it becomes a raging 
and almost unnavigable torrent. By far the finest 
of the Korean rivers is the stately Han, sometimes 
referred to, because of the auriferous deposits in its 
bed, as the River of Golden Sand. It has its nativity 
in the mile-high fastness of Diamond Mountain, 
near the eastern coast, swings south and west across 
the peninsula to Seoul, where it is nearly a thousand 
feet in width, and forty-five miles farther on joins the 



106 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

Yellow Sea. It is navigable for small, flat-bottomed 
craft for nearly nine score miles above its mouth, and 
up and down its sinuous course, through gorges as 
wild and imposing as those of the Upper Yangtze, 
go lumbering junks with towering sterns and huge 
lug-sails and great goggle eyes painted on their 
bows. The Han flows through the most fertile 
portion of Korea, the rich alluvial soil, sometimes 
ten feet deep, being capable of bearing two bumper 
crops a year with little or no enriching. Considering 
the remarkable fertility of the soil, the Korean agri- 
culturist has not obtained the results that might be 
expected, though this is due not to any lack of indus- 
try but rather to his antiquated methods and imple- 
ments, which are as crude as those used in the Egypt 
of the Pharaohs. The backward condition of agri- 
culture in the peninsula is being remedied, however, 
by the Japanese — themselves the most intensive and 
successful farmers in the world — who are establishing 
experiment stations, introducing modern methods and 
machinery, and displaying the same energy and abil- 
ity which have made them such formidable competi- 
tors in California. Mark my words: Korea, under 
Japanese tutelage, will be one of the most prosperous 
agricultural countries in the world some day. 

Korea is a land where poverty should be unknown, 
for nature has lavishly endowed it with resources 
and blessed it with a superb climate. During nine 
months of the year the climate is dehghtful — most 



KOREA 107 

nearly comparable, perhaps, to that of northern Cali- 
fornia. Though the three summer months are char- 
acterized by heat, humidity, and heavy rains, they 
are quite supportable, even for foreigners. Particu- 
larly delightful are the bright, beautiful, strangely 
calm and perfect mornings — clear as crystal and ex- 
hilarating as dry champagne — which give Chosen its 
name. With such a climate, a productive soil, an 
abundant rainfall, with mountains rich in minerals 
and coastal waters teeming with every variety of fish, 
Korea needs only the security and encouragement of 
a decent and unselfish government to make it one of 
the most opulent countries in the East. 

The condition of any people may be gaged with 
considerable accuracy by their facilities for intercom- 
munication. Judged by this standard, the Koreans 
must be set down as an extremely unprogressive peo- 
ple, for by far the greater part of the roads in the 
peninsula are merely trails, so rough that even the 
ubiquitous bicyclist sometimes has to pick up his ma- 
chine and carry it on his back over the worst stretches, 
often so narrow that laden bulls cannot pass. The 
constant shuffling of feet through untold centuries 
has worn these narrow paths down below the level 
of the ground, so that during the rains they become 
miniature canals. Indeed, during the rainy season, 
when the streams have become brawling torrents and 
the flimsy bridges have been swept away, all traffic 
save that by junk along the rivers is perforce sus- 



108 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

pended. Towns of considerable size are sometimes 
connected only by narrow foot-paths running along 
the tops of the embankments between the rice-fields. 
Though the Japanese are steadily expanding and 
improving the peninsular highway system, it will be 
some years before motoring in Korea will be practi- 
cable outside the immediate vicinity of the larger 
cities and still longer before it will be enjoyable. 

The government-owned Chosen Railway, which 
now has close to fifteen hundred miles of line in op- 
eration, is one of the best built, best equipped, and 
best run systems in the Farther East. The main line, 
which makes connections at Antung with the South 
Manchuria Railway, traverses the entire length of 
the peninsula to Fusan, whence extremely comfort- 
able steamers maintain a rapid service across the 
Korea Strait to Shimonoseki, where the Japanese 
system begins. It is approximately six hundred miles 
from Fusan to Antung, and the express trains make 
the journey in about nineteen hours. A first-class 
ticket costs in the neighborhood of $15.00; the fare 
for second-class, which is scarcely distinguishable 
from first, is $10.00; while $5.50 will pay for a third- 
class ticket from one end of Korea to the other. 
Branches connect the main line with Mok-po, Kun- 
san, Jinsen (Chemulpo), and Chinnampo, the four 
chief ports on the Yellow Sea, and with Gensan, on 
the east coast of the peninsula, it being only a matter 
of time before this latter line is pushed north to 



KOREA 109 

Vladivostok. Most of the equipment is American, 
though the sleeping and dining-cars were built at 
Dairen or in Japan and mounted on American-made 
trucks. The aisles in the day-coaches, instead of 
running down the center, as in the United States, 
run down the side of the car, thus making the seats 
almost twice as wide as those in American trains. 
The sleeping-cars are divided into compartments, 
after the European fashion, thereby affording for- 
eign travelers a privacy which is highly desirable in 
an Oriental country. The meals on the dining-cars 
are well cooked and well served, Korea being one of 
the few countries where the old "dollar dinner" is still 
to be had. At every station is a large sign-board in 
English and Japanese, giving a brief description of 
the places of historic and scenic interest in the neigh- 
borhood, their distance from the station, and how to 
reach them — an idea which might well be adopted in 
Western lands. 

When the Japanese adopted the standard four-foot 
eight-inch gage for the Korean system they assimil- 
ated it with the Chinese railways, though at the same 
time rendering it altogether different from their own 
system in Japan, which is still upon the now inade- 
quate meter gage. In adopting the standard gage 
they had in mind something far more important, how- 
ever, than providing Korea with an up-to-date rail- 
way system. In shaping her Korean railway policy 
Japan had three distinct objectives: first, to facilitate 



110 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

the rapid movement of troops and supplies into Si- 
beria, Manchuria, and China; second, to place the 
empire in direct railway communication with Europe 
via Mukden, Harbin, Manchouli, and the Trans- 
Siberian ; third, to bring the South China market for 
Japanese piece goods and the mid-China ore supply, 
which is required for the Japanese steel works, into 
connection with Fusan, whence it is but a short half- 
day's steam to the great Japanese port of Shimono- 
seki. As a result of the hnking of the Korean and 
Manchurian systems, Japan is now enabled to send 
her manufactured goods by rail from Fusan to 
Peking and Hankow, while the impending comple- 
tion of the Hankow-Canton Railway will give her 
vast new markets for her merchandise among the 
teeming millions of southern China. The Shantung 
Railway, which connects the seaport of Tsingtau with 
the Peking- Shanghai system, provides Japan with 
still another means of access to the Chinese markets — 
a fact which explains her reluctance to surrender con- 
trol of that much discussed and highly important 
line. Thus it will be seen that these railways are 
something more than twin lines of steel laid down for 
the convenience of travelers and shippers. They are 
the instruments which Japan is using to effect her 
political and commercial penetration of eastern Asia. 
Barring the busy port of Chemulpo, where the 
first shot of the Russo-Japanese War was fired on 
February 8, 1904, when the Japanese fleet attacked 



KOREA 111 

the Russian cruisers Variag and Korietzj and Ping- 
Yang, the ancient and highly picturesque town which 
was for centuries the capital of Korea, the only city 
in the peninsula of more than passing interest to the 
foreigner is the present capital, Seoul (pronounced 
sowl, if you please), or, as the Japanese have re- 
named it, Keijo. Encircled by a crumbling, crene- 
lated wall, obviously modeled after the Great Wall 
of China and built a century before Columbus set 
foot on the beach of San Salvador, it stands on the 
eastern bank of the broad, swift-flowing Han, nest- 
ling in a bowl-shaped valley formed by two semi-cir- 
cular mountain ranges whose bare brown peaks tower 
above it in somber grandeur. Arid and forbidding as 
these mountains look in winter, summer finds them 
clothed in vivid green relieved here and there by great 
splashes of heliotrope, honeysuckle and azalea. In 
springtime the budding orchards of cherry, peach and 
plum transform the valley into a sea of snowy blos- 
soms. 

Seoul, with not far from half a million inhabitants, 
is the political, commercial and intellectual center of 
Korea. For upward of eight centuries it was the 
home of the Korean sovereigns, and few cities have 
witnessed more cruelty, bloodshed, licentiousness and 
corruption. It has several picturesque palaces, now 
falling into decay, a small but exceptionally fine art 
museum, mediocre botanical and zoological gardens, 
a number of government buildings, erected by the 



112 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

Japanese, which, though substantial, have small 
architectural merit, street-e^x, electric-light and tele- 
phone systems, and a hotel that has only one superior 
in Eastern Asia.. The Chosen Hotel, which is op- 
erated by the Korean Railways, stands in the walled 
compound of an ancient temple amid a garden heavy 
with the fragrance of many roses. At night, when 
the paper lanterns on the terrace are reflected in the 
lotos pools, and the incense from the Temple of 
Heaven mingles with the perfume of the flowers, it 
is a place to be marked with a white mile-stone on the 
road of memory. 

Seoul is a city of magnificent distances and of re- 
markably wide streets — several of them are wider 
than the Avenue du Bois in Paris — ^which are in 
curious contrast to the mean and garish shops of tin- 
der-box construction with which they are lined. One 
great thoroughfare, the Chon-no, or Big Bell Street, 
bisects the entire city, running from the East Gate 
to the West Gate and far into the country in both 
directions. It is not only the principal artery of the 
capital but the "Main Street" of all Korea, for along 
its dusty length flow placid, slow-moving townsmen, 
dignified despite their absurd topknots and strag- 
gling goatees, their enormous, horn-rimmed goggles 
and transparent fly-trap hats; short, squat women 
with olive skins and coarse black hair and figures 
which look like meal sacks with a string tied around 
the middle, their shapeless garments of white cotton 



CHOSEN 

(KOREA) 

SCALE OF MILES 
50 100 150 200 250 

Principal Railroads..— o- 




S £ A 



C.S.Hammond & Co.,N.Y, 



KOREA 113 

concealing everything save their breasts, which are 
brazenly exposed; Yang-bans, as the native officials 
are known, lolling somnolently in palanquins borne 
by sweating coolies; peasants, fresh from the coun- 
try districts, leading strings of squealing, kicking 
ponies laden with farm produce or bulls piled high 
with the twigs which the Koreans use for fuel ; Japa- 
nese officials in ill-fitting European clothes and Japa- 
nese officers in red-banded caps and smart khaki 
uniforms ; school-boys with knapsacks on their backs, 
speeding by on bicycles, their baggy garments flap- 
ping in the breeze; rickshaws, drawn by half -naked 
coolies, skimming along on silent wheels; creaking 
carts hauled by lumbering bullocks; clanging 
street-cars ; motors of all makes and sizes, from lordly 
Rolls-Royces to bustling members of the well known 
Ford family of Detroit — all these combine to im- 
part to the great thoroughfare a strange blend of the 
medieval and the modern, of the backward and the 
progressive, of the Orient and the Occident. 

But of all the things I saw in this most picturesque 
and curious city, there were two which struck me as 
being of peculiar significance. One is a deserted gar- 
den, overgrown by shrubbery and rank with weeds. 
It is at the back of the North Palace, surrounded by 
a crumbling and discolored wall. Here, in the cold 
gray dawn of an autumn morning in 1895, the clever 
and ambitious queen, the most brilliant and the most 
cruel Korean woman of her time, was brutally mur- 



114 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

dered by a band of Japanese and Korean assassins.* 
The other place to which I refer is a long, low, unpre- 
tentious cottage in the gardens of the East Palace, 
screened from observation by shrubbery and high 
hedges. Here, guarded by Japanese sentries and 
watched by Japanese spies, dwells in enforced seclu- 
sion a pasty-faced, unhealthy-looking youth, who, ac- 
cording to popular report at least, is little better than 
an imbecile. He is the dethroned emperor, now 
known as His Imperial Highness Prince Yi Kon, the 
title which the Japanese have bestowed upon him, the 
last of that long line of sovereigns who ruled in 
Korea for upward of two thousand years. In the 
palace, not a stone's throw distant, is a vast and lofty 
room, its walls hung with the richest of brocades, its 
carven woodwork embellished in all the colors of the 
chromatic scale. On a dais in the center of this mag- 
nificent apartment, flanked by the gorgeous trappings 
of royalty and cushioned in the imperial yellow, is 
an empty throne. 



II 

The first impressions of most visitors in Korea are 
generally unfavorable to the Koreans. This is due, 
in the first place, to the disgusting filth and squalor 
amid which the great mass of the people live, which 

* Though the Japanese Minister, Viscount Miura, appears to have 
instigated this shocking crime, there is every reason to believe that he 
acted without the knowledge of his government. 



KOREA 115 

has led some one to describe the country as "a going 
piggery"; secondly, to the cowed manner and abject 
servility of the average Korean, which reminds one 
of a dog that has been beaten and which is probably 
due to the same cause; and lastly, to the grotesque 
and unbecoming national costume. Every adult male 
in Korea wears on the top of his otherwise shaven 
head what looks for all the world like a twist of navy 
plug. This is the topknot, which is as distinguish- 
ing a mark of the Korean as the queue formerly was 
of the Chinese. But, whereas the queue was a sym- 
bol of subjugation, the topknot is the Korean's badge 
of legal manhood, and, until he reaches the age when 
he is permitted to wear it, he is known as "a half- 
man." It is protected by a transparent hat of woven 
horsehair, many sizes too small, held in place by 
broad black ribbons tied beneath the chin, which lend 
to the wearer's chubby face, with its drooping and at- 
tenuated mustaches or straggling chin-whisker, an 
infantile and comical expression. Should the horse- 
hair hat get wet, it is ruined, so, to prevent this, it 
is covered in inclement weather with a conical affair 
of oiled paper, producing an effect as ludicrous as 
it is bizarre. The rest of the costume consists of 
a short, shapeless jacket and enormously baggy 
trousers which are confined at the ankles by means 
of strings. The garments of the poorer classes are 
made of a coarse white grasscloth, woven by the peas- 
ants themselves, but the upper classes, when they can 



116 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

afford it, wear thin silks that vie with Joseph's coat 
in their diversity of colors. In the case of the Yang- 
bans — officials and men of leisure — ^this curious en- 
semble is completed by the addition of an enormous 
pair of horn-rimmed spectacles and a pipe with a 
yard-long stem and a bowl the size of a thimble. 
Thus arrayed, the Greek gods would have looked 
like circus clowns. 

The garb of the Korean women, though less ludi- 
crous than that of the men, is equally unattractive: 
an apology for a zouave jacket and exaggerated 
Turkish trousers, the latter all but concealed, how- 
ever, by a petticoat as shapeless as a sheet. Between 
the petticoat and the jacket there is a hiatus of bare 
skin, the breasts being displayed as fully and un- 
blushingly as the damsels of Mr. Ziegfeld's chorus 
display their legs. Were the Korean women less 
faded and of more youthful mold this daring decol- 
letage might be more alluring. 

To form a just appreciation of the mental and 
moral characteristics of an alien race, particularly an 
Oriental race, is a delicate and difficult matter, even 
for those who have spent years among the people in 
question, while a casual observer like myself is in 
constant danger of indulging in hasty and inaccurate 
observations based on inadequate knowledge and lim- 
ited opportunities for observation. In order, there- 
fore, that I may not lay myself open to charges of 



KOREA IIT 

superficiality or prejudice, I have drawn the mate- 
rials for the following sketch of Korean character 
and characteristics from the statements of Mr. Homer 
B. Hurlbert,^ one of the foremost authorities on 
Korean history, life and customs, and an avowed 
friend of the Koreans. 

Let it be emphasized, in the first place, that the 
Korean is a man of high intellectual possibilities, his 
present state of moral and mental stagnation being 
directly traceable to his unhappy history, his wretched 
condition, and his discouraging surroundings. Lift 
him out of this slough of despondency, set him on 
his feet, give him a chance to develop independently 
and naturally, and you would have as good a brain 
as the Far East can produce. It is the experience 
of those who have had to do with the various peoples 
of the extreme Orient that it is easier to understand 
the Korean and to get close to him than it is to under- 
stand either the Japanese or the Chinese. While the 
Japanese inclines toward the idealistic, and the Chi- 
nese leans toward the materialistic, the temperament 
of the Korean lies midway between the two, even as 
his country lies between Japan and China. In other 
words, he is the most rational, judged by Western 
standards, of all the Far Eastern races. I am per- 
fectly aware that those who possess only a superficial 
acquaintance with the Korean, and those others who, 
actuated by pohtical motives or racial prejudices, 

^See Mr. Hurlbert's "The Passing of Korea." 



118 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

make it their business to belittle and discredit him, 
will jeer at this appreciation; but those who have 
had the opportunity and patience to go to the bot- 
tom of the Korean character, and are able to dis- 
tinguish the true Korean from some of the caricatures 
which have been drawn of him, will confirm the asser- 
tion that he possesses certain qualities which, were 
they developed, would make him a reputable member 
of the community of nations. 

The Korean always looks toward yesterday instead 
of toward to-morrow. He has a proverb, "'If you 
try to shorten the road by cutting 'cross lots you will 
fall in with robbers." In other words, he believes 
in staying in the old ruts instead of making new ones. 
What was good enough for his great-great-grand- 
father, he argues, is good enough for him. Yet he can 
be induced to abandon his conservatism by convinc- 
ing him that a change would be to his own advantage, 
as is shown by his enthusiastic adoption of bicycles, 
phonographs, sewing-machines, and other Western 
innovations. 

Foreigners are unfavorably impressed by the read- 
iness of the impecunious Korean to live on his rela- 
tives or friends, but to a large extent this is offset by 
his willingness, when his finances are in a flourishing 
condition, to let his relatives and friends live on him. 
The moment a man attains prosperity he automati- 
cally becomes the social head of his clan, and his rela- 
tives, no matter how far removed, descend upon him 



KOREA 119 

in droves to Kve indefinitely upon his bounty. It 
amounts to a sort of nepotistic communism in which 
every successful man has to divide his profits with 
the less prosperous members of his family, many a 
Korean having been impoverished by the heavy de- 
mands thus made upon him. It should be added, 
however, that this custom is by no means peculiar 
to the Koreans, for precisely the same practice pre- 
vails among the Filipinos and, to a certain extent, 
among the Malays. 

Mr. Hurlbert seems to be of the opinion, however, 
that the average Korean rather welcomes the burden 
thus imposed upon him, for it caters to his over- 
whelming egotism and pride and gives him an excuse 
for lording it over his less fortunate relatives and 
friends. For the Korean is a born social climber, 
and, like social climbers in every country, any acces- 
sion of importance goes to his head like champagne. 
Give a Korean a position of even minor responsibility 
and he will swell up like a toy balloon. The slightest 
social or business promotion is prone to make him 
very offensive, his overbearing manners and pro- 
nounced self-esteem rendering him quite unfitted for 
employment in positions where tact and courtesy are 
required. The medal has another and more pleasing 
side, however, for there is the best of evidence that 
a large number of Koreans die annually from starva- 
tion because they are too proud to beg or borrow or 
to sorn upon their friends. In Seoul there is one 



120 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

whole quarter almost wholly populated by those on 
whom Fortune has turned a cold shoulder. It lies 
under the slopes of South Mountain, and you have 
only to say of a man that he is a "South Ward gentle- 
man" to tell the whole story. 

In the matter of veracity the Korean measures well 
up to the best standards of the Orient, which are 
none too high at best. Some people lie out of pure 
maliciousness; others for the fun of the thing. The 
Korean does not belong in either of these categories ; 
but if he gets into trouble or is faced by a sudden 
emergency, or if the success of some plan necessitates 
a lie, he does not hesitate to take a few liberties with 
the truth. The difference between the Korean and 
the European is illustrated by their reactions if given 
the lie direct. Before calling a European a liar it 
is the part of wisdom to prepare for sudden emer- 
gencies, whereas it is as common for Koreans to use 
the expression "You're a liar!" as it is for an Ameri- 
can to remark "What, really?" or "Is it possible?" 
or "You don't say so!" As Mr. Hurlbert succinctly 
puts it, a Korean sees about as much moral turpitude 
in a lie as we see in a split infinitive. 

Though nothing in my own experience in Korea led 
me to believe that the Korean is any more dishonest 
than his Japanese or Chinese neighbors, I was told 
that he does not hesitate to appropriate anything 
which excites his cupidity when he can do so with 
safety to himself. The Korean costume struck 



KOREA 121 

me as affording a standing inducement to pocket- 
picking, the capacious sleeves and balloon-like trous- 
ers providing ideal places of concealment for pur- 
loined articles. Like all Orientals, the Korean is an 
inveterate gambler, making his appeals to Lady Luck 
through the medium of dominoes or cards, the latter 
being made of stiff oiled paper, half an inch wide and 
eight inches long. There are few harder or more 
constant drinkers than the Korean. He is as fond 
of "fire water" as the red man of the West and 
periodically embarks on drunken and disorderly 
sprees. On these occasions he is prone to display 
unusual assertiveness, which he manifests by forcibly 
abducting some neighboring beauty or emphasizing 
his opinions by beating in the head of a friend. 

As for morality in its narrower sense, the Koreans 
are as easy as an old shoe. And it would be surpris- 
ing if they were otherwise, for from the dawn of 
Korea's history her ruling classes have set an ex- 
ample of depravity and debauchery without parallel 
save in ancient Greece and Rome. Indeed, the Greek 
hetsera has her nearest modern equivalent in the 
Korean kisang, or dancing-girl. These "leaves of 
sunlight," a feature of Korean life, stand apart in 
a class of their own. In the days of Korea's inde- 
pendence they were attached to a department of the 
government, were controlled by a special bureau of 
the court, and were supported from the national treas- 
ury. They are trained from earliest childhood with 



122 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

a view to making them brilliant and entertaining com- 
panions, the one sign of their profession, indeed, be- 
ing their culture, intellectual development, and charm. 
Korean parents, upon meeting with financial reverses, 
frequently dedicate their daughters to the career of 
a kisang, just as, in the days of the empire, they ap- 
prenticed their sons to that of a eunuch. Besides 
these privileged and pampered playthings of the rich, 
Korea has another and far larger class of women of 
easy virtue of a lower and less attractive grade. But 
this much must be said for the Koreans: until the 
Japanese came prostitutes were not recognized by 
law or advertised by segregation. 

The Korean, as both Mr. Hurlbert and Mr. Philip 
Terry ^ have noted, is devoid of humane instincts 
where animals are concerned. If a lame dog or a sick 
cat is seen upon the street, old and young enthusiasti- 
cally join in the sport of stoning it to death. They 
take particular delight in catching insects and pulling 
oflp their legs and wings, going into gales of laughter 
at the contortions of the tortured creatures. Their 
callousness to suffering is exemplified in their meth- 
ods of slaughtering animals for food. In killing a 
beef the butcher first cuts the throat of the animal and 
inserts a peg in the opening, after which he proceeds 
to beat the frenzied creature on the rump with a heavy 
mallet until it is dead. The process takes about an 

*See Terry's "The Japanese Empire." 



KOREA 123 

hour and the poor anunal suffers agonies before death 
intervenes, but, as the Korean will point out, very 
little blood is lost by this method, the meat is full of it, 
and its greater weight consequently means more profit 
for the butcher. Goats are killed by pulling them 
to and fro in a stream, thus destroying the rank taste 
of the meat and enabling it to be sold for mutton. 
Dogs are despatched by twirling them in a noose 
until they are dead, after which they are bled, dog- 
meat being a common article of food among the 
poorer classes. 

It would be easier to overlook the Korean's other 
weaknesses were it not for his incurable aversion to 
cleanliness. Water he never uses except with his 
meals, and then only when there is nothing stronger 
to be had; with soap he does not possess so much as 
a nodding acquaintance. As might be expected, there- 
fore, his voluminous, dirt-caked clothing is usually 
alive with vermin. His villages are but one degree 
removed from pig-sties — ^mere clusters of hovels open- 
ing on narrow, refuse-littered streets from whose open 
drains assorted stenches rise to high heaven. You 
do not have to see a Korean village to be made aware 
of its existence, for when the wind is in the right di- 
rection it is as manifest as a fertilizer plant. If the 
filth and squalor amid which he lives are distasteful 
to the Korean, he never shows it; he is always com- 
placent. One might say of Korea, as Artemas Ward 



124 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

once remarked of Spain, that there would be more 
arable land in the country if the people did not carry 
so much of it around on their persons. 

Though the upper class Koreans are, with few ex- 
ceptions, slothful, purposeless, and born dawdlers, 
the peasants, when well trained and competently su- 
pervised, make excellent workmen, the success of 
those who have emigrated to Hawaii testifying to 
their willingness to work. American and British 
mine managers have told me that the Korean miner, 
if tactfully handled, has no superior in the world. 
Taking him by and large, however, the countryman 
and the town dweller, the upper class and the lower, 
the Korean can hardly be characterized as a hard 
worker. The trouble is that he is without ambition. 
The thing he does best is nothing; his clothes always 
wear out first in the seat. Indeed, he might appro- 
priately adopt that favorite doggerel of the American 
negro, whom, in his distaste for physical exertion, he 
so greatly resembles: 

Dat's de reason why 
I's as happy as a bee, 
Fur I don't trouble work 
An' work don't trouble me. 

Yet there are a fair number of items to be listed 
on the credit side of the ledger. First of all is the 
Korean's good nature, for when even passably well 
treated he is docile and easy to control. Secondly 
comes his imf ailing hospitality, both to utter strangers 



KOREA 125 

and, as I have already shown, to impecunious rela- 
tives and friends. Another redeeming trait is a cer- 
tain sturdiness of character — perhaps stubbornness 
would be a better word — which has enabled him to 
preserve his nationality under the sorest trials. The 
want of courage and self-reliance so frequently com- 
mented on by foreigners are not, I am convinced, 
the result of constitutional cowardice, but are prob- 
ably due to centuries of servitude and oppression. 
Koreans have fought well on occasion, the irregular 
bands who have been conducting a guerilla warfare 
along the Manchurian border having time and again 
proved themselves the equals of the best troops that 
Japan could send against them, while during the sup- 
pression of the independence movement many of the 
Korean prisoners displayed a very high order of 
moral courage in the face of death. I doubt, indeed, 
if braver men are to be found anywhere than the 
tiger-hunters of the hills, who, armed with antiquated, 
long-barreled, percussion muskets, follow the great 
Korean tiger into its den, approach to within a few 
paces, and kill it with a single shot. As there is no 
time to reload, the man who misses dies; the tiger 
attends to that. 

Now it should be remembered that in my estimate 
of the Korean character I have been speaking of the 
average Korean, which means the peasant, for the 
peasantry form the great mass of the population. 
But, though the Korean of the old school admittedly 



126 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

presents a discouraging problem, the country is grad- 
ually gaining a considerable class of young men who 
have been educated abroad and who are intelligent, 
cultured, progressive, and genuinely patriotic. An- 
other encouraging sign is the growing demand among 
all classes for education, the number of students reg- 
istered last year being unprecedented in the history 
of the country. The Koreans make excellent stu- 
dents, displaying particular aptness for mathematics. 
They are quick of comprehension, and those who know 
them well assure me that there is no doubt that they 
are the intellectual equals of the Japanese. All they 
need is the opportunity and the incentive. 

I, for one, can perfectly well understand how the 
alert, energetic, industrious, progressive, aggressive 
Japanese have been exasperated to the limit of their 
patience by the ignorance, slothfulness, irresolution 
and squalor of this people whom they have under- 
taken to reform. I can understand why the Japanese 
consider them and treat them as inferiors. Yet there 
are traits of mind and heart in the Korean which, if 
developed, would prove an enormous asset to the em- 
pire. Make no mistake about that. Japan cannot 
afford to permit the Koreans, who form one quarter 
of her total population, to be overrun and crushed 
beneath the wheels of a selfish and short-sighted 
policy directed by a little group of military men. 
Were she to do so she would be guilty, in the words 
of Talleyrand, of something worse than a crime — 
a mistake. 



KOREA 127 

2. THE JAPANESE IN KOREA 



On a sultry August afternoon in 1905, four men 
— two burly, bearded Russians and two slight, 
suave Japanese — bending over a table in an unim- 
pressive red brick building within the walls of the 
Navy Yard at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 
scrawled their signatures at the bottom of a closely 
written parchment, thereby bringing to an end the 
stupendous struggle between their respective coun- 
tries for the mastery of the Farther East. But, in 
thus concluding a peace between their own great em- 
pires, the plenipotentiaries were signing the death 
warrant of a third nation, a nation which had kept 
its independence for upward of two thousand years, 
for, by the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Rus- 
sia recognized Japan's "paramount political, military, 
and economical interests" in Korea. Thus guaran- 
teed complete freedom of action in the peninsula, 
Japan proclaimed a protectorate over the ancient 
little kingdom before the ink on the treaty was fairly 
dry, and Korea passed into the limbo of subject 
nations. 

The Koreans and their champions have never 
ceased to denounce the methods employed by Japan 
in the estabhshment of the protectorate, asserting, 
and probably with some degree of truth, that the 



128 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

Emperor of Korea and his ministers were intimi- 
dated into signing away the independence of their 
country. But, though the methods which Japan em- 
ployed in effecting this step may be open to criticism, 
that the step was imperative and inevitable cannot 
seriously be questioned. Korea's loss of independ- 
ence was primarily due to her unfortunate geograph- 
ical position. Her internal condition, bad as it was, 
was only contributory in bringing about her down- 
fall. Glance at the map and you will see that the 
peninsula of Korea is a pistol pointed straight at the 
heart of Japan. As long as that weapon remained, 
unloaded, on the table, Japan felt tolerably secure. 
But when she saw an unfriendly hand moving stealth- 
ily to grasp it, she was forced to take decisive action 
in order to insure her own safety. For with nations, 
as with individuals, self-preservation is the first law 
of nature. 

In 1894 China, which had long claimed a shadowy 
suzerainty over Korea — a suzerainty not recognized 
by Japan — despatched a military force to the penin- 
sula for the ostensible purpose of stabilizing the gov- 
ernment of the little kingdom and effecting internal 
reforms. In reality it was a move to bring Korea 
under the rule of Peking. China's curt refusal to 
withdraw her troops forced Japan to choose between 
a permanent Chinese occupation of the peninsula 
and war. She chose the latter and, by a series of 
continuous and easy victories, quickly won an over- 






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FUNERAL OF THE EX-EMPEROR OF KOREA 



KOREA 129 

whelming triumph. By the terms of the treaty of 
peace China abandoned her pretensions to the suze- 
rainty of Korea, which remained, in theory at least, 
an independent kingdom. This was Japan's first 
modern war and it was fought to keep China from 
obtaining possession of the Korean pistol. 

Scarcely was Japan rid of the Chinese menace, 
however, than another and far more formidable 
enemy reached down from the north to snatch the 
weapon so temptingly displayed. In 1903 the Em- 
peror of Korea granted permission to a Russian 
lumber company to fell timber on the Korean side 
of the Yalu River. This seemingly innocent com- 
mercial concession provided the land-hungry Musco- 
vites with a pretext for demanding the cession of a 
Korean harbor — Yongampo — on the Yellow Sea. 
The Bear was coming down to the Warm Water. 
Fully awake to her peril, Japan promptly and vigor- 
ously protested against this aggression, insisting that 
Russia should keep out of Korea and demanding that 
her own special interests in the peninsula should be 
recognized. Russia, made over-confident by her huge 
army and enormous resources, contemptuously re- 
fused. Thus Japan found herself confronted by the 
same problem with the Muscovite that she had fought 
out with the Celestial a decade before. The announce- 
ment of her decision came with paralyzing sudden- 
ness in the dimness of a February dawn in 1904, 
when she launched a torpedo attack against the Rus- 



130 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

sian squadron lying under the guns of Port Arthur. 
The struggle that followed cost the island empire 
135,000 lives and eight hundred million dollars, but 
in eighteen months the men from the little islands, 
who in their youth had worn skirts and carried painted 
fans and drunk their tea from eggshell cups the size 
of thimbles, whipped to a standstill the Colossus of 
the North. 

Having thus waged two wars on account of Korea, 
Japan emerged from the second conflict fully con- 
vinced that her national security depended upon her 
preventing the peninsula from again falling under 
the dominance of a third power. Nor could she per- 
mit the little kingdom to drift into a condition of 
such internal chaos as to imperil foreign interests 
and thereby provide an excuse for foreign interfer- 
ence. There seemed only one way for Japan to dis- 
pel for good and all the threatening cloud which had 
so long overshadowed her: she must herself assume 
supervision of Korea's affairs. Instead of permitting 
the pistol to remain upon the table, a standing invita- 
tion to her enemies, she decided to take charge of it 
herself. It was a case of "safety first." 

The establishment of the protectorate placed 
Korea in much the same relation to Japan that Egypt 
bore to England when the latter intervened in the 
Nile country in 1882. There is, indeed, a striking 
analogy between the two cases. Egypt, its peas- 
antry cruelly oppressed and exploited by a corrupt 



KOREA 131 

and vicious government, occupied a position of im- 
mense strategic importance astride the Suez Canal, 
the gateway to England's eastern possessions. Korea, 
with an equally wretched population and an even 
worse government, by virtue of her conmianding posi- 
tion on the Straits of Korea lay squarely athwart 
Japan's road to her sphere of influence in Manchuria. 
Japan could no more take the risk of another power 
gaining a foothold in Korea and thereby threatening 
her causeway to the Asian mainland than England 
could take the risk of another power gaining a foot- 
hold in Egypt and threatening her sea-road to 
India. England intervened in Egypt in order to 
avert foreign complications by reforming its gov- 
ernment and ameliorating the condition of its peo- 
ple. Japan intervened in Korea for precisely the 
same reasons. England sent to Egypt as proconsul 
her greatest administrator, Evelyn Baring, later Lord 
Cromer. Japan sent to Korea her greatest adminis- 
trator. Marquis I to. Each was confronted by the 
same problem : to reform a government rotten to the 
core and to effect the regeneration of a people re- 
duced to the lowest depths of misery and degrada- 
tion by centuries of spoliation and oppression. Had 
Ito not fallen by the bullet of a Korean assassin at the 
moment when the patient, tactful, sympathetic ad- 
ministration which he had established was beginning 
to show results, there is little doubt that he would 
have met with as astonishing success in rehabilitating 



132 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

the "Land of the Morning Calm" as Cromer did in 
the "Land of the VaUey of the Nile." 

When the Japanese undertook the task of regen- 
erating Korea there were but two classes in that 
unhappy country — the spoilers and the spoiled. Ex- 
tortion, bribery, and peculation were the rule in every 
branch of the government and in every grade ; every 
position was for sale to the highest bidder. The peas- 
antry had neither rights nor privileges, save that of 
being the ultimate sponge. The court at Seoul was 
permeated with treachery and intrigue. Foreigners 
found, as the natives had long known, that no man's 
life or property was safe from the rapacity of the 
court party and its henchmen. Political assassina- 
tions were so common as scarcely to provoke com- 
ment. Never, perhaps, has there existed a weaker 
government, one more degraded and corrupt, one 
more utterly incapable of governing. No govern- 
ment more richly deserved its fate. 

In June, 1907, the weak, intrigue-loving old em- 
peror, notwithstanding his agreement not to engage 
in any act of an international character except 
through the medium of Japan, secretly despatched 
three emissaries to The Hague, where the Second 
Peace Conference was sitting, in an attempt to bring 
about foreign intervention. In order to save their 
country from the consequences of the emperor's in- 
discretion, which the Japanese regarded as treach- 
ery, the Korean cabinet, composed, for a wonder, of 



KOREA 13S 

patriotic and far-seeing men, virtually insisted on 
the sovereign's abdication. He was succeeded by 
the crown prince, a youth who, if popular report is 
to be believed, has been mentally incompetent from 
birth, but his tenure of the puppetship was destined 
to be of brief duration. 

Meanwhile, political conditions in Seoul were go- 
ing from bad to worse. Plot and counterplot fol- 
lowed each other in rapid succession. To avert an- 
archy, the Japanese put down these conspiracies with 
an iron hand. And to protect the peasantry, who 
were powerless to protect themselves, they suppressed 
extortion and oppression with equal firmness. The 
firm attitude of the government so alarmed and in- 
furiated the corruptionists and conspirators that they 
had recourse to the Korean's traditional method of 
political retaliation — assassination. This campaign 
of terrorism, which culminated in the brutal murder 
of Prince Ito, Korea's staunchest friend, only served 
to hasten the end, which came on the twenty-second 
of August, 1910, when Korea was formally annexed 
to the Empire of Japan. 

The imperial rescript proclaiming the annexation 
was the signal for the systematic Japanization of 
Korea to begin. And it was begun with all the 
method and thoroughness so characteristic of the peo- 
ple of Nippon. The conciliatory policy of Prince 
Ito gave way to a Bismarckian policy of blood and 
iron. Those who now shaped Japan's Korean policy 



134 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

were not content to work toward a genuine amalga- 
mation of the Koreans with the Japanese by a proc- 
ess of education and conciHation. They insisted on 
forcible denationalization. Instead of being far- 
sighted enough to grant the Koreans the large meas- 
ure of autonomy which we have given to the Filipinos 
and the Porto Ricans, which England has given to 
the Boers and the Egyptians, they made the mistake 
of attempting to extirpate the language and the lit- 
erature of the Koreans, to destroy their national 
ideals, to root out their ancient manners and customs. 
In short, they tried to mold these new subjects over 
again, mistakenly believing that, were sufficient pres- 
sure applied, they would emerge from the process as 
Japanese, though I imagine that it was never intended 
that they should be anything except an inferior grade 
of Japanese, subject to restrictions and disabilities 
from which the islanders themselves were immune. I 
may be doing those who were responsible for this 
policy a grave injustice, but, judging their aims by 
their actions, I am tempted to believe that they 
dreamed of eventually bringing the Koreans to a 
status not far removed from that of the American 
negro, thereby giving to the empire seventeen millions 
of patient, uncomplaining, and submissive subjects, 
hewers of wood and drawers of water, who would ac- 
cept without remonstrarice the role of social, political, 
and economic inferiority assigned to them. In adopt- 
ing this policy they committed the first of the series 



KOREA 135 

of psychological and political blunders which have 
caused such grave criticism of Japanese rule in Korea 
and which have provided the enemies of Japan with 
so much ammunition. Mind you, I am not suggesting 
that progressive Japanese opinion approved of this 
policy, for it did not. The Korean program repre- 
sented the views of the military party alone. Indeed, 
there was a considerable element in Japan which dis- 
approved of the annexation altogether, holding that 
a resentful and rebellious Korea, annexed against her 
will, standing at Japan's door, would prove a source 
of weakness rather than of strength to the empire. 

Korea was now an integral part of the Japanese 
Empire. But though the instrument which brought 
the two peoples together specifically and by implica- 
tion provides that Koreans shall share in the public 
affairs of Japan, the Japanese proceeded to treat 
Korea as a conquered nation. It was at once placed 
under military rule, General Count Terauchi, a grim 
soldier of the old samurai school, being appointed 
resident-general and clothed with almost sovereign 
powers. Soldiery, gendarmerie, and police were 
poured into the new province until it assumed the 
appearance of a great armed camp. Then, with the 
stage set, the curtain rose on the tragic spectacle of 
the denationalization of a people. 



136 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 



II 

What I now have to say cannot but prove distaste- 
ful reading for the Japanese and their friends. Yet 
to minimize, or apologize for, or ignore the deplorable 
blunders which marred Japan's administrative record 
in Korea during the decade immediately following 
the annexation, as certain American champions of 
Japan have done, would only impair the value of 
this book in the eyes of thoughtful and impartially- 
minded men, without rendering any corresponding 
service either to the Japanese or the Koreans. Were 
I to attempt to make the picture more flattering to 
Japanese pride by leaving out the blemishes, I should 
be failing in that duty which every self-respecting 
author owes to his readers and to himself. On the 
other hand, I shall not permit myself to be influenced 
by the usually exaggerated and frequently untruthful 
charges made against the Japanese administration 
by the Koreans and their champions. I believe that 
every statement contained in the succeeding pages 
can be fully substantiated, in many cases by the 
"Annual Report" of the Government- General of 
Korea itself. 

One of the first steps taken by the Japanese in 
their organized campaign of denationalization was 
the enactment of legislation denying freedom of the 
press, of speech, and of assembly to the Koreans. In 



KOREA 137 

pursuance of this policy all the papers and periodi- 
cals owned or managed by Koreans were suppressed. 
"At the end of the fiscal year 1916 there were twenty 
newspapers published in Chosen, of which eighteen 
were in Japanese, one in Korean, and one in Eng- 
lish," says the "Annual Report," which might have 
added that they were all Japanese, and that three of 
them, including the last two, were government organs. 
During the reign of repression the only non- Japanese 
publications in Korea were certain newspapers 
printed secretly, while their publishers were "on the 
run," and distributed from hand to hand, like the 
famous Belgian journals issued during the German 
occupation. The hand-presses and type were con- 
veyed from hiding-place to hiding-place under cover 
of night, the lives of the editors being as thrilling as 
the Japanese police and spies could make them. 

It having been determined that the Korean lan- 
guage, like Korean literature, should die, an attempt 
was made to destroy it by making Japanese the offi- 
cial tongue not only in public documents and court 
proceedings, but wherever possible in the schools. 
It is instructive to compare this with our own policy 
in the Philippines, where Spanish is taught as freely 
and as widely as English. The text-books used in 
the schools were printed in Japanese under the super- 
vision of Japanese censors; the teachers were either 
Japanese or Japanese-speaking Koreans. And, as 
though to impress the children with the military might 



138 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

of Japan, the teachers wore sabers. Imagine the 
effect on a class of little girls when their teacher em- 
phasized his authority by rattling his sword I 

Though Korea has a history reaching back into 
the past for two thousand years, its teaching in the 
schools was forbidden. Nor, with the exception of 
certain specially favored individuals, were Koreans 
permitted to go abroad for study, except to Japan, 
and those who had been studying abroad were 
not permitted to return. Moreover, those who suc- 
ceeded in obtaining permission to attend the Imperial 
University at Tokyo were discouraged, if not actually 
forbidden, from specializing in such subjects as law, 
constitutional government, history, or economics, it 
being the Japanese policy to encourage industrial 
education along practical lines for their new subjects 
to the exclusion of everything else. The Japanese 
have always held that England, by encouraging a 
purely academic education for the higher class Hindus 
in India, was breeding discontent and agitation, and 
they had no intention of trying a similar experiment 
in Korea. 

"The holding of public meetings in connection with 
political affairs, or the gathering of crowds out of 
doors, was also prohibited, except open-air religious 
gatherings or school excursion parties, permission for 
which might be obtained of the police authorities." 
Thus reads a passage in the "Annual Report," which 
further states that "most of the political associations 



KOREA 139 

and similar bodies were ordered to dissolve themselves 
at the time of annexation. . . . Since then there has 
been no political party or association, as such, among 
the Koreans." This regulation was even more com- 
prehensive than its wording would suggest. For ex- 
■ ample, a Y. M. C. A. had to submit to the police the 
date, hour, speaker, and topic of discussion of a pro- 
posed meeting before it could obtain permission to 
hold it; the same prohibitive principle applied to 
interscholastic field-meets in which two or more 
schools proposed to participate. 

Another source of Korean resentment was provided 
by the Japanese attitude toward religion. Broadly 
speaking, religious instruction was forbidden in Ko- 
rean schools. Religious gatherings of more than five 
persons were required to obtain a permit from the 
police and native Christians had to obtain special 
authorization to hold religious services. This interfer- 
ence with religious liberty was, in itself, the height 
of political unwisdom, but the over-zealous police, 
by their harsh and unintelligent methods of enforce- 
ment, turned it into something perilously close to re- 
ligious persecution. For example, such hymns as 
"Onward, Christian Soldiers" were forbidden on the 
ground that they tended to develop a militaristic 
spirit among the Koreans — an inhibition only equaled 
in recent times, in its patent absurdity, by Abdul 
Hamid's famous dictum against the importation into 
Turkey of dynamos "because they sound too much 



7 

140 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

like dynamite!" Prominent churchmen, leaders in 
Korean thought and education, were arrested and 
sometimes thrown into prison on charges so ridiculous 
that they sounded more like a passage from a Gilbert 
and Sullivan opera than a serious court proceeding. 
For example, the pastor of one of the native churches 
was arrested for having referred in his sermon to the 
Kingdom of Heaven. He was freed with an admoni- 
tion not to repeat the offense, the police magistrate 
warning him that the only kingdom in which the 
Koreans should display an interest was the King- 
dom of Japan! Mr. C. W. Kendall, in "The Truth 
About Korea," cites the case of Pastor Kil of Ping- 
Yang, who, for preaching against the evils of cigar- 
ette-smoking by boys, was charged by the Japanese 
authorities with treason. The argument of the Jap- 
anese prosecutor, according to Mr. Kendall, ran 
something after this fashion: 

Pastor Kil preached against the use of cigarettes. 

The manufacture of cigarettes is a government monopoly. 

To speak against their use is to injure a government in- 
stitution. 

To injure a government institution is to work against the 
government. 

To work against the government is treason. 

Ergo, Pastor Kil is guilty of treason. 

Though upon annexation Korea became, in theory 
at least, a province of the empire, the Koreans were 
permitted neither a national assembly nor representa- 
tion in the Japanese Diet, thus giving them justifica- 



KOREA 141 

tion for adopting the slogan, "Taxation without rep- 
resentation is tyranny." Had the Japanese been more 
familiar with American history they would have real- 
ized that the same slogan cost England her American 
colonies. Though in principle the Koreans were to be 
accorded the same treatment as other subjects of the 
emperor, discrimination of the most flagrant character 
was practised against them everywhere. Koreans and 
Japanese were subject to two entirely different codes 
of legal procedure. The codes applying to Koreans 
were severer, on the assumption that they needed 
heavier penalties to bring about a desired result. 
For example, corporal punishment could be legally 
administered only to Koreans. Hence, if a Japa- 
nese was convicted of a misdemeanor, he was im- 
prisoned or fined. If a Korean was convicted of 
the same offense, he was flogged — sometimes into 
insensibility. If a Japanese was killed by the Seoul 
street-railways, his family was paid two hundred yen. 
If the victim was a Korean, the indemnity was half 
that sum. A Japanese common laborer received 
over half again as much pay as a Korean laborer 
engaged in the same task, and the same rule applied 
to skilled workmen and, for that matter, to govern- 
ment officials. While eleven years are allotted to 
Japanese youths for primary and secondary edu- 
cation, only eight years were allowed the Koreans. 
It has been suggested, incidentally, that this discrim- 
ination in the curricula was the highest unintentional 



142 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

compliment the Japanese could pay the exceptional 
intellectual ability of the sons and daughters of 
Korea. 

Even more humiliating and degrading were the 
various forms of social discrimination practised 
against the Koreans. As staunch a defender of 
Japan's pohcy in Korea as Dr. George Gleason ad- 
mits this in his book, "What Shall I Think of Japan?" 
"Nearly all Japanese assume an air of superiority 
toward the Koreans," he says. I can assert from per- 
sonal observation that the great majority of Japanese 
treat the Koreans in personal intercourse as the dirt 
beneath their feet. A Japanese always takes his 
place, as by right, at the head of a waiting line at a 
post-office, bank, or railway-station. The Japanese 
coolie kicks or punches the Korean who chances to 
stand in his way. The Japanese petty functionaries 
assume an air of hauteur and disdain in their deal- 
ings with the Koreans. Even the Korean nobles 
and princes of the royal house are treated with studied 
condescension. It is only fair to add, however, that 
this disregard of Korean susceptibilities is confined 
in the main to Japanese of the lower and middle 
classes. Every nation has its gentlemen. 

Immediately upon annexation the peninsula was 
flooded with gendarmes, police, spies, and informers, 
who promptly proceeded to inaugurate a reign of ter- 
rorism. On the pretext of searching for arms or se- 
ditious literature the police entered private residences 



•^ 



KOREA 148 

without search-warrants, still further irritating the 
Koreans by invading the apartments of the women. 
Spies, usually low-class Koreans, were everywhere, 
adding to the general demoralization. No one knew 
when, or in what form, the most harmless acts or 
words might be reported to the authorities. Yet the 
Koreans had no appeal from these oppressions, be- 
cause, with no newspapers, they had no way of mak- 
ing themselves heard. 

"In the peninsula," tc quote again from the official 
"Annual Report," "miiior offenses relating to gam- 
bling, bodily harm, etc., or to a violation of administra- 
tive ordinances, which would ordinarily come under 
the jurisdiction of the lowest courts, are adjudicated 
by the police, instead of by ordinary judicial pro- 
cedure." Thus it will be seen that the police, in addi- 
tion to their regular functions of crime prevention 
and the apprehension of criminals, were given judi- 
cial power. They could sentence prisoners to fines, 
flogging, imprisonment, or exile. The extreme un- 
wisdom of granting such wide powers to the police, 
who were totally incompetent to exercise them with 
discretion and who, to make matters worse, were for 
the most part men of petty minds and narrow sym- 
pathies, requires no comment. Add to this the fact, 
of which there exists indubitable proof, that the poHce 
frequently tortured innocent persons in order to ex- 
tract testimony from them, and it will be seen that 
the Koreans had abundant ground for complaint. 



144 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

That the police had gendarmes and soldiers asso- 
ciated with them in the enforcement of the law led 
the Koreans to regard the police not as civil servants 
and protectors, but as oppressors. This feeling was 
intensified by the multitude of petty and vexatious 
regulations, many of which the people could not 
understand, and by the harsh and indiscriminate man- 
ner in which they were administered. The records of 
the summary courts — ^which correspond to our police 
courts — for 1915 show a total of 59,483 persons 
brought to trial and only seven acquitted. Dr. Glea- 
son, who is strongly pro-Japanese in his sympathies, 
asserts that in the four years, 1913-16, 221,000 per- 
sons were tried and only 496 acquitted. In the re- 
port issued by the government-general for the year 
1916-17 it is stated that out of 82,121 offenders dealt 
with "in police summary judgment," 81,139 were sen- 
tenced, 952 were pardoned, and only 30 were able 
to prove their innocence. Dr. Hugh C. Cynn, in his 
dispassionate and, on the whole, remarkably just 
book, "The Rebirth of Korea," dryly remarks that 
"either the Japanese police in Korea are so superior 
to those of all other nations in detecting crime that 
they almost never run down any but the actual crim- 
inals, or the Koreans, when they get into the meshes 
of the police and gendarme-interpreted ordinances, 
find it next to impossible to prove their innocence." 

Instead of putting Korean interests first, Japan 
made the mistake of ruling the peninsula primarily 



KOREA 145 

for her own giory and the benefit of her own people. 
The Japanese settler, the Japanese trader, the Japa- 
nese concessionaire, were the men whose needs the 
government -general at Seoul studied and whose de- 
mands it heeded. The Koreans, without influence and 
without protection and hampered by serious political 
disabilities and restrictions, could be exploited with 
impunity, provided the methods used were not too 
outrageous. Under the old Korean Government the 
land was divided into four classes :^ 

1. Private lands, owned by individuals. 

2. Crown lands, belonging to the emperor but 
leased in perpetuity to private individuals. 

3. Municipal lands, the titles to which were vested 
in the various municipalities, but the practical owner- 
ship of which was in the hands of private individuals. 

4. Lands belonging to the Buddhist temples. 

Owners of private lands paid taxes to the govern- 
ment. Tenants of crown lands paid rental to the 
royal household. Those occupying municipal lands 
paid fees to the respective municipalities. The tem- 
ple lands, which were held under a communistic ar- 
rangement by the Buddhists, were exempt from taxa- 
tion. In many cases the leasehold of these lands had 
acquired a value almost equal to that of land held 
in full possession. One of the first acts of the Japa- 
nese administration was to survey the country and 
expropriate all crown, municipal, and temple lands, 

* "The Truth About Korea," by C. W. KendaU. 



146 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

on the ground that, as they did not belong to private 
individuals, they must be the property of the govern- 
ment. They were then turned over to a concern 
known as the Oriental Development Company, which 
was a government- fostered organization for encourag- 
ing the immigration of Japanese into Korea. This 
company, by demanding greatly increased rentals 
from the Korean tenants, forced them to abandon the 
lands which they had tilled for generations in favor 
of government-assisted Japanese settlers. The eco- 
nomic unwisdom of this policy is shown by the fact 
that, though some 400,000 Japanese have settled in 
the peninsula since the annexation, upward of 1,500,- 
000 Koreans have gone into voluntary exile in Man- 
churia and Siberia because they could not stand the 
pressure thus brought to bear upon them. The re- 
peated assertions of the Japanese that they went into 
Korea for the benefit of the Koreans reminds me of 
an anecdote about one of the rulers of the House of 
Hanover — I think it was George the First — who, 
addressing his new subjects upon his arrival in Eng- 
land, assured them in his broken English, "I am here 
for your own good — for all your goods." 

By virtue of Article V of the Treaty of Annexa- 
tion, which bound "the Emperor of Japan to confer 
peerages and monetary grants upon Koreans who, 
on account of meritorious services, are regarded as 
deserving such special recognition," some seventy-two 



KOREA 147 

Koreans were made counts, viscounts, and barons. 
Had Japan chosen for the new nobility those men 
who, by reason of their integrity, ability, and patriot- 
ism, held the respect of the Korean people, this meas- 
ure would have met with popular approval. But in- 
stead she chose to honor the corruptionists and con- 
spirators who had ruined the country, most of the 
more upright and respected statesmen being con- 
spicuous by their omission from the honors list. On 
the other hand, the leaders of the former progressive 
party, who were the real brains of the country, were 
proscribed and persecuted. As a result, many of 
them were forced to leave the country and the lives 
of those who remained were made miserable by espion- 
age and bullying. Had these men, the real leaders 
of Korean public opinion, been treated in a tactful 
and friendly manner by the Japanese, had they been 
consulted on Korean problems, as England consulted 
and honored her great Boer adversaries, Botha and 
Smuts, I am convinced that it would have done more 
than anything else to have won the confidence of the 
Korean people and to have brought peace and content- 
ment to the new province, for the Koreans were 
heartily sick of the follies and extravagances of 
the old regime. Instead of availing herself of 
their knowledge of Korea's needs and profiting 
by their advice, Japan made the mistake of driving 
them into exile or imprisoning them. In so doing she 



148 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

made martyrs of them in the eyes of their own people. 
What a pity that the Japanese, in their treatment 
of these men, could not have been blessed with the 
shrewd common sense of that English sovereign who, 
speaking of the leader of a rebellious faction, said, "I 
won't let him make a martyr of himself." 

In the foregoing pages I have sketched in brief out- 
line the methods by which Japan sought to assimilate 
the Korean people during the ten years following the 
annexation. In doing this I have tried to be abso- 
lutely fair. All of the abuses which I have cited are 
fully substantiated by the official reports of the gov- 
ernment-general itself. Of certain other charges, 
which I have not been able to verify to my own satis- 
faction, I have made no mention. Viewing the ques- 
tion impartially, it appears to me that at the begin- 
ning of 1920, when Japan inaugurated a milder and 
more sympathetic rule in the peninsula, the Koreans 
had no less than a dozen distinct and justifiable 
grounds for complaint against the Japanese adminis- 
tration. These might be summed up as follows : 

1. Taxation without representation. 

2. Denial of freedom of the press, of speech, and 
of assembly. 

3. Measures tending to the eventual extirpation 
of the Korean language. 

4. Educational discrimination. 

5. Interference with the religious activities of the 
people. 



KOREA 149 

6. Abuse of power by the police. 

7. Multiplicity of irritating laws and lack of judg- 
ment in their enforcement. 

8. Expropriation of public lands. 

9. Economic pressure against Koreans. 

10. Persecution of Korean leaders. 

11. Lack of tact, sympathy, and understanding 
on the part of Japanese officials. 

12. Social discrimination. 

By these methods the Japanese sought to remold 
their new subjects in their own image. But, much 
to their surprise and perturbation, they discovered 
in the Korean a character as hard, as obstinate, and 
as unyielding as their own. At every turn they found 
themselves confronted by that most baffling of all 
obstacles — passive resistance. Had the Japanese 
been far-sighted enough to treat the Koreans, who are 
not a conquered race, as England treated the con- 
quered Boers, there would have been a genuine amal- 
gamation of the two peoples. And it is not a long step 
from amalgamation to assimilation. But the Japa- 
nese ignored this golden opportunity to win the 
loyalty and friendship of their new subjects. They 
entered on their task in a wrong spirit; they were 
hampered by mistaken ideas. Failing utterly to 
understand the Korean's psychology, they assumed 
an attitude of contempt instead of sympathy. And 
without sympathy on the part of the governors for 



150 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

the governed, good government is impossible.^ 
Imagine the upheaval in the British Empire if Eng- 
land should suppress the vernacular newspapers of 
the Hindus, if she should forbid the use of Arabic in 
the courts of Egypt, if she should expropriate the 
lands of the Indian princes, if she should prohibit the 
teaching of the Koran in the schools of her Moham- 
medan possessions. Yet that is a fair parallel to 
the policy of the Japanese in Korea. They insisted 
that the Koreans should speak their language, read 
their newspapers, follow their customs, lead their 
lives, even wear their clothing; in short, permit them- 
selves to be remade mentally, spiritually, and out- 
wardly. That the complete breakdown of this policy 
has been clearly recognized by the more progressive 
and discerning of the Japanese themselves is shown 
by the report of Mr. Kenosuke Morya, whom the 
Japanese constitutional party sent to Korea to in- 
vestigate conditions on the spot. In it he says, "It 
is a great mistake of colonial policy to enforce upon 
the Koreans, with their two-thousand-year history, 
the same spiritual and mental training as the Japa- 
nese people." 

Ill 

Yet during this same discouraging decade the Japa- 
nese made amazing material progress in Korea. The 

* "Korea's Fight for Freedom," by F. A. McKenzie. 



KOREA 151 

old, effete, corrupt administration was swept away. 
A cabinet was formed on the model of that in Japan. 
An elaborate system of local government was adopted. 
The judiciary was reformed. A sound monetary sys- 
tem was established and maintained. Prisons were 
cleansed and modernized. The mileage of the rail- 
ways was doubled. The inadequate Korean harbors 
were transformed into spacious ports equipped with 
all modern appliances. Remarkable improvements 
in the public health were effected by government hos- 
pitals and systems of sanitation. New waterworks 
were built in fourteen cities and towns. The 500 
miles of road which existed in 1910 were increased to 
8000, it being proposed to eventually cover the penin- 
sula with a network of highways. New industries 
were introduced, nearly 800 factories, something 
hitherto unknown in the land, being established, 
thereby providing occupation for thousands of Ko- 
reans. Handsome and substantial public buildings 
were erected. Streets were extended and paved and 
charming parks laid out. Primary, secondary, tech- 
nical, agricultural, forestry, and other schools, as well 
as model farms and experimental stations, were 
opened. Agriculture — the mainstay of the country — 
was enormously developed, the Korean farmer being 
taught new and profitable side-lines — fruit, cotton, 
sugar-beet, hemp, tobacco, and silk-worm culture, and 
sheep -breeding. Afforestation was pushed forward 
on a truly astounding scale, no less than half a bil- 



152 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

lion young trees being set out by the Japanese fores- 
try service on the bare, brown hillsides. The area of 
cultivated land was doubled. Fruit production was 
more than doubled. The output of the Korean coal 
mines was trebled. Cotton acreage increased by more 
than 4500 per cent, and salt production by more 
than 7000 per cent. There were increases of several 
hundred per cent, in the acreages of wheat, beans, and 
barley. By the introduction of modem appliances 
the value of the fishery products doubled. The for- 
eign trade of Korea went up from 59,000,000 yen to 
131,000,000 yen in seven years. In less than a decade 
after the annexation there were a million depositors 
in the postal savings-banks — and this in a country 
with a notoriously shiftless and improvident popula- 
tion. In short, more public improvements were made, 
civic reforms instituted, and economic progress ef- 
fected in these ten years than the Koreans had so 
much as thought of since their history began. 

For this great work Japan deserves the highest 
commendation. It is a striking testimonial to her 
efficiency in effecting material reforms. And it is 
likewise a testimonial to the capacity for making prog- 
ress of the Koreans themselves. If successful col- 
onial administration consisted only in effecting ma- 
terial benefits, Japan's record in Korea would entitle 
her to be regarded as one of the most successful col- 
onizing nations in the world. The curious fact re- 
mains that few, if any, of the writers on Korea have 



KOREA 153 

appraised this record of achievement at its true valu- 
ation/ Their perspective is distorted by their preju- 
dices. The pro-Korean writers, almost without 
exception, have either minimized Japan's accomplish- 
ments in the peninsula or have denied their benefit 
to the Koreans themselves. On the other hand, such 
pro-Japanese writers as Messrs. Sherrill, Glea- 
son, and Hershey have magnified the chronicle of 
progress until it all but obscures everything else. It 
can no more benefit the Koreans for their champions 
to shut their eyes to the undeniable good that the 
Japanese have accomplished than it can serve Japan to 
have her partisans ignore those evils which cry for 
redress. 



IV 

Following the annexation many of the Korean lead- 
ers who had tried to save their dying country in its 
last desperate moments, recognizing the futility of 
attempting to do anything further at that time, fled 
to foreign countries. Some settled across the frontier 
in Siberia and Manchuria; others established them- 
selves in the Treaty Ports, in Manila, Honolulu, San 
Francisco. A number of these political refugees con- 

"■ In "The Truth About Korea" Mr. C. W. Kendall devotes only four 
lines to what Japan has done for the good of the Koreans. In his 
"Modern Japan" Dr. A. S. Hershey devotes scarcely more space to dis- 
cussing the shortcomings of the Japanese administration. The only 
fearless and non-partisan account I have been able to find is that con- 
tained in Mr. J. O, P. Bland's "Japan, China and Korea." 



154 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

stituted themselves into a "Provisional Government 
of Korea," with headquarters at Shanghai, it being 
claimed that the self-appointed members of this 
"government" are supported by funds voluntarily 
paid as taxes by the Korean people. It is very doubt- 
ful, however, whether these enthusiastic young pa- 
triots are as truly representative of the great mass of 
the Korean people as the Korean National Associa- 
tion, a society which claims to have a membership of 
over a million Koreans living in exile throughout the 
Farther East. At the same time, despite the activity 
of the Japanese police, other secret societies, likewise 
dedicated to freeing Korea from Japanese rule, were 
organized in the peninsula itself. From all I have 
been able to learn these associations are not composed 
of dangerous radicals, disgruntled politicians, and bol- 
shevist terrorists, as charged by the Japanese author- 
ities, but, on the contrary, consist for the most part 
of Korean scholars and progressives, many of them 
graduates of American and European universities, 
who have the best interests of their country sincerely 
at heart. They are agitators, it is true, in that they 
are agitating for their country's independence, but 
what, pray^ were Patrick Henry and Bolivar, Kos- 
ciuszko and Juarez and Gomez? 

Throughout the four years of the World War 
there were manifest to keen observers many evidences 
that a new spirit was gradually taking possession of 
the Koreans. It would be stating only a part of the 



KOREA 155 

truth, however, to assert that the Japanese adminis- 
tration was the sole cause of this national unrest. 
Obnoxious though that administration was, it was 
only contributory; the real cause was to be found in 
the innate and irresistible desire of the Koreans to 
govern themselves. They were hungry for freedom. 
Now that the world had been made safe for democ- 
racy; now that the Poles and the Croats and the 
Czechs and the Lithuanians were about to achieve their 
independence, is it any wonder that the Koreans felt 
that the hour when they should strike for liberty was 
likewise at hand ? It was Woodrow Wilson's pronun- 
ciamento on the right of small nations to self-deter- 
mination which gave them their text and battle-cry. It 
was the assembling of the peacemakers at Versailles 
which gave them their opportunity. The Korean 
leaders, believing, no doubt, that they could ride to 
success on the wave of political freedom which was 
sweeping the world, chose the time set for the opening 
of the Peace Conference to launch their "passive 
revolution." For the most part impractical vision- 
aries, there is something of the pathetic in their fail- 
ure to realize how hopeless was their attempt to inter- 
est a distracted Europe in the fortunes of an obscure 
little nation half the world away. 

It was planned that the "revolution" should be 
unique in the history of political uprising in that there 
should be neither bloodshed nor violence. The par- 
ticipants were explicitly warned that no one was to 



156 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

be harmed. No property was to be destroyed or 
damaged. No rowdyism, no bolshevism, no terrorism 
was to be tolerated. Orders were given that under no 
circumstances were the demonstrators to resist the 
Japanese poHce. If they were beaten, imprisoned, 
or even killed they were to take their punishment 
without complaint. Nothing must be done which 
would bring reproach upon the name of Korea or 
their movement. It was arranged that these passive 
demonstrations should break out simultaneously in 
all the larger towns and cities of the peninsula, while 
in Seoul itself the demonstrators were to divide them- 
selves into groups of three thousand, each under a 
leader, and march to the various foreign consulates 
and government offices, singing the Korean national 
anthem and shouting "Manseir, which is the Korean 
equivalent of "Hurrah!" In short, it was to be a 
nation-wide demonstration in which seventeen million 
Koreans were to impress on their Japanese rulers by 
strictly peaceable methods that they would no longer 
submit to misgovernment and oppression. When it 
is remembered that for every Japanese in the penin- 
sula there are fifty Koreans, it is not hard to guess 
what would have happened if the demonstration had 
not been a passive one. 

How the great number of country people who were 
to participate in the demonstration were to gain ac- 
cess to the capital without arousing the suspicions of 
the Japanese police was a question which caused some 



KOREA 157 

perplexity to the leaders of the movement, but it 
was suddenly solved in the latter part of January, 
1919, when the old ex-Emperor Yi passed away in 
his palace in Seoul. Though he had been of no service 
to his countrymen when alive, it seemed that he might 
aid them unwittingly now that he was dead, for his 
funeral, set for March 4, provided the excuse the 
Korean leaders had been seeking for a sudden influx 
of peasantry into the capital. In some way, however, 
the carefully guarded secret reached the ears of the 
police, whereupon the resourceful leaders suddenly 
changed the date for the demonstration to March 1, — 
the day set for the rehearsal of the funeral. Now the 
rehearsal of a Korean funeral is almost as magnificent 
as the event itself, so the authorities saw nothing to 
cause alarm in the great numbers of Koreans who 
came pouring into the capital by train and road, afoot, 
and in lumbering carts and astride of horses. 

The morning of March 1 found upward of two 
hundred thousand people assembled in the streets 
of Seoul. The whole city was tense with anxiety, 
mingled with some vague expectancy. In the mean- 
time thirty-three men, representing all religions, 
sects, and classes, had drawn up and signed what was 
virtually a declaration -of independence. These men 
thoroughly believed that President Wilson's declara- 
tion that the civilized world was determined hence- 
forth to protect the rights of weaker nations pro- 
claimed the end of Korea's vassaldom. "A new era," 



158 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

they declared, "wakes before our eyes; the old world 
of force is gone, and the new world of righteousness 
and truth is here." As an English writer, Mr. J. 
O. P. Bland, has put it, "Of practical politics, of the 
great world beyond the Hermit Kingdom, these sim- 
ple old-world scholars and guileless enthusiasts knew 
little or nothing; they only knew that under the rule 
of Japan they were humiliated and unhappy, and 
that after the agony of ten years of foreign oppres- 
sion the clarion call had sounded which was to give 
them unfettered liberty." Copies of the proclama- 
tion, together with instructions as to what was ex- 
pected of the people, were sent to local leaders all 
over Korea through the aid of little school-girls, who 
hid the incriminating documents in their capacious 
sleeves and trudged from town to town, bearing the 
message of freedom. 

Shortly before noon on March 1 twenty-nine of 
the thirty-three signers of the declaration met in the 
Tai-wha Kwan, where the independence of Korea 
had been signed away nearly a decade before. It is 
said that all the higher officials of the Japanese admin- 
istration had been invited to attend the meeting, but 
that only one had come, the others having official 
duties which took them elsewhere. After the mo- 
mentous document had been read to the assemblage 
a messenger was despatched to communicate its con- 
tents to the great crowd which had gathered in Pa- 
goda Park. Then, after drinking success to the 



KOREA 159 

movement thus initiated, one of the signers went to 
the telephone, called up the chief of police, told him 
what they had done, and informed him that they were 
ready to go to prison. The suggestion was promptly 
complied with. 

The demonstration, taken as a whole, followed the 
instructions of the leaders to the letter. The demon- 
strators were unarmed, and among them were as 
many old men and women as young people. For- 
eigners who witnessed the affair told me that it was 
one of the most curious and impressive sights they had 
ever seen. The masses of white-clad people, pulsat- 
ing with the new spirit of freedom, surged through the 
streets in human billows, waving little Korean flags, 
of which thousands had been distributed secretly, 
singing the Korean national anthem, which is set 
to the tune of "Auld Lang Syne," and shouting 
"Mansei! Mansei! Mansei! Ten thousand years 
for Korea !"^ 

So skilfully had the demonstration been planned 
and executed that the authorities were taken com- 
pletely by surprise. The Japanese secret service, 
which had boasted that it had its fingers constantly on 
the pulse of Korean public opinion, had been outwit- 
ted and out-manoeuvered at every turn. Because of 
the magnitude of the movement the police were help- 

^ This sketch of the independence agitation has been drawn, in the 
main, from Korean sources — "The Truth About Korea," by C. W. 
Kendall and "The Rebirth of Korea," by Hugh Heung-wo Cynn — in 
BO far as they agree with the testimony of unprejudiced witnesses. 



160 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

less, but as soon as the seriousness of the situation 
was reahzed the troops were called out and the par- 
aders were dispersed by force, hundreds being 
wounded or trampled upon. By nightfall of "Inde- 
pendence Day" the prisons of Korea were filled to 
overflowing. 

It was here, in my opinion, that the authorities were 
guilty of a serious blunder. It must be patent to 
every fair-minded person that they could not tolerate 
disorders and revolutionary acts, however patrioti- 
cally intended, and that in adopting stern measures 
for their suppression they only did what all govern- 
ments are likely to do under similar circumstances. 
The question is whether, in view of the eminently 
passive character of the demonstration, they chose the 
wisest course. So long as there was no violence it 
would have been the part of wisdom, it seems to me, 
to have let the pent-up emotions of the people escape 
through the safety-valve provided by the demonstra- 
tion, instead of attempting forcibly to suppress them. 
Much bloodshed might have been averted if the au- 
thorities had possessed the psychology of one village 
policeman, who permitted the people in his district 
to celebrate for three days without molestation. Then 
he told them that if they wanted independence they 
should build up an army and navy ; this would require 
much money, so they had better return to their work 
and accimiulate the wealth necessary to develop the 
nation. They agreed with him that it was sound 




DEVIL-POSTS OUTSIDE KOREAN VILLAGE TO KEEP AWAY EVIL SPIRITS 




TRANSPORTING FODDER ON THE BACKS OP BULLS IN KOREA 



1 




ANCIENT KOREAN TEMPLE IN SEOUL 




PALANQUIN OP PRINCE LI 
(Former Emperor ot Korea) 



KOREA 161 

advice and dispersed peaceably without any harm hav- 
ing been done/ 

Notwithstanding official attempts to minimize the 
extent and significance of the agitation, there seems to 
be little doubt that it was a genuine national move- 
ment. When I went to Korea I was quite prepared 
to find certain classes of the population, particularly 
the students and intellectuals and those having polit- 
ical aspirations, permeated by the spirit of national- 
ism. But I expected to find the farmers, who com- 
pose the great mass of the people and are the back- 
bone of the country, largely ignorant of and indif- 
ferent to the new movement. I found, however, that 
the emotions aroused — which might be described as 
a new national consciousness — have gone deep and 
broad into the lives of the people as a whole. When 
Yi Sang-Chai, who has been called "the Tolstoy of 
Korea," was interrogated by a secret service man as 
to who were the persons behind the movement, he 
replied: "All the Korean people, from Fusan to the 
Ever White Mountains. They are all in it. They 
are the committee back of the agitation." 

Now it is not fny intention to enter into any de- 
tailed account or discussion of the excesses which 
marked the suppression of the independence move- 
ment. That the Japanese police and gendarmes were 
guilty of many brutalities and some horrible reprisals 
is not open to question. Not only have they been 

*"What Shall I Think of Japan?" by George Gleason. 



162 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

confirmed by a host of reputable witnesses, foreigners 
as well as natives, but the Japanese Government it- 
self has virtually admitted them by punishing the 
perpetrators. In certain of the provincial towns, if 
the testimony of trustworthy witnesses is to be be- 
lieved, unarmed and unresisting Koreans, both men 
and women, were bayoneted or shot down in cold 
blood. Houses were looted and burned. In order 
to extort confessions or to obtain evidence, many of 
the prisoners were subjected to torture. Women and 
young girls were stripped, beaten, and subjected to 
shameful indignities, though I might add that I found 
no evidence of a single case of assault on Korean 
women by Japanese police or soldiers. Yet, brutal 
and cruel though they undeniably were, that is no 
excuse for the grossly exaggerated accounts that have 
been spread broadcast. For example, Mr. C. W. 
Kendall in "The Truth About Korea" is authority 
for the statement that in the first three months of the 
agitation over 50,000 Koreans were killed or wounded. 
In December, 1919, The World Outlook published 
a report placing the killed at between 30,000 and 40,- 
000. According to official reports, 631 Koreans were 
killed and 1409 wounded. This is perhaps an under- 
statement, but none of the foreigners with whom I 
discussed the question when I was in Korea estimated 
the killed at over one thousand. 

Mr. George Gleason, who certainly cannot be ac- 
cused of any anti-Japanese leanings, has summed up 



KOREA 163 

the results of the rising as follows, drawing his figures, 
it is to be assumed, from official reports : 

"Of the 2500 village districts in Korea, there were 
uprisings in 577, the total number of demonstrations 
being 779, with demonstrators numbering 452,868. 
[Heaven only knows how such exact figures were ob- 
tained!] Riots took place in 236 places. The police 
and gendarmes numbered 8000 Koreans and 6000 
Japanese located in 1800 villages. There were, be- 
sides these, about 25,000 Japanese soldiers, all of 
whom at one time were engaged in suppressing the 
demonstrations. In 185 places guns were fired at 
the demonstrators ; 631 Koreans were killed and 1409 
wounded. Nine Japanese policemen were killed and 
186 wounded. In 87 places public buildings were 
destroyed and in 88 places private houses were burned. 
Up to July 20, 1919, 28,934 Koreans were arrested. 
While there is some duplication in the reports, the fol- 
lowing treatment was given those arrested: 7111 were 
set free without trial; 8993 were committed to trial; 
5156 were sent to prison; 10,592 were flogged and 
released. In only two out of the nearly 600 villages 
where demonstrations took place did the Koreans use 
firearms. That such a peaceful movement resulted 
in the killing and wounding of 2000, the arrest of 29,- 
000, and the flogging of 10,000 is a fact which calls 
for meditation more than for comment. No Japanese 
can be surprised at the widespread wave of protest." 

In considering the methods which the Japanese 



164 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

authorities used in suppressing the independence 
movement, it should be kept in mind that they were 
by no means indicative of the sentiments of the Japa- 
nese people as a whole, who, on the contrary, disap- 
proved and deplored them. They were indicative 
of the sentiment of only a small, though powerful, 
section of the Japanese people — the military party. 
These men, brought up in the stern school of the 
soldier, steeped in military traditions, believing in 
inflexible discipline and unquestioning obedience to 
authority as a Mohammedan believes in the Koran, 
took the position that Korea and the Koreans were 
the absolute property of Japan, that the subjugation 
and Japanization of the Koreans was a military neces- 
sity, and that the independence movement constituted 
a defiance of the imperial power which must be 
stamped out with fire and sword. I am not excusing 
the Japanese, mind you, when I remind my readers of 
the massacre ordered by the British general, Dwyer, 
at Amritsar; of Captain-General Weyler's treatment 
of the Cubans; of the behavior of the "Black and 
Tans" in Ireland; of the excesses perpetrated by the 
Greeks in Albania and Asia Minor. The Japanese 
excesses in Korea should not be condoned because 
other people have committed them. I am merely 
calling attention to the fact that history has repeat- 
edly shown that enlightened and humane nations have 
frequently been disgraced by the action of their mili- 
tary men. 



KOREA 165 

It is due to historical accuracy and to the Japa- 
nese army to emphasize the fact that three bodies 
of men have been sent by the Japanese Government 
to Korea to restore order. One is the regular army. 
Another is the gendarmerie — a police force organized 
on military lines. The third is the police, or rather, 
those contingents of police recruited in Japan. These 
forces are distinct and should not be confused. Nor 
should their deeds. In organization, discipline, tem- 
per, and ideals the police and gendarmerie are sev- 
eial degrees removed from the regular army. Unlike 
the regular army, their discipline, training, and tem- 
per could not withstand the trials and temptations to 
which they were subjected in Korea. Neither their 
discipline nor methods could compare with army dis- 
cipline, so it is scarcely a matter for surprise that at 
certain times and places they broke loose — ^that they 
burned, destroyed, killed, tortured, intimidated. In 
the vast majority of cases the excesses in Korea were 
committed by police and gendarmes ; not by Japanese 
soldiers. 

Now here is the most significant and discouraging 
feature of the whole deplorable business. When the 
news of what had happened in the peninsula became 
known in Japan there was no public, and very little 
political, reaction. The wave of indignation which 
swept England when the conduct of the "Black and 
Tans" in Ireland became known, had no parallel in 
Japan. Scarcely more than a ripple disturbed the 



166 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

political waters, while the public remained as pro- 
foundly apathetic as though the excesses had occurred 
in Central Africa instead of in a province of the em- 
pire, six score miles away. It is true that the Japa- 
nese Constitutional Party despatched an independ- 
ent investigator to Korea to examine the situation on 
the spot, and that his report ascribed the movement to 
discriminatory treatment of the Koreans, complicated 
and impracticable administrative measures, and ex- 
treme oppression, but I have the feehng that in this 
the constitutionalists were inspired by a desire to 
embarrass the government as much as by humani- 
tarian motives. It is also true that the resident-gen- 
eral. Count Hasegawa, the director of political af- 
fairs, Mr. Yamagata, and the chief of gendarmerie 
were recalled, though the government "saved the 
face" of the militarists by making General Hasegawa 
a field-marshal. There is no doubt that the govern- 
ment was gravely concerned over the excesses, though 
not so much on moral grounds as because of its fear 
of the effect on. Western opinion. And this concern 
was shared by a small group of men who had had 
long associations with Western life and were familiar 
with Western thought. In discussing the excesses 
some months later with Viscount Kaneko, who is a 
graduate of Harvard and one of the most advanced 
Japanese statesmen, he said with great earnestness: 
"Unfortunately they are only too true. I do not pre- 
tend to deny them ; I can only deplore them, the more 



KOREA 167 

so because they were committed by my own people. 
I only hope that they will not be interpreted abroad 
as indicative of the real attitude of the Japanese peo- 
ple toward the Koreans." I do not wish to do the 
Japanese Government or people an injustice, but in 
my opinion the reforms which were promptly insti- 
tuted in Korea were inspired not by public opinion in 
Japan, but almost wholly by public opinion outside 
of Japan. For the Peace Conference was then sit- 
ting in Paris, and Japan, with enormous interests at' 
stake in the ante-bellum settlements, could ill afford 
to have her case prejudiced by criticism of her con- 
duct in Korea. 

The government thus found itself in a difficult and 
trying situation. Premier Hara was quick to recog- 
nize that something must be done, and done at once, 
to convince America and the European nations that 
Japan was sincere in her desire to ameliorate condi- 
tions in the peninsula. But he likewise realized that 
he could not afford to do anything which would arouse 
the animosity of the military party. He steered a 
middle course, therefore, by designating Admiral 
Baron Saito, a retired naval officer, as the new gov- 
ernor-general of Korea, this appointment being in the 
nature of a compromise between the militarists, who 
demanded that the independence movement be sup- 
pressed with an iron hand, and those statesmen of 
broader vision, who, recognizing the danger of flout- 
ing foreign opinion, insisted on a new deal for the 



168 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

Koreans. I might add, parenthetically, that as a 
captain in command of a Japanese warship Baron 
Saito was present when the American squadron under 
Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay, 
and that he unreservedly sided with the American 
commodore when the commander of a German war- 
ship attempted to interfere in behalf of the Spaniards. 
The portfolio of political affairs in Baron Saito's cabi- 
net is held by Dr. Kentaro Midzuno, formerly minister 
of the interior of Japan, an enlightened and progres- 
sive statesman of the highest type. Though I believe 
that Baron Saito's administration has the best interests 
of the Koreans genuinely at heart, its freedom of ac- 
tion has been hampered by the military party. Men 
like Baron Saito and Dr. Midzuno could and would 
accomplish far-reaching reforms in Korea if they were 
not discouraged in their efforts by the apathetic state 
of public opinion at home. 

I had a long conference with Baron Saito when 
I was in Seoul. He spoke fair English and answered 
my queries as to Japan's future course in Korea with 
every appearance of candor. He freely admitted 
that many mistakes had been made; he deplored the 
harshness which had characterized the preceding ad- 
ministration; and he expressed his intention of mak- 
ing Japanese rule in Korea of real benefit to the 
Koreans, who, he felt, had never been given a fair 
chance. He impressed me as being sincere, deeply in 
earnest, and possessed of a large measure of sym- 



KOREA 169 

pathy for the Koreans, and this despite the fact that 
upon the very day of his arrival in Seoul to take over 
his new duties, before he had an opportunity to make 
his policy known, an attempt was made by a Korean 
to assassinate him. 



More than two years have passed since the Im- 
perial Rescript of August 20, 1919, in which the 
emperor called upon his officials "to rush reforms," 
which was followed by Premier Hara's proclamation 
announcing that "it is the government's fixed deter- 
mination to forward the progress of the country in 
order that all differences between Korea and Japan 
proper in matters of education, industry, and the 
civil service may be finally obliterated. ... It is the 
ultimate purpose of the Japanese Government in due 
course to treat Korea as in all respects on the same 
footing with Japan proper." In that period a credit- 
able number of reforms have been effected. The 
objectionable gendarmerie system has largely been 
done away with and the police system, improved, 
enlarged, and under the direct control of the civil 
instead of the military authorities, has been substi- 
tuted. The much criticized custom of flogging was 
definitely abolished on April 1, 1920 — about the time, 
incidentally, that American newspapers were carry- 
ing reports of the movement to abolish the public 



170 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

flogging of women in Georgia. The prisons have 
been enlarged and improved. New school regulations 
have been adopted, lengthening the courses of study, 
granting wider options in the curricula, permitting 
rehgious instruction in private schools, and relaxing 
the requirements as to the use of the Japanese lan- 
guage in certain subjects. The regulations governing 
religious activities have been revised, simplifying the 
requirements as to reports concerning the opening of 
new churches, the number of adherents, and the like. 
The so-called "Company Law," restricting the estab- 
lishment of commercial companies, has been repealed. 
Newspapers in the Korean language, owned and 
edited by Koreans, have again appeared, and freedom 
of the press, at least in some degree, has been re- 
stored, though the newspapers are still frequently 
suppressed by the authorities. The spies and in- 
formers who so long swarmed in the peninsula have 
largely disappeared. The salaries of Japanese and 
Koreans in government employ have been equalized 
in the various grades. Koreans have been appointed 
to high posts in the government, including those of 
provincial governor, judge, and public procurator. 
The custom of wearing swords by civil officials has 
been abolished. The Advisory Council, composed of 
Korean statesmen, which had fallen into innocuous 
desuetude, has been revived, it being convened regu- 
larly once a week, and by the infusion of new blood 
has been made more representative of all classes of 



KOREA 171 

Korean opinion — including the anti-Japanese — ^thus 
providing at least the germ of representative govern- 
ment in Korea. Though admittedly much remains to 
be done, this, as most fair-minded persons will admit, 
is a creditable showing for two years. 

The Korean leaders with whom I discussed the 
situation, though guarded in their comments, were 
dissatisfied — as might have been expected — with the 
extent of the reforms and frankly skeptical of Japa- 
nese sincerity. Their chief criticisms appeared to be 
(1) that the new administration is supporting the 
leaders of the old, corrupt, discredited regime, rather 
than the leaders of the progressive party; (2) that it 
is keeping the Korean standard of education fully 
two years behind that of Japan; (3) that the police 
still have altogether too much authority, particularly 
in the rural districts, where an ignorant constable is 
often vested with almost autocratic powers; (4) that 
the treatment of prisoners is not yet in accordance 
with enlightened standards, those charged with polit- 
ical offenses being confined in overcrowded cells and 
permitted insufficient exercise. 

Though I am myself convinced that substantial 
progress is really being made, and though I am satis- 
fied of the sincerity of the new administration, it is 
my opinion that no program of reform can be ex- 
pected in the immediate future that will satisfy a 
large section of the Korean people and their friends. 
They expect and will continue to demand more than 



172 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

the Japanese Government will feel able to grant. A 
complete reversal of Japanese policy in Korea will 
come only when military autocracy definitely has been 
subordinated to democracy in Japan itself. It should 
be remembered that the late Premier Hara was in 
none too strong a position, for the forces of reaction, 
as personified by the militarists, had too much power 
for him to do as he would perhaps have liked to do 
if left to his own devices. And if the prime minister 
of the empire is not his own master in this respect, 
the governor-general of Korea is still less so. 

Notwithstanding the reforms, the independence 
movement, though at the moment in abeyance, has by 
no means dissolved, being carried steadily forward 
despite the vigilance of the police. I was given to 
understand that there are two factions among the 
Korean leaders; one which favors advancing their 
cause by forcible methods, the other favoring peace- 
able means, and that the latter is at present in control 
of the situation. The prevailing behef in Korea is 
that the continuance in power of the peace party will 
largely depend upon the sincerity and energy dis- 
played by the new administration in prosecuting the 
promised reforms. "All that is now asked," a well- 
informed foreign official in Seoul told me, "is that the 
Korean people be treated with respect, be given jus- 
tice, and be permitted to develop along various lines." 
Should the promises of the government and the ex- 
pectations of the people remain unfulfilled, however, 



KOREA 173 

there is every likelihood of an outbreak of a more 
serious nature than has yet occurred. For the sake 
of peace in the peninsula it is sincerely to be hoped 
that the new administration will prove itself so en- 
lightened that the peace party may remain in the 
ascendant. I was told by a foreign official in whom I 
have confidence that the leaders of the secret organiza- 
tion which has been directing the independence move- 
ment were rapidly becoming convinced of the futility 
of open resistance on the part of the Koreans at 
present, and were counseling the people to attend to 
their business, and the students to their studies, until 
such time as they are better able to make their 
strength felt. If that is true — and it is borne out by 
the fact that the student registration for last year 
(1921) was unprecedented — it explains the present 
lull and is an indication of what may be expected in 
the future, provided the reforms proceed at a reason- 
able pace. If, on the other hand, the Japanese Gov- 
ernment fails to keep its promises, if it makes the 
blunder of returning to the old, short-sighted policy 
of repression and oppression, then I fear that the next 
chapter in Korea's troubled history will be written in 
blood. 

VI 

No account of existing conditions in Korea would 
be complete without at least passing reference to the 
work and influence of the missionaries, of whom there 



174 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

are in the peninsula at present nearly five hundred, 
about three quarters of these being Americans. They, 
with their native assistants, shepherd churches which 
have not far from 100,000 regular members, these 
native Christians constituting the most enlightened 
and reputable element of the indigenous population. 
It has long been the fashion for a certain brand of tour- 
ist to sneer at the missionary. Usually these are per- 
sons who have never traveled beyond the treaty ports, 
whose knowledge of Oriental conditions is largely 
confined to irresponsible gossip picked up on hotel 
verandas or over hotel bars in Yokohama and Hong 
Kong and Shanghai. I imagine that most thoughtful 
people will prefer to accept the testimony of such a 
man as Mr. Thomas W. Lamont, who said, in speak- 
ing of the American missionaries in China, that they 
are giving their lives to develop a people into a 
nation. And that is even truer of the American mis- 
sionaries in Korea. For they are something more 
than prosely tizers ; they are educators, sanitary ex- 
perts, agricultural advisers, physicians, statesmen. 
The statistics of their conversions by no means repre- 
sent the sum total of their activities or give an ade- 
quate idea of the enormous service they are perform- 
ing in carrying civilization, as well as Christianity, 
into the world's dark corners. 

Though there is no disguising the fact that the 
independence movement in Korea owed its inspiration 
originally to the influence and teaching of American 



KOREA 175 

missionaries, the attitude of the missionary body has 
been, as a whole, formally correct. When the reform 
program was first announced the attitude of the mis- 
sionary body in Korea was distinctly one of benevo- 
lent neutrality, but as time passed and the reforms 
were slow in coming, while many of the worst abuses 
of the old regime remained, this attitude was largely 
replaced by one of skepticism and a neutrality con- 
fined to speech and action alone — and in some cases 
not to speech. But there is no word of truth in the 
charges made in certain sections of the Japanese press 
that the disorders in Korea were instigated by the 
missionaries. The falsity of such assertions is con- 
vincingly shown by an interview with Mr. Yamagata, 
formerly director of political affairs in Korea, which 
appeared in The Japanese Advertiser : "No mission- 
ary in Korea, directly or indirectly, took part in the 
Korean demonstrations, although it is quite probable 
that some missionaries have shown their sympathy 
with the Koreans." Everything considered, the 
American missionaries have succeeded to a remark- 
able degree in maintaining a discreet and neutral 
attitude in a most difficult situation, the factors of 
which have tended to draw their hearts and their 
heads in opposite directions. 

I cannot let pass this opportunity to deprecate and 
deplore the short-sighted and injudicious methods 
which the Japanese authorities are using in an 
attempt to convince foreign visitors to Korea of the 



176 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

justice of their policy and to prejudice them against 
the Koreans. Indeed, foreign travelers in the penin- 
sula have been misinformed and blinded by a propa- 
ganda against the Koreans, a manipulation of the 
press, which has seldom been equaled in audacity of un- 
truth and dexterity of misrepresentation. Piled high 
on the desks of the admirably run Japanese hotels in 
Seoul, Fusan, and Mukden are pamphlets, written by 
an American, Frank Herron Smith, in which the 
Koreans are painted in the most unflattering colors, 
while in the same breath the author not only defends 
Japan's policy but lauds it to the skies. Another 
American, T. Philip Terry, has apparently attempted 
to earn Japanese gratitude by the savage and intem- 
perate attacks on the Koreans, in which he has ex- 
hausted the unflattering adjectives in his vocabulary, 
which he has introduced into his otherwise admirable 
guide-book to the Japanese Empire. The tone of 
The Seoul Press, a daily newspaper in English owned 
and edited by Japanese, is far more temperate and 
sympathetic than the writings of these Americans. 
The Koreans are now as much subjects of the em- 
peror as the Japanese themselves, and as deserving of 
consideration. By lending its approval to such 
attacks on a section of its people the government is as 
guilty of bad judgment as their American authors 
are of bad taste. It is a form of propaganda which 
is discreditable to those who are responsible for it and 
should be discontinued forthwith. 



KOREA 177 



VII 

I have now sketched for you the conditions which 
prevailed in Korea before the Japanese came and 
those which obtain there to-day. What the future of 
the peninsula is to be depends wholly upon whether 
the Koreans and the Japanese adopt an attitude of 
mutual sympathy and understanding. Were Japan 
to evacuate the country now, or in the near future — 
as there is not the slightest prospect of her doing — 
she would leave it under conditions which would soon 
result in chaos, and the good that she has done would 
be largely lost. The extensive schemes for agricul- 
tural and industrial development upon which she has 
entered, and upon which the prosperity of the penin- 
sula largely depends, could never be financed by an 
independent Korea, and the same is true of her plans 
for improving the means of communication, which are 
at the bottom of all the problems of economic devel- 
opment in Korea. 

However critical we may be of the methods by 
which it was accomplished, the annexation of Korea 
seems to me to have been justified. For the fact must 
not be lost sight of that the country was doomed to 
become either Japanese or Russian. The Japanese 
occupied it to forestall a Russian occupation, which 
would have menaced their independence as a nation. 



178 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

And they have remained in the peninsula for reasons 
similar to those which, in the opinions of reasonable 
men, justify Great Britain in retaining control of 
Egypt and of Ireland. 

The Koreans insist that they are themselves per- 
fectly capable of establishing and maintaining a just 
and stable government. But their ability to do this 
is, I believe, open to grave question. Certainly there 
is nothing in the twenty centuries of their history as 
an independent nation to justify such confidence, for 
the old government of Korea was perhaps the worst 
on which the sun ever shone. Though they are now 
making encouraging progress, it is being made under 
Japanese guidance and tuition. The leaders of the 
independence movement are, for the most part, young 
men, students, intellectuals, idealists, who, no matter 
how able individually, are wholly without experience 
in practical government. To turn a nation of seven- 
teen millions of ignorant, simple-minded people over 
to their guidance would be to invite disaster. 

Mind you, I do not think that the Japanese admin- 
istration of Korea has been all, or nearly all, that it 
should have been. I cannot agree with Dr. Hershey, 
who asserts that "the government of Chosen must be 
pronounced a great success," any more than I can 
agree with Mr. Kendall, who claims that "the nine 
years following the egregious annexation has been 
one of the most shameful pages in the history of the 
Japanese Empire." The truth lies somewhere be- 



KOREA 179 

tween these extremes. As a matter of fact, the Japa- 
nese officials have worked hard and in many instances 
effectively for the amelioration of the Korean people 
and the improvement of Korean conditions, but their 
method has been lacking in tact, sympathy, and 
understanding. But criticism of Japan's stern mili- 
taristic policy and of the harsh methods she has per- 
mitted in its execution should not blind us to her 
integrity, her large administrative ability, and to the 
energy she has displayed in carrying out material 
reforms. From personal observation on the spot, I 
am convinced that the general condition of the Korean 
peasantry is appreciably higher than it ever was, or 
could have been, under Korean administration. This 
is not to be interpreted as meaning that I do not 
sympathize with the Koreans, for I do. They have 
been the victims of cruelty, injustice, and oppression. 
Nor would they be worthy of respect if they did not 
prefer to rule themselves. But I can also sympathize 
with Japan. During one of the most trying periods 
in the world's history — disliked, distrusted, and op- 
posed by Koreans, Chinese, Russians, and most of 
the foreigners living in the Far East — she has jerked 
a nation out of the depths of poverty, degradation, 
and despair, as though by its collar, set it on its feet, 
and is teaching it to "play the game." And, as Count 
Terauchi once remarked, "It is no easy task to uplift 
a decayed people." 

Viewing the question from an unbiased standpoint. 



180 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

I believe that the balance inclines heavily in favor of 
Japan. I will go further than that and assert that 
Korea could suffer no greater calamity than to have 
Japan go. Not that there is the slightest probability 
of her doing so, for the unrest in China, combined 
with the uncertainty in Russia, is likely to cause her 
to tighten, rather than relax her grip on the peninsula. 
For, when all is said and done, Korea is the key to 
the whole Far Eastern situation. Upon her control 
of it depends Japan's entire scheme for the economic 
penetration of Siberia, Manchuria, and China. For 
her to withdraw from Korea would be tantamount 
to leaving the gateway to these great, rich markets 
unguarded, and that, I am convinced, she will never 
do. The sooner the Koreans realize that Japan's 
determination to remain in the peninsula is adaman- 
tine, and the sooner the Japanese realize that the 
Koreans will resist further attempts at forcible dena- 
tionalization to the bitter end, the better it will be for 
both peoples. If the Japanese will adopt a concilia- 
tory and unselfish policy toward the Koreans with a 
view to granting them a very large measure of 
autonomy as soon as they are prepared for it, and if 
the Koreans, on their part, will drop their demands 
for complete independence, which it is obviously im- 
possible for Japan to accede to, and set to work to fit 
themselves for self-government under the empire, it 
will set forward the hands of progress in the Farther 
East and there will no longer be a Korean Question. 




•.«A>-/ 






^-.t^-^ 



PART III 
CHINA 



WE have witnessed one of the most brazen ex- 
amples of international brigandage in the 
history of the world. In less than four-score years 
we have seen China, a country as large as Europe, 
with a civilization extending back into the mists of 
antiquity, rifled of territory and resources by a hand- 
ful of predatory nations with as little compunction as 
a gang of lawless boys would raid a farmer's orchard. 
We have seen this vast, rich, peaceable, defenceless 
country bullied, intimidated, reduced to a state of 
virtual vassalage, and parceled out in spheres of in- 
fluence, leases obtained under duress, and enforced 
concessions by methods which, in their effrontery and 
callousness, are reminiscent of the freebooters of the 
Spanish Main. The story of the pillage of China is 
saturated with intrigue and corruption, deceit and 
trickery, selfishness and greed. It forms one of the 
most shameful and depressing chapters in the history 
of our times and makes a mockery of Europe's sancti- 
monious championship of justice and fair-dealing. 

181 



182 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

The bewilderment and discouragement which 
usually reward those foreigners who attempt to 
acquire a clear-cut understanding of the Chinese 
situation are primarily due, in my opinion, to their 
failure to comprehend the peculiar geographic divi- 
sions of the country and the ethnologic distinctions 
of its inhabitants. Opening the atlas to the map of 
Asia, they see an enormous wedge-shaped territory, 
nearly one third larger than the United States, driven 
so deeply into the continent that its point impinges 
on the Afghan border. Because this wedge is tinted 
yellow and labeled "China," they naturally assume 
that it is a compact nation, like Italy or France, and 
that its three hundred million inhabitants are one 
homogeneous race, like the Italians or the French. 
Strictly speaking, however, the term "China" is ap- 
plicable only to a single section of this vast territory, 
and the term "Chinese" only to the natives of that 
section. 

The territory which comprised the Chinese Em- 
pire, and which was inherited, at least in theory, by 
the Chinese Republic, consists of five^ great racio- 
political divisions : Manchuria in the northeast, Mon- 
golia in the north, Sinkiang^ in the west, Tibet in 
the southwest, and China proper in the southeast. 
Though the design adopted by the republic for its 

*The Chinese assert that the republic consists of only four political 
divisions, China, Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet, claiming that Manchuria 
should be considered a part of China proper. 

* Sinkiang, or the New Dominion, consists of Kulja, Kashgaria, and 
Chinese Turkestan. 



CHINA 183 

new flag, on which the old yellow dragon has been 
replaced by five latitudinal stripes — crimson, yellow, 
blue, white, and black — to denote the five races — 
Mongol, Chinese, Manchu, Turki,^ and Tibetan^ — 
which comprise the Chinese people, might be inter- 
preted as symbolic of national solidarity, the very re- 
verse is the truth, for these five divisions, as a matter 
of fact, are bound together by the loosest and weakest 
of ties. This lack of homogeneity is due to the fact 
that the various elements of the population have little 
in common, being wholly distinct in origin, history, 
characteristics, traditions, and language. For ex- 
ample, the speech of a Tibetan is as unintelligible to 
a Mongol, a Manchu, or a Chinese as Gaelic is to an 
Englishman. 

Now it should be clearly understood that of these 
five great divisions three — Mongolia, Sinkiang, and 
Tibet — are little more than outlying dependencies 
over which the central government exercises the 
vaguest and most shadowy control. Tibet, for in- 
stance, is nominally a territory of the Chinese Re- 
public, yet the Peking government may not appoint 
or dismiss a single Tibetan official without the sanc- 
tion of the government of British India. In fact, 
Tibet may be said to be far more under the rule of 
Calcutta than of Peking. The vast and ill-defined 
tract of country known as Mongolia, a region five 
times the size of Texas, is likewise considered a part 

*The Turkis are the Mohammedan inhabitants of Sinkiang. 



184 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

of the republic, yet the central government has seen 
fit to raise a tariff wall between this border territory 
and the homeland by imposing a duty of ten per cent, 
ad valorem on goods imported from Mongolia into 
China, or vice versa, whereas Mongolian products 
are permitted to enter Russian territory duty free. 

Though the three outlying dependencies have a 
combined area of nearly two and one half million 
square miles, or about two thirds of the total area of 
the republic, they are very sparsely settled, their in- 
habitants comprising not more than seven per cent, of 
the total population. They are, moreover, remotely 
situated and are entirely destitute of modern means 
of communication, being accessible only by the 
ancient caravan routes. Hence, notwithstanding 
their enormous extent and their immense wealth in 
undeveloped resources, Mongolia, Sinkiang, and 
Tibet play no greater part in Chinese poHtics than 
Alaska, Porto Rico, and the Philippines play in 
American politics, if as much. But, politically and 
economically unimportant though they are at present, 
I would stake my life that these remote and little- 
known regions will be great countries some day. 

Manchuria, owing to its greater population (about 
twenty millions), its extensive railway system, and 
its strategic position athwart the routes from Siberia 
and Korea to China proper, has a status quite dif- 
ferent from that of the dependencies just mentioned. 
Though most foreign authorities regard Manchuria 



CHINA 185 

as an outlying territory of the republic, the Chinese 
themselves — for reasons of political expediency, I 
imagine — assert that its correct designation is not 
"Manchuria," which is not a Chinese term, but "The 
Three Eastern Provinces,"^ and that it forms an 
integral part of China proper. This region is now 
colonized almost entirely by immigrants from the 
northern provinces of China and the immigration 
continues steadily by road and sea. As a result, the 
Manchu population has been almost completely ab- 
sorbed by the Chinese, a few scattered Manchu com- 
munities alone remaining. Manchuria's position as 
a debated borderland, its unsettled political condi- 
tion, the prevalence of brigandage, the great tide of 
immigration, the high-handed and often lawless 
methods pursued both by the local governors and the 
Japanese mihtary authorities — all these find striking 
parallels in the conditions which prevailed along the 
Rio Grande during the first half of the nineteenth 
century, when Texas was a bone of contention be- 
tween Mexico and the United States. 

When all is said and done, the only one of the five 
divisions of the republic that counts politically is 
China proper. This is the great apple-shaped ter- 
ritory in the southeast, consisting of the eighteen 
provinces — Chihli, Shansi, Shantung, Kangsi, Shensi, 
Honan, Anhwei, Kiangsu, Szechwan, Hupeh, Che- 

^The region commonly referred to as Manchuria consists of the prov- 
inces of Fengtien, Kirin, and Heilungchiang. 



186 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

kiang, Kwaichow, Hunan, Kiangsi, Fukien, Yunnan, 
Kwangsi, and Kwantung — ^which bulges out, like a 
huge bay-window, into the China Sea. Though China 
comprises only about one third of the country's total 
area, it contains nearly nine tenths of the total popu- 
lation, together with virtually the whole of the sea- 
board and nearly all of the larger cities, which ex- 
plains its dominancy in national affairs. 

As I have already pointed out, the inhabitants of 
the various divisions of the republic speak entirely 
different tongues. Hence, intercommunication is 
slow and uncertain. And history has repeatedly 
shown that a country handicapped by inadequate 
means of communication rarely is well governed. The 
difficulty of welding these various races into a homo- 
geneous nation is still further increased by the fact 
that even in China proper we find not one spoken 
language, but a number of dialects, all clearly of a 
common stock, yet differing from one another as 
widely as the various Romance languages of Europe 
— say, French, Spanish, and Italian. It is a common 
occurrence, indeed, when a man from Chihli meets a 
man from Kwantung for them to fall back on Pidgin 
English as a medium of communication. In the 
South, Cantonese is generally spoken on the coast 
and Hakka in the interior. Proceeding northward, 
we find in succession the Swatow, Foochow, Wen- 
chow, and Ningpo dialects. Still farther north we 
come into the range of the great dialect popularly 



CHINA 187 

known as Mandarin, which sweeps around behind the 
narrow coastal strip where the various dialects just 
mentioned are spoken and dominates a hinterland 
constituting nearly four fifths of China proper. Of 
all these tongues, Mandarin is by far the most im-^ 
portant. Not only can it claim to be the native speech 
of the majority of Chinese, but it is the recognized 
medium of oral communication between all Chinese 
officials, even when they come from the same part of 
the country and speak the same patois. In the de- 
pendencies, though the officials usually are familiar 
with Mandarin, the natives speak only their own out- 
landish tongues. Hence, a Chinaman traveling in 
Mongolia, Sinkiang, or Tibet has almost as much diffi- 
culty in making himself understood as would a Euro- 
pean, while the services of interpreters are frequently 
required at official conclaves in Peking. 

By glancing at the map you will see that China 
proper is bisected latitudinally by Asia's greatest 
river, the three-thousand-mile-long Yangtze. It 
might naturally be supposed that this mighty water- 
way would form the dividing line between "the 
North" and "the South" — a sort of Chinese Mason 
and Dixon's line, as it were — but this is not the case. 
The real line of demarcation is ethnologic rather than 
geographic. "The North," speaking broadly, may 
be said to embrace those regions inhabited by the 
descendants of those Mongol-Tartar tribes who set- 
tled in the basin of the Yellow River in the dim dawn 



188 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

of history, at least forty centuries ago, and who, as 
the years passed, gradually spread in all directions, 
forming the race known to ethnologists as the "conti- 
nental" Chinese. "The South," on the other hand, 
consists of those districts along the Chinese littoral, 
from the frontiers of Indo-China nearly to the 
Yangtze, together with their immediate hinterlands, 
which were colonized by immigrants of Malay origin 
early in the Christian era. Though these two races 
have lived side by side, under the same rule, for close 
on two thousand years, they have never become com- 
pletely amalgamated, still being distinguished by 
many of their ancient characteristics. The "conti- 
nental" Chinese, for example, speak the Mandarin 
tongue, while the "coastal" Chinese cling to the va- 
rious dialects spoken along the littoral. Thus it will 
be seen that the existing differences between the 
North and the South are not wholly political. Racial 
characteristics also enter into the question. Surely 
it is no matter for surprise that the children of those 
fierce Tartar tribesmen who swept out of Inner Asia 
should not always see eye to eye with the descendants 
of those daring sea-rovers who came sailing up in 
their fragile prahus from the islands and jungles of 
Malaysia. 

II 

The last of the thirty-odd dynasties that ruled 
China was the Ta Tsing ("Great Bright") or 





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THE GREAT WALL OF CHINA 
It stretches from the sea to the borders of Turkestan 




ANOTHER VIEW OF THE GREAT WALL 

It runs for 2500 miles across China 




CAMELS UNDER THE WALLS OP PEKING 




THE TARTAR WALL AND A PORTION OF THE TARTAR CITY IN PEKING 



CHINA 189 

Manchu, whose fierce Tartar chieftains began to make 
their power felt in Manchuria about the beginning 
of the sixteenth century, when the Mings, a Chinese 
house, sat on the Dragon Throne. Early in the fol- 
lowing century the Ming emperors appealed to the 
Manchus for aid in putting down a rebellion, where- 
upon these men of the horse and the tent came riding 
into China like a whirlwind, just as another Tartar 
tribe, the Osmanlis, poured into Europe behind the 
horse-tail standards. Once over the Great Wall, 
they quickly secured victory for those who had called 
upon them. But, recognizing at once the wealth of 
the land and the weakness of its rulers, they decided 
to remain. Establishing themselves in the rich and 
populous provinces below the Wall, they quickly suc- 
ceeded in making themselves masters of the country, 
monopolizing the military and most of the civil offices 
and revenues. In 1644 the Ming dynasty came to an 
end and the Manchus assumed the reins of power. 
Holding themselves aloof from the Chinese, whom 
they regarded as an inferior race, they compelled 
them to shave the fore-skull and to adopt the queue 
as a mark of submission. But in time they too suc- 
cumbed to luxury, their moral fiber disintegrated, 
and they gradually lost their language and their cus- 
toms, virtually being conquered by the people on 
whom they had imposed their rule. 

Centuries passed. The Chinese slowly yielded to 
the spirit of progress, but the Manchus appeared for 



190 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

the most part incapable of responding to the 
exigencies of the modern world. Reformers and 
thinking men began to realize that the continuance 
in power of the Manchus boded disaster and spelled 
the ultimate partition of the country by foreigners. 
Young men educated abroad, on coming home, found 
the situation intolerable. Every branch of the gov- 
ernment was paralyzed by incompetence, injustice, 
and corruption. And while the great mass of Chinese 
toiled and starved, thousands of indolent Manchu 
officials battened on the bounty that flowed from the 
Dragon Throne. The death in 1908 of the feeble- 
minded young emperor, shortly followed by that of 
the empress dowager, "the old Buddha," and the ap- 
pointment of Prince Chun, a reactionary of the reac- 
tionaries, as regent for the infant named to fill the 
throne, hastened the inevitable. Though the govern- 
ment at Peking, reading the signs of the times, 
reluctantly promised a modern constitution and a 
representative government, it postponed the promul- 
gation of the one and the convocation of the other, 
thereby irritating the discontented elements and pro- 
voking open rebellion. 

Now appeared a leader, a Cantonese named Dr. 
Sun Yat-sen, a Christian, a man of science, and a 
physician. Educated in the British colony of Hong 
Kong, converted to Christianity in Honolulu, long 
a resident in San Francisco and London, he is one of 
the most picturesque and interesting figures ever 



CHINA 191 

produced in the East. The story of his Hfe would 
provide material for a dozen novels. Unsuccessful 
in his attempts to enter official life, he turned against 
the government, being compelled to flee from China 
while still a young man because of his seditious 
activities. Establishing himself in London, he quickly 
became the leading spirit in a revolutionary junta 
which aimed to rid China of Manchu rule. Brought 
to a tardy realization of the rapidity with which 
the movement led by Sun Yat-sen was spreading, the 
court at Peking offered a reward of fifty thousand 
dollars for his death or capture. His escapes from 
assassination partook of the miraculous. While stay- 
ing in London he was kidnapped by agents of the 
imperial government and conveyed to the Chinese 
Legation, preparatory to smuggling him aboard a 
ship bound for China. Had not the British Govern- 
ment insisted on his release, he would have met his 
end beneath the sword of a Manchu executioner, and 
the revolutionary movement might well have perished 
with him. 

In the North the man of destiny was Yuan Shih- 
kai, a pupil of and a worthy successor to that great 
statesman, Li Hung-chang. A native of Honan, a 
mandarin, and a devout Confucian, he had served in 
turn as Chinese Resident in Korea, as Viceroy of the 
metropolitan district of Chihli, in which Peking is 
situated, as head of the Waiwupu, or foreign office, 
and, at the very end of the Manchu reign, as prime 



192 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

minister of the empire. A past-master in all the arts 
of mandarin intrigue, an expert in opportunism, an 
adherent of the corrupt traditions which have char- 
acterized the government of China for centuries, a 
staunch supporter of the imperial dynasty, he was 
nevertheless sufficiently shrewd and far-sighted to 
realize that the Manchu government as it had hitherto 
existed, incompetent and rotten to the core, could 
not endure. 

Thus the country became divided into two camps: 
the party of the North, composed in the main of reac- 
tionary office-holders and militarists, some of whom 
were foreign-trained, headed by Yuan Shih-kai; and 
the party of the South, consisting of students, intel- 
lectuals, men of progressive tendencies, many of 
whom had been educated abroad, under the leader- 
ship of Sun Yat-sen. It was autocracy versus de- 
mocracy, the "stand-patters" against the progres- 
sives, the old order of things as opposed to the new. 

By 1910 the revolutionary movement, starting in 
Canton and Hunan, had spread over all of the south- 
ern provinces. The men of the reorganized army, 
well armed and ably led, had early thrown in their 
lot with the insurgents, and against them the troops 
of the imperial household could make little headway. 
There was desultory fighting throughout 1911, but 
on the whole the revolution was comparatively blood- 
less, far fewer lives being sacrificed than has been the 
case in far less important political upheavals in West- 



CHINA 193 

em countries. Toward the close of 1911 the revolu- 
tionary committee, which had been joined by Wu 
Ting-fang, at one time Chinese Minister to the 
United States and one of the ablest men in China, 
met at Nanking, organized a provisional government, 
drafted a provisional constitution, and proclaimed a 
republic. The presidency of the new government 
was offered to Yuan Shih-kai, then prime minister 
of the tottering empire, but he declined, presumably 
because he questioned the strength of the movement. 
Sun Yat-sen, the father of the revolution, thereupon 
consented to become the first provisional president 
of the Chinese Republic. But when the monarchists 
acknowledged the fait accompli, in February, 1912, 
by announcing the abdication of the boy-emperor, 
Suan-t'ung, Sun Yat-sen, anxious to bring to the 
support of the republic the powerful northern ele- 
ment represented by Yuan Shih-kai, offered to resign 
the presidency in his favor. This time Yuan accepted 
and was duly elected by the provisional government 
the second provisional president of China. 

The constitution drafted by the revolutionists in 
Nanking provided for a provisional president and 
vice-president, and a national council, which was to 
exercise legislative powers until such time as a regular 
parliament could be convened in accordance with laws 
which the National Council was to enact. These laws 
were enacted and a parliament, consisting of a Senate 
and a House of Representatives, was duly elected. 



194 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

The members of the Lower House were to serve for 
three years, the members of the Senate for six years, 
one third retiring every two years. This parhament 
was opened in Peking early in 1913, the world being 
treated to the curious spectacle of elected representa- 
tives from every province of China proper and from 
the outlying dependencies, most of them wearing 
frock-coats and top-hats, assembling in the ancient 
stronghold of the Manchu power, within the walls of 
the Forbidden City, for the purpose of giving China, 
which for four thousand years had been the most 
absolute of monarchies, a democratic form of govern- 
ment. 

Parliament, in addition to being the national legis- 
lative body of the republic, was to draft and promul- 
gate a permanent constitution and to elect the presi- 
dent and vice-president, it being obviously unwise, in 
view of the ignorance and political inexperience of the 
great mass of the people, to have the head of the 
nation elected by popular vote. A presidential elec- 
tion law, dealing with the election and term of office 
of the president, was accordingly passed, and on 
October 6, 1913, at a joint session of the two Houses, 
Yuan Shih-kai, already provisional president, was 
elected as the first (regular) president of the Chinese 
Republic. The vice-presidency went to Li Yuan- 
hung, a graduate of the Peiyang Naval College, who 
served on a cruiser during the Chino-Japanese War, 
afterward entering the army, in which he rose to the 



CHINA 195 

grade of general, eventually being appointed Chief 
of the General Staff. 

The Parliament of 1913 was dominated by the 
Kuo-min-tang, or People's Party, which waysi the 
original revolutionary organization and which, 
broadly speaking, represented the views of southern 
China. As might have been expected, the new par- 
liament was extremely jealous of its constitutional 
rights, particularly the control of the cabinet and the 
treasury. But, from the very beginning, President 
Yuan Shih-Kai, steeped in the traditions of autocracy 
and accustomed to exact unquestioning obedience to 
his commands, refused to submit to parliamentary 
dictation. He had been in office only a few weeks 
before he defied parliament by placing his personal 
friends, men of the North, in cabinet positions and 
by contracting a loan without parliamentary authori- 
zation. These high-handed and unconstitutional pro- 
ceedings instantly aroused the violent opposition of 
the Kuo-min-tang, whose members, led by Sun Yat- 
sen, foresaw that, were they to be permitted to con- 
tinue, the republican structure which they had so 
painstakingly reared would quickly be undermined. 
Sun Yat-sen and his adherents demanded govern- 
ment by the people through their representatives in 
parliament, while President Yuan Shih-kai soon made 
it clear that he proposed to reign without a parliament 
rather than be hampered by systematic opposition. 
But the opposition, instead of declining, steadily 



196 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

gained in strength, whereupon President Yuan de- 
cided to rid himself of it for good and all. Accord- 
ingly, on the night of November 4, 1913, he issued 
orders for the immediate dissolution of the Kuo-min- 
tang on the ground that it was a seditious organiza- 
tion and that its members were rebels. It was as 
though President Wilson had dissolved the Repub- 
lican party and driven its members from the Senate 
and the House in order to rid himself of Republican 
opposition. The effect of this coup d'etat was to 
unseat more than half of the members of Parliament, 
thereby depriving it of the quorum necessary for the 
transaction of business. As the Kuo-min-tang repre- 
sented the South, this arbitrary procedure left all 
southern China without parliamentary representa- 
tion, the government now being completely domi- 
nated by Yuan Shih-kai and his northern adherents. 
The unseated legislators, threatened with arrest, 
fled to Canton, where they established a schismatic 
government under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen. A 
southern army was organized for the purpose of 
marching on Peking and restoring the constitutional 
government, but Yuan Shih-kai, possessing a superi- 
ority of force, had no difficulty in crushing the con- 
stitutionalists, or, to put it more accurately, in con- 
fining their activities to the south of the Yangtze. 
This was the second revolution, or, if you prefer, the 
first civil war, and it resulted in dividing China into 




THE JADE PAGODA NEAR PEKING 



CHINA 197 

two armed camps — "the North" under Yuan Shih- 
kai, and "the South" under Sun Yat-sen. 

Emboldened by the success of his coup d'etat, Yuan 
Shih-kai became more autocratic than ever. In order 
to strengthen his grip on the northern provinces, he 
appointed his mihtary sateUites as tuchuns, or pro- 
vincial military governors, who, supported by large 
forces of soldiery and vested with dictatorial powers, 
proceeded to enforce Yuan's dictates in their respec- 
tive provinces. Early in January, 1914, President 
Yuan formally dissolved the rump parliament in 
Peking, thereby ridding himself of the last vestige of 
constitutional control. He then set about taking 
measures to strengthen and consolidate his power. 
The first of these measures was the creation of a 
political council, composed of members appointed by 
himself. This body, which was nothing more than 
Yuan's instrument and mouthpiece, recommendied 
that the president call into being an elected assembly 
— the idea being, no doubt, that it would give to his 
unconstitutional actions at least a flavor of legality. 
Within six weeks the political council, acting under 
Yuan's dictation, had drawn up an "amended pro- 
visional constitution" which provided for a single- 
chambered legislature, whose members were to be 
elected by popular vote, and a council of state, whose 
members, appointed by the president, were to advise 
him on those matters on which he might consult them. 



198 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

The legislature was never elected, but the council 
of state sat in the capacity of the legislature during 
1914 and 1915. All this was but camouflage, how- 
ever, designed to cloak the wholesale usurpation of 
power by Yuan Shih-kai. 

In the summer of 1915 a movement began in favor 
of the reestablishment of the monarchy — a movement 
secretly inspired by Yuan, who, though yielding lip- 
service to the republican form of government, har- 
bored the secret ambition of himself ascending the 
Dragon Throne. In October the political council 
made a show of constitutional procedure by referring 
the question of reestabHshing the monarchy to a vote 
of the provinces, or rather to a number of Yuan's 
political henchmen. The issue, of which there never 
was the slightest doubt, was a practically unanimous 
"vote" in favor of Yuan's accession to the throne as 
emperor of a constitutional monarchy. On December 
12, 1915, the monarchy was formally proclaimed, the 
coronation ceremony being set for the February fol- 
lowing. But it was not to be. For within a week 
the storm, long brewing, which was to put an end to 
the dictator and his ambitions, suddenly burst in the 
distant province of Yunnan, which declared its inde- 
pendence and emphasized its opposition to the restor- 
ation of the monarchy by despatching a rabble army 
against the imperial forces which had been hurried 
to the adjacent province of Szechwan. The insur- 
rectionary movement spread with surprising rapidity 



CHINA 199 

and Yuan's star quickly began to decline. Other 
provinces followed the example of Yunnan in re- 
nouncing their allegiance to the Peking government 
and bodies of imperial troops began to make common 
cause with the rebels. Late in January Yuan's 
friends persuaded him to issue a proclamation an- 
nouncing that the establishment of the monarchy had 
been indefinitely postponed. But the announcement 
came too late. The debacle had begun. In April, 
1916, Yuan, in a last desperate attempt to retrieve 
something from the wreck of his ambitions, agreed 
to surrender all civil authority to the cabinet, which 
had been reconstructed under the premiership of 
Yuan's former minister of war, Tuan Chi-ju, an 
able diplomatist and a professional harmonizer, who, 
despite his monarchical sympathies, was popular with 
the southern faction. Upon coming into power. 
Premier Tuan Chi-ju attempted to placate the South 
by promising that parliamentary government would 
be reestablished at an early date. But meantime the 
members of the Kuo-min-tang, who had been ex- 
pelled from Peking, had organized a government of 
their own at Canton and had proclaimed Vice-Presi- 
dent Li Yuan-hung president of the republic. Thus 
China found itself with two presidents and two gov- 
ernments at the same time. But on June 5, 1916, 
Yuan Shih-kai simplified the complicated situation 
by dying. The physicians who attended him an- 
nounced that his death was due to kidney trouble and 



200 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

nervoUiS prostration. The man in the street was 
probably nearer the mark when he said that he died 
from disappointment and hmniHation — from "loss of 
face." 

The parliament which had been dissolved by Yuan 
in 1913 was reconvened in August, 1916, under the 
presidency of Li Yuan-hung, and the provisional 
constitution of 1912 was again recognized as the 
fundamental law of the republic. The reestab- 
lished parliament at once began consideration of a 
draft of a permanent constitution, but friction quickly 
developed between the militarists of the North and 
the republicans of the South. After some months of 
bickering, the military governors of several of the 
northern provinces declared their independence of 
Peking and proceeded to establish a provisional gov- 
ernment at Tientsin. President Li's position had now 
become difficult and dangerous. In the hope of gain- 
ing support in his struggle with the military gov- 
ernors, who, backed by armies of mercenaries, had 
become all-powerful in their respective provinces, the 
president invited to Peking as a mediator General 
Chang Hsun, a swashbuckling soldier and a former 
pillar of the Manchu dynasty, who since 1911 had 
maintained himself as virtual dictator of southern 
Shantung. General Chang Hsun came promptly, 
bringing with him a "bodyguard" of several thousand 
men, who proceeded to occupy railway junctions and 
other strategic positions about the capital. The day 



CHINA 201 

after Chang Hsun's arrival in the capital President 
Li issued a mandate dissolving parliament. 

Though summoned to Peking as a mediator, Chang 
Hsun did not accept the role assigned to him. He 
had been a dictator and a dictator he intended to 
remain. He dreamed, as had Yuan Shih-kai, of 
attaining supreme power, but, remembering the dis- 
aster that had overtaken his predecessor, he did not 
plan to himself assume the imperial yellow. He de- 
cided that it was safer, and equally satisfactory, to 
be the power behind the throne, his plans calling for 
the restoration of the Manchu dynasty in the form 
of a regency administered by himself as viceroy of 
Chihli — the province in which the capital is situated. 
For Chinese history has repeatedly shown that he who 
holds Chihli holds Peking. Accordingly, before day- 
break of July 1, 1917, General Chang Hsun sum- 
moned from his bed the boy-emperor, who for five 
years had been living in enforced but luxurious seclu- 
sion in the Forbidden City, and informed the bewil- 
dered and frightened lad that he was to reascend the 
Dragon Throne. But the restored monarchy found 
itself confronted with opposition on every hand. 
Even the military governors, on whose support 
Chang Hsun had confidently counted, refused to 
support the new regime — not because they were op- 
posed to the monarchy, but because they were afraid 
that Chang Hsun, as regent, might succeed in under- 
mining their own power. An army under the former 



202 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

premier, Tuan Chi-ju, advanced on the capital from 
Tientsin, while another force threatened to move up 
from the South under the command of Vice-President 
Feng Kuo-chang. On July 7, after less than a 
week's reign, the emperor announced his abdication. 
Chang Hsun's troops attempted a feeble defense of 
the imperial city, but capitulated after a few days of 
comic-opera warfare, the would-be dictator seeking 
refuge in the Dutch legation. 

President Li Yuan-hung, who, upon the restora- 
tion of the monarchy, had fled to the Japanese lega- 
tion, declined to resume a post for which he had no 
liking and for which he was not adapted, and resigned 
in favor of his vice-president, General Feng Kuo- 
chang, who had been in command of the South' s mili- 
tary forces. The accepted theory in Peking at this 
time was that the situation had now reverted to the 
one which had existed in 1912, immediately after the 
promulgation of the Provisional Constitution; that 
all that had transpired during the interim was illegal ; 
and that everything must be done over again. Presi- 
dent Feng Kuo-chang accordingly convened a council 
for the purpose of drafting new laws for the election 
of a new parliament, which was duly opened in Au- 
gust, 1918. A few days later, by 425 out of 436 votes, 
Hsu Shih-chang, a native of Hunan, who had held 
in turn the posts of Viceroy of Manchuria, Grand 
Secretary, Grand Councillor, Vice-Premier, Chief of 
the General Staff, and Grand Guardian of the Em- 



CHINA 203 

peror, was elected President of the republic. His 
term of office will expire in 1923. 

But the Peking reading of the situation did not 
satisfy South China or the members of the old par- 
liament, who had been unseated a second time. These 
were summoned to meet at Canton and to constitute 
the real representative legislature of the republic. 
During the summer of 1918 a quorum of the old par- 
liament was obtained, and for about a year China had 
two parliaments — ^the one sitting at Peking, the other 
at Canton — each subscribing to the Provisional Con- 
stitution of 1912 and each claiming to be the sole 
legislative body of the republic. The Canton Parlia- 
ment finally broke up, however, in 1919. 

Throughout the whole of 1918 there was desultory 
fighting between the North and the South, the 
provinces chiefly affected being those along the 
Yangtze River. But the inability of the North to 
make any headway in the campaign, the financial 
embarrassments of both sides, and the growing dis- 
satisfaction with a state of affairs that disrupted the 
country and promised to lead nowhere resulted in the 
president proclaiming an armistice when the news of 
the armistice in Europe reached China. At about the 
time the Peace Conference was assembling at Ver- 
sailles, another peace conference, composed of rep- 
resentatives of the North and the South, was as- 
sembling on the neutral ground provided by (the 
Foreign Settlement of Shanghai. But after months 



204 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

of parleying the two factions appear to be no nearer 
an agreement than before the conference began. At 
the moment of writing, President Hsu Shih-chang is 
still nominally in power in the North, while Dr. Sun 
Yat-sen, with the title of Administrative Director, 
appears to be in control of affairs in South China. 

To add to the existing confusion, were such a thing 
possible, both the North and the South proceeded to 
split into opposing factions, so that the already dis- 
tracted country, instead of being divided into two 
camps, found itself broken up into four clearly de- 
fined groups, each plotting against and checkmating 
the others. The North split into the Anfu Club and 
the Chihli factions. The Anfu Club was a political 
organization composed of military men who were pro- 
Japanese in their sympathies and most of whom were 
popularly credited with being in the pay of Japan. 
The Chihli group took its name from the metro- 
politan province in which Peking is situated. 

Upon the death of Yuan Shih-kai, the leadership 
of the North passed, as I have already explained, to 
General Tuan Chi-ju, a native of Anhwei Province 
and a pillar of the Anfu Club, who became premier 
in the cabinet of President Feng Kuo-chang, who was 
a native of Chihli. In making his appointments, 
President Feng naturally favored men from his own 
province of Chihli, whereas Premier Tuan insisted 
on filling the positions with men from Anhwei. This 
was the beginning of a schism which split the North 







The official residence of the President of China 




't-r-^ ^M 



1" ■' 



^ ■% ., 




The Throne Hall 
IN THE FORBIDDEN CITY 



CHINA 205 

wide open. The president and his premier intrigued 
against each other in eveiy possible way and on every 
possible occasion. Premier Tuan and his fellow- 
members of the Anfu Club, bought with Japanese 
gold, advocated a rapprochement with Japan. Presi- 
dent Feng and his Chihli adherents, on the contrary, 
recognizing the popular hostility toward Japan, 
steadfastly opposed everything which threatened to 
strengthen Japan's grip on China. The military men 
of the Anfu Club insisted on bringing the South to 
terms by force of arms, whereas the Chihli group 
beheved in conciliatory measures. When Premier 
Tuan despatched a military expedition against the 
southern insurgents, the provinces of Kiangsu, 
Kiangsi, and Hupeh, all controlled by President 
Feng and the Chihli faction and all occupying strate- 
gic positions along the Yangtze River, not only re- 
fused to assist the enterprise, but even adopted to- 
ward the South a policy of friendly neutrality. In 
the summer of 1920 the smoldering enmity between 
the Anfu and Chihli factions flamed into open war- 
fare. There was a skirmish in the imperial city in 
which a few lives were lost, whereupon the Anfu 
troops either fled or surrendered, leaving the Chihli 
faction in undisputed control of the North. By this 
time public opinion had become so inflamed against 
those officials who were believed to be intriguing with 
Japan that Tuan Chi-ju, sensing the rising storm, 
hastily resigned the premiership and withdrew from 



206 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

public life, his fellow- Anfuites seeking safety in the 
Japanese legation. Thus collapsed the notorious 
Anfu Club, one of the most potent agencies for evil 
in China. 

The story of the dissensions which resulted in split- 
ting the South into two factions is equally saturated 
with jealousy, intrigue, and corruption. Here, as in 
the North, personal greed and ambition were the prin- 
cipal factors. In Canton, as in Peking, it was a case 
of the "outs" versus the "ins." The southern govern- 
ment originally consisted of those members of the first 
Chinese Parliament who had been unseated by Yuan 
Shih-kai, and who, fleeing to Canton, had there organ- 
ized the provisional government. This government 
had no president, but was headed by a board of seven 
men, known as Administrative Directors. For a time 
things went smoothly enough, but friction eventually 
developed and the directorate split into two factions. 
One faction came to be known as the Sun- Wu-Tang 
group from the first names of its principal leaders — 
Sun Yat-sen, Wu Ting-fang, and Tang Shao-yi. 
The other faction, headed by two other directors, 
Chen Chun-hsien and Lu Yung-ting, in like manner 
took the appellation of the Chen-Lu group. The split 
came because Chen and Lu persisted in ignoring the 
decisions of the majority of the directorate, because 
they used funds appropriated to pay members of par- 
liament for the payment of their own troops, and 
because it was discovered that they were carrying on 



CHINA 207 

secret negotiations with the Chihh group in the North. 
The Chen-Lu faction replied to these accusations by 
charging the Sun- Wu-Tang party with intriguing 
with the Anfu Club. The existing relations between 
the two southern factions are ill-defined. Though 
both maintain armed forces in the field, they fight 
but rarely, and, to add to the Gilbert and Sulli- 
van atmosphere, their leaders are in constant tele- 
graphic communication with each other and with 
Peking. 

Nor should you get the idea that the North and 
the South are seriously at war. More than that, there 
is no longer any serious pretense of vital difference 
between them. The only real warfare now being 
waged in China is the interminable struggle for place, 
power, patronage, and pelf between the "ins" and 
the "outs," which has gone on, almost without inter- 
ruption, since the dawn of Chinese history. Despite 
all the talk about patriotic ideals, constitutional gov- 
ernment, and parliamentary reform, it is, in the last 
analysis, a sordid and purely mercenary conflict. The 
"governments" at Peking and Canton ("misgovern- 
ments" would be a more fitting term) consist of 
groups of predatory, self-seeking officials who are 
far more concerned in strengthening their own posi- 
tions and, incidentally, in filling their own pockets 
than they are in pulling China out of the slough of 
despond, setting her on her feet, and giving her an 
honest and efficient administration. 



208 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

Overshadowing both the northern and the southern 
governments, and still further complicating a political 
situation already confused almost past understand- 
ing, is the tuchunate — ^the system of tuchuns, or pro- 
vincial military governors, who are the real rulers of 
China. In theory, each tuchun represents the central 
government in his respective province, being respon- 
sible to Peking for the entire local administration — 
political, judicial, fiscal, and military. In theory, I 
have said. For in practice he is accountable to no 
one but himself and obeys the orders of Peking or 
Canton — depending upon whether he is a supporter 
of the North or the South — only when it suits him to 
do so. Each tuchun exercises autocratic power within 
the limits of his own province. Though he is supposed 
to govern with the assistance and advice of a civil gov- 
ernor and a provincial assembly, he always over- 
shadows them and usually ignores them completely, 
making and administering his own laws, imposing his 
own taxes, collecting his own revenues, and using 
them for his own purposes. As a result of this anom- 
alous situation, conditions in China are comparable 
in many respects to those which prevailed in Mexico 
when Villa was dictator of the North and Zapata 
held sway in the South, both of them completely ig- 
noring the mandates issued by the central govern- 
ment from the City of Mexico. 

Perhaps the closest parallel to the tuchuns, how- 
ever, is to be found in those leaders of mercenaries. 



CHINA 209 

known as condottieri, who for nearly three hundred 
years held medieval Italy in their grasp. As the great 
mass of the Italian peasantry took no part in the wars 
of that period, contenting themselves with the role 
of onlookers, war was not merely the trade of the 
condottiere, but also his monopoly, and he was thus 
able to obtain whatever terms he demanded, whether 
money payments or political concessions. Precisely 
the same holds true of the tuchun. The condottieri 
were always ready to change sides at the prospect of 
higher pay. So are the tuchuns. As the condottieri 
were to a certain extent bound together by the bonds 
of a common profession and by a common contempt 
for the civilian population, and as they realized that 
the enemy of to-day might well be the ally of to-mor- 
row, their battles were often as bloodless as they were 
theatrical. A similar lack of bloodshed usually charac- 
terizes the clashes between the forces of the tuchuns. 
Just as the great condottiere, Francisco Sforza, the 
son of a Neapolitan peasant, climbed on the lances of 
his mercenaries to the dukedom of Milan and the 
overlordship of northern Italy, so Chang Tso-lin, a 
one-time bandit, has climbed on the bayonets of his 
mercenaries to the tuchunate of Mukden and to- 
day holds the whole of Manchuria in the hollow of his 
hand. 

The tuchuns keep themselves in power by means of 
personal armies — usually little more than imiformed 
bandits — which vary in size from the few battahons 



210 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

maintained by the less important governors to the 
well-organized force of one hundred thousand men 
maintained by the great su^^er-tuchurij Chang Tso-lin. 
There are to-day more than a score of such private 
armies, totaling, it is estimated, not far from 
1,200,000 men. Thus is presented the astonishing 
paradox of China, the weakest of all nations, having 
under arms more soldiers than any other nation in 
the world. Though these armies are supported from 
the public revenues, the tuchtms brazenly use them 
for private purposes. They will always sell their 
services to the party or faction that will pay the 
highest price, and they use the threat of their mili- 
tary power to strengthen their own position. As 
a result, the more powerful tuchuns wield a power 
more arbitrary and absolute than was ever dreamed of 
by the dictators of Latin- America. For example, 
when Chang Tso-lin wishes to move troops he seizes a 
sufficient number of railway cars and moves them 
whither he will. If his army requires aircraft, he 
sends troops to Peking with orders to help themselves 
from the government supply, puts the planes on flat- 
cars, and without so much as a by-your-leave trans- 
ports them to his stronghold at Mukden. When he 
needs money to pay his troops, or for the purpose of 
raising more men, or for investment in some new busi- 
ness enterprise, he sends a telegram to Peking — and 
gets it. The government does not dare to oppose or 
refuse him, for it is perfectly aware that it exists only 



CHINA 211 

on his sufferance. And what is true of Chang Tso-lin 
is equally true of Tsao Kun, tuchun of the metropoli- 
tan province of Chihli, and in a lesser degree of all the 
other tuchuns. As a result of their strangle-hold on 
the country, these military dictators have succeeded in 
amassing far greater fortunes under the republic than 
the viceroys ever did under the empire. Indeed, the 
most pressing question in China to-day is how to limit 
the power and rapacity of the tuchuns, how to bring 
them under the authority of the central government. 
If China is to escape complete disruption, the tuchum^ 
must cease being each a law unto himself. And this 
will come about only when their so-called armies have 
been disbanded under some scheme which will insure 
their disappearance for good and all. As Mr. J. O. 
P. Bland concisely puts it: "Nobody doubts for a mo- 
ment that the whole Chinese army would be delighted 
to return to its ancestral homes with all arrears of pay 
and a three months' bonus. The question is, however, 
who is going to prevent the tuclium,s from replacing 
them next morning by a new set of loot-hungry 
coolies?" 

The whole deplorable situation has been set forth 
with admirable fairness by a supporter of the south- 
ern faction, Mr. S. G. Cheng, in his book, "Modern 
China." One passage is so illuminating that it de- 
serves quoting in full : 

"For mihtary operations against the North, the 
South depends on governors who are just as selfish 



212 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

as their northern colleagues. It also receives, as its 
alHes, brigands or military leaders who have some 
personal grievance against the North and who desire 
to gratify their greed and ambition by taking advan- 
tage of the quarrel between the constitutionalists and 
the militarists. Among the army commanders of the 
South, many have no sympathy at all with the demo- 
cratic aspirations of the constitutionalists, but fight 
their own battle under the cloak of a good cause. 
This hopeless state of affairs is acknowledged and de- 
plored by the southern leader, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who 
summarizes the situation by saying that the struggle 
of military leaders for supremacy is equally rampant 
in the South and in the North, and that he has almost 
exhausted his voice, with no effect, in calling atten- 
tion to the incoherent situation." 



Ill 

In works of reference and official publications China 
is referred to — at least by implication — as a sovereign 
state, an independent nation. As a matter of fact, 
however, her independence is largely fictitious, the 
fiction being maintained because an official admission 
of her true status would be as embarrassing to those 
foreign nations which really control the country as it 
would be humihating to the Chinese themselves. 
Doubtless there are those who will attempt to ques- 



CHINA 213 

tion my assertion that China is not an independent 
nation by pointing out that she has her own govern- 
ment, her own army, her own diplomatic service, her 
own postal system, and her own flag. Let me answer 
such critics by asking if a nation can truthfully be 
called independent, in the generally accepted sense of 
the term, which ( 1 ) does not control its own fiscal af- 
fairs; which (2) is not permitted to revise its own 
tariff; which (3) is not permitted to collect its own 
revenues; which (4) is not permitted to appoint or re- 
call its officials in certain portions of its own territory 
without the consent of a foreign power ; which ( 5 ) can- 
not negotiate foreign loans or grant concessions to for- 
eigners without the permission of other powers ; which 
( 6 ) is not permitted to control its own inland water- 
ways; which (7) cannot sell, cede, or lease its own 
territory as it sees fit; which (8) does not possess 
jurisdiction over foreigners dwelling within its bor- 
ders ; which ( 9 ) is forced to agree to the maintenance 
on its soil of foreign courts, foreign police forces, for- 
eign prisons, and foreign post-offices; (10) within 
whose borders four foreign powers maintain armed 
forces; and (11) whose territory is seized and held by 
foreign nations without provocation or excuse? With 
foreign armies on her soil, with foreign flags flying 
over her seaports, with foreign courts functioning 
in her cities, with foreign gunboats patrolling her 
rivers, with foreign officials collecting her customs and 
her salt-duties, and with other foreigners supervising 



214 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

her fiscal affairs, China might be described, without 
taking undue Hberties with the truth, as a country 
under foreign occupation. It is a curious commen- 
tary on international standards of morality and jus- 
tice that China should receive less consideration from 
her late allies, so far as their refraining from inter- 
ference with her domestic affairs is concerned, than 
is accorded to unregenerate and resentful Germany. 

The position of virtual vassalage in which China 
finds herself to-day is not due to centuries of persis- 
tent nibbling by land-hungry nations, as in the case 
of Africa; it is the result of barely four score years 
of foreign aggression and spoliation. Until nearly 
the middle of the nineteenth century the regions di- 
rectly under the sway of the Chinese emperors ex- 
tended from the borders of Siberia on the north to An- 
nam and Burmah on the south, and from the Pacific 
Ocean on the east to Russian Turkestan on the west. 
There was also a fringe of tributary states — Korea, 
Annam, Burmah, and Nepaul — which still kept up 
the ancient forms of allegiance and which acknowl- 
edged in greater or less degrees the suzerainty of 
Peking. 

The dismemberment of China may be said to have 
been initiated by Great Britain in 1840, when, as 
the result of her ignoble victory in the so-called 
"Opium War" — a war waged to impose a poisonous 
drug on China against her will — the Chinese Gov- 



CHINA 215 

eminent was forced to cede to the victors the island 
of Hong Kong, occupying a position of immense 
strategic and commercial importance in that it com- 
mands the approaches to the great port of Canton ; to 
pay an indemnity of twenty-one milhon dollars; and 
to consent to the importation of opimn. 

In 1849 the Portuguese, who some three centuries 
earher had established a trading-post at Macao, a 
small island at the mouth of the Canton River for 
which they had long paid a trifling annual rental to 
the government at Peking, emulated the high-handed 
methods pursued by the Great Powers in their treat- 
ment of China by suddenly expelling the Chinese gar- 
rison and declaring the island a Portuguese posses- 
sion. For nearly forty years there was a state of 
quasi-war between Portugal and China over Macao, 
but a treaty was finally concluded in 1887 whereby 
the Chinese Government ceded the island to Portugal 
in perpetuity. Though, by the terms of this treaty, 
Portugal agreed to cooperate with the Chinese Gov- 
ernment in the suppression of the opium trade, she has 
never adhered to her promise. On the contrary, she 
has steadily developed her lucrative opium and gam- 
bling monopolies in Macao, free rein being given in 
this European-owned territory to those vices of which 
the Chinese have honestly endeavored to rid them- 
selves. As a result, Macao is the most notorious sink 
of iniquity in the China Seas, vice in every form 



216 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

flaunting itself, naked and unashamed, where the ban- 
ished poet, Camoens, wrote the immortal epic of his 
native land. 

Sixteen years after the "Opium War" Great Brit- 
ain again went to war with China, this time because 
Chinese authorities had seized a Chinese vessel flying 
the British flag on the ground that it was manned 
by Chinese pirates. By way of punishment for this 
affront to British dignity. Canton was bombarded 
and occupied and its viceroy exiled to Calcutta, 
where he died in prison. Before the menace of 
the guns of an Anglo-French squadron the Chinese 
Government agreed to sign treaties with Great Brit- 
ain and France granting their nationals extraterri- 
torial rights and opening the Yangtze River to Brit- 
ish and French commerce. But before the treaty 
could be ratified an incident occurred which over- 
shadowed the war in the seriousness of its conse- 
quences. The Pei-ho River, which connects Tient- 
sin with Peking, was closed to foreign vessels, but 
the warships bearing the British and French en- 
voys, who were on their way to the capital to obtain 
the ratification of the treaty, attempted to force the 
river defenses and were repulsed. Thereupon a 
second allied expedition was hurried from Europe, 
Peking was occupied and looted of priceless treasures 
in jewels, jade, bronze, and porcelain, and, as a crown- 
ing act of vandalism, the Summer Palace was burned. 
As this was not deemed sufficient punishment, China 



CHINA 217 

was forced to pay large indemnities to France and 
Great Britain and to cede to the latter a strip of ter- 
ritory along the Kowloon peninsula, on the mainland 
opposite Hong Kong. 

The next nation to exert pressure on China was 
Russia, which, during the middle years of the nine- 
teenth century, had begun to colonize the territory 
along the lower reaches of the Amur as a step in her 
advance toward the Pacific. This was a remote region, 
undeveloped and sparsely settled, and, as the Rus- 
sians pointed out, it had only been a part of the 
Chinese Empire for a few hundred years. In 1860, 
China, yielding to Muscovite coercion, ceded to Russia 
all the Chinese territory lying north of the Amur and 
between the Ussuri and the Pacific. On the coast 
of this territory, which comprises the present Amur 
and Maritime Provinces, Russia founded the port 
of Vladivostok, thereby obtaining her long-desired 
outlet on the ice-free waters of the Japan Sea. So 
easily was this vast territory acquired — ^taking land 
from China was like taking candy from a child — ^that 
in 1881 the Tsar's government tried its luck again, 
this time obtaining the cession of a portion of the 
fertile province of Kulja, in westernmost China, bor- 
dering on Russian Turkestan. I almost forgot to 
mention that, in addition to her loss of territory, China 
had to pay Russia an indemnity of nine million rubles. 

In 1883 it was France's turn again. The French 
Government, having decided to round out its pos- 



218 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

sessions in Indo-China, despatched an expedition for 
the conquest of Annam, which had always been re- 
garded as tributary to China. The Peking govern- 
ment protested, and there was a frontier skirmish in 
which both French and Chinese troops were killed, 
whereupon France promptly declared war. The 
French were victorious at sea and the Chinese on land, 
but, as the former had political troubles of their own 
at home, they consented to a compromise, which con- 
sisted in China recognizing the French protectorate 
over Annam. This time, thanks to the diplomacy of 
Li Hung-chang, France did not succeed in extracting 
an indemnity. 

While China had been engaged in her controversy 
with France over Annam, Great Britain had invaded 
Burmah, occupied its capital, and deposed King The- 
baw. Hitherto Burmah had been considered a vassal 
state of China and had paid her tribute annually, 
so, merely to satisfy diplomatic etiquette and to 
make the title clear, China was asked to give her 
formal assent to the incorporation of Burmah in the 
Indian Empire. She gave her assent — ^there was 
nothing else for her to do — and, for a wonder, no 
indemnity was demanded by Great Britain. 

In 1894-95 came China's brief but disastrous war 
with Japan, to which, as the price of defeat, she was 
forced to cede the great, rich island of Formosa and 
the Liao-tung Peninsula, on which were the towns of 
Dalny and Port Arthur. But it did not suit the 



CHINA 219 

policies of certain European powers, particularly Rus- 
sia, to see the Island Empire obtain a foothold on the 
Asian mainland, so Russia, France, and Germany 
presented a joint note to Japan suggesting that the 
Liao-tung Peninsula be restored to China. As 
Japan was in no position to resist the pressure thus 
brought to bear, she sullenly obeyed, retaining only 
Formosa. But though China retrieved the Liao-tung 
Peninsula, thanks to European intervention, a huge 
indemnity (230 million taels) was exacted by Japan 
and she was also forced to renounce her claims of 
suzerainty over Korea, thus losing the third of her 
great tributary states. 

Evidence was soon forthcoming, however, that 
Russia and France had not been disinterested in 
rescuing Chinese territory from the grasp of Japan, 
for Russia now demanded from Peking and obtained 
the right to carry the trans-Siberian Railway straight 
across Manchuria to Vladivostok, thus avoiding a long 
and costly detour. The syndicate which was to build 
the railway was also granted enormous timber and 
mining concessions in the regions through which the 
line was to pass and was authorized to maintain its 
own gendarmerie. This was the first step in the 
alienation of Manchuria. As payment for the part 
she had played in resisting the Japanese demands, 
France asked for and obtained a rectification of the 
frontier between China and Indo-China, as well as cer- 
tain mining rights in Kiangsi and Yunnan. Both 



220 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

powers also obtained territorial concessions in Han- 
kow for French and Russian settlements in that city. 
But as a result of the rectification of the Indo-China 
frontier England claimed that her interests had been 
injured and demanded compensation in the form of 
considerable modifications in the boundaries of Bur- 
mah, thereby adding several thousand square miles to 
the British Empire. 

While Russia and France were profiting by what 
they were pleased to call the generosity of China, 
Germany alone had so far received no reward for 
her share in compelling the restitution of Liao-tung, 
but in 1897 she proceeded to help herself by suddenly 
seizing the Bay of Kiauchau, on the eastern side of the 
Shantung Peninsula. The seizure was made osten- 
sibly in order to obtain redress for the murder of two 
German missionaries, but in reality because Ger- 
many's scheme of naval expansion demanded a har- 
bor and naval base in the Far East. The following 
year Germany succeeded in extracting from China a 
ninety-nine-year lease of Kiauchau Bay, together 
with the city of Tsing-tau and a considerable area of 
adjacent territory, with liberty to build docks, erect 
fortifications, and exercise all the rights of sover- 
eignty. In the same year Russia, which only a short 
time before had forced Japan to restore Port Arthur 
and Dalny to China, demanded from the Chinese Gov- 
ernment a twenty-five-year lease of those ports on the 
ground that her interests in Manchuria must be pro- 



CHINA 221 

tected against German penetration. This was the 
cue for England and France to again appear upon the 
scene, both of them demanding further concessions 
from China in order, as they explained, to preserve 
the balance of power in Eastern Asia. France de- 
manded and obtained a ninety-nine-year lease of 
Kwang-chou-wan, on the mainland, opposite the 
island of Hainan, while England took Weihaiwei, at 
the extremity of the Shantung Peninsula, for as long 
as Russia remained in Port Arthur. ( Though Russia 
surrendered Port Arthur to Japan in 1905, the Union 
Jack still flies over Weihaiwei. ) France, finding that 
fruit could be had for the picking, then demanded 
and obtained some valuable mining concessions in 
South China, England responding to this move 
by exacting from the government at Peking 
a pledge that the Yangtze Valley would not be 
alienated to a third power. Thereupon France came 
back with a demand that China agree not to alienate 
to a third power the three southern provinces of 
Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan. This left 
France slightly in the lead, so, to make matters even, 
England demanded a ninety-nine-year lease of the 
Kowloon Peninsula, comprising nearly four hundred 
square miles on the mainland opposite Hong Kong, 
a portion of which, it will be remembered, had 
been ceded to her forty years before. And by way 
of getting good measure she also obtained from China 
an undertaking to throw open the whole of her inland 



222 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

waterways to steam traffic, at the same time exacting 
a promise that the post of Inspector-General of Cus- 
toms (then held by Sir Robert Hart) should always 
be held by an Englishman as long as the trade of 
Great Britain with China was greater than that of 
any other nation. 

The territorial concessions thus exacted from 
China by the European nations marked the be- 
ginning of the "spheres of influence" policy and 
would have inevitably resulted in the complete parti- 
tion of the country had not the United States stepped 
in, in 1899, and enunciated its policy of "the open 
door," meaning equal opportunity for all. By her 
insistence that the customs duties in the leased terri- 
tories and spheres of influence should be made no 
higher than those prevailing in other parts of the 
empire, the United States secured an equal oppor- 
tunity for the commerce of all nations, large and 
small, and minimized the chances of a conflict between 
the powers which might have led to an extension of 
their territory at the expense of China. Great Britain, 
to her credit, was the first to endorse this policy of 
"the open door," and the other powers, though some- 
what reluctantly, followed her example. 

As was only to have been expected, the long series 
of aggressions by the foreign powers eventually re- 
sulted in arousing among the patient and long-suffer- 
ing Chinese people a feeling of bitter resentment and 



CHINA 223 

a desire for revenge. This smoldering resentment was 
fanned into flame by a secret society, known as "Har- 
monious and Peaceful Fists," which organized an agi- 
tation with the avowed object of killing all the for- 
eigners in China in order to save the country from 
further territorial encroachments and humiliations. 
In June, 1900, the movement, which came to be known 
as the Boxer Rebellion, burst over northeastern China 
with the fury of a hurricane. Hundreds of foreign 
traders and missionaries were murdered in the out- 
lying provinces. In Peking the Europeans sought 
refuge in the legations, which, though besieged by 
thousands of Boxers, aided by imperial troops, suc- 
ceeded in holding out until the arrival of an allied 
relief expedition. The reparations demanded by the 
Allies for this affair were calculated to discourage the 
Chinese Government from ever again countenancing 
an attack on foreigners within its borders. China was 
forced to execute certain of the ofiicials responsible 
for the outbreak and to degrade others ; to send special 
envoys to Berlin and Tokio to formally apologize for 
the murder of the German minister and the secretary 
of the Japanese legation ; to raze the Taku forts at the 
mouth of the Pei-ho River; to permit a foreign mili- 
tary occupation of the strategic points between the 
capital and the coast, thereby insuring communication 
with the sea ; to permit the fortification of the legation 
quarter in Peking and the maintenance of permanent 



224 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

legation guards therein; and to pay an indemnity of 
450 million taels, equivalent to about 337 million dol- 
lars. 

This staggering indemnity, which is now generally 
admitted to have been excessive and unjust, was se- 
cured (1) on the balance of the maritime customs 
revenue not already mortgaged for previous loans, 
the Powers permitting the Chinese Government to 
raise its tariff on imported articles to an effective five 
per cent, ad valorem; (2) on the revenue of the "na- 
tive" customs in the treaty ports; and (3) on the 
total revenues of the Salt Gabelle, salt being a gov- 
ernment monopoly. The collection of these revenues 
was insured by the establishment of effective foreign 
control of both the customs and salt administrations. 
The Boxer indemnity was converted into a loan 
which was to be repaid in annual installments extend- 
ing over a period of thirty-nine years, so that, had 
events followed a normal course, China would not have 
regained control of her own finances until 1940. But 
in 1908 the American Government, desiring to set 
China on her feet financially, informed the govern- 
ment at Peking that the United States was prepared 
to refund the shares of the indemnity that it had al- 
ready received and to remit the balance, on condition 
that the money should be used for the purpose of 
sending Chinese youths to the United States to be 
educated. By this altruistic action the United States 
won the confidence and friendship of the Chinese for 



CHINA 225 

all time. When, following the advice of the United 
States and the pleading of the Allies, China declared 
war against Germany in 1917, she promptly ceased 
payment of the German share of the indemnity, and 
a few months later also ceased payment to Russia. 
Her financial burden was still further relieved, at 
least temporarily, when, upon her entry into the war, 
the Allies agreed to suspend the payment of their 
shares of the indemnity for five years, or until 1922. 
In view of the great assistance which China rendered 
the Allies during the war by supplying them with 
laborers and her extinction of German competition in 
Chinese markets, it would seem that the least the Al- 
lies could have done by way of showing their gratitude 
was to follow the example of the United States and 
write off the payments of the indemnity still due them. 
More selfish, more short-sighted than the United 
States, however, they contented themselves with a 
five-year suspension. If the Powers concerned are 
sincerely desirous of rehabilitating China, their first 
step should be to completely remit, or at least mate- 
rially reduce, the intolerable burden imposed by the 
Boxer indemnities. 

The next assault against Chinese sovereignty was 
made by Great Britain in 1904, when the British 
Government despatched an expedition to Lhassa, the 
capital of Tibet, under Colonel Sir Francis Young- 
husband. Yielding to the pressure thus brought to 



226 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

bear, the Dalai Lama was forced to sign a treaty 
which provides ( 1 ) "that no portion of Tibetan terri- 
tory shall be ceded, sold, leased, or mortgaged to any 
other Power without the previous consent of the Brit- 
ish Government"; (2) "that no representative of any 
other country may be admitted"; (3) "that no conces- 
sion for railways, telegraphs, mining, or other rights 
shall be granted to another Power" ; and (4) "that no 
Tibetan revenues shall be pledged or assigned to any 
other government." This treaty, which the Tibetans 
were forced to sign literally at the mouths of British 
guns, constituted a flagrant infringement of Chinese 
sovereignty, for from time beyond reckoning Tibet 
had formed an integral part of the Chinese Empire 
and its rulers had acknowledged the suzerainty of 
Peking. Under the circumstances, however, there 
was nothing for Peking to do but submit with the 
best grace possible, the Chinese Government con- 
firming the treaty in exchange for Great Britain's 
pledge not to annex Tibet or to encroach on its in- 
ternal autonomy. Since then Great Britain has 
steadily strengthened her position in Tibet, demand- 
ing and obtaining new privileges and pursuing a 
policy which has for its object, apparently, the even- 
tual alienation of Tibetan territory. For example, a 
recent agreement provides that China may not dis- 
miss officials in Tibet, or appoint new ones, without 
first obtaining British permission. In short, the 
Chinese Government was warned by Great Britain 



CHINA 227 

that the acknowledged sovereignty of China in Tibet 
must not be allowed to lead to the exercise of actual 
sovereignty. Yet Tibet is represented by five depu- 
ties in the Chinese parliament. 

In the same year that England invaded Tibet 
came the war between Japan and Russia, a war fought 
almost wholly on Chinese soil in cynical disregard of 
Chinese rights or neutrality. The result of this con- 
flict did not greatly alter China's position in Man- 
churia. In South Manchuria Japan fell heir to the 
special privileges which Russia had wrung from 
China, taking over the lease of Port Arthur and 
Dalny (now known as Dairen) and the South Man- 
churia Railway as far north as Changchun. This in- 
cludes seventy square miles in the railway zone about 
the fifty-five stations along the line. Over this zone 
and the 1300 square miles of leased land surrounding 
Port Arthur and Dairen Japan rules as absolutely as 
in her own island realm. Japan also retained posses- 
sion of the light military railway which she built dur- 
ing the war from Antung, on the Korean frontier, to 
Mukden, and which she later converted into a 
standard-gauge line. This line connects at Antung 
with the Korean system, which, in August, 1917, 
passed under the control of the South Manchuria 
Railway, thus giving the Japanese a through line, 
under their own management, from Fusan, the Ko- 
rean port nearest Japan, to Changchun, where con- 
nection with the railway system to Harbin, on 



228 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

the main line of the Trans-Siberian, is effected. 
The section from Changchun to Harbin, and that 
portion of the Trans-Siberian which traverses Man- 
churia, are at present under Japanese control and 
guarded by Japanese troops. As these railways 
traverse the central and most fertile areas of a prov- 
ince larger than our three Pacific Coast states put to- 
gether, capable of supporting a population of 100 
millions, their value to Japan is obvious, and, unless 
I am greatly mistaken, she will not readily relax her 
grip on them. Though at Portsmouth both Russia 
and Japan solemnly agreed to evacuate Manchuria 
and restore it to China, it remains an imperium in 
imperio, theoretically an integral part of the Chinese 
Republic but to all intents and purposes a territory 
of the Japanese Empire. 

We now come to the question of Shantung — a 
question as easy of explanation as it should be 
of solution. In 1898, as I have already mentioned, 
Germany coerced China into granting her a ninety- 
nine-year lease of Kiauchau Bay, on the coast of 
Shantung Province, together with the territory in a 
fifty kilometer radius of the bay, including the sea- 
port of Tsingtau. On the coast of one of the richest 
and most populous provinces of China, midway be- 
tween Peking and Shanghai, within a few hours' 
steam of Weihaiwei, Tientsin, and Port Arthur, it 
occupies a position of immense strategic importance. 
Here the Germans proceeded to intrench themselves, 




CANAL SCENE IN CANTON 




THE PAWNSHOPS OP CANTON 
These are the only fireproof huildings in the city 




VIEW FROM THE TERRACE OP THE SUMMER PALACE 




BRIDGE IN THE GARDENS OF THE SUMMER PALACE, PEKING 



CHINA 229 

pouring out money like water in the construction of an 
elaborate system of fortifications, a spacious harbor, 
dockyards, machine-shops, warehouses, and all the 
other appurtenances of a great naval base. At the 
same time that the Germans obtained the lease of 
Kiauchau they extracted from the Chinese Govern- 
ment a concession to build a railway across the prov- 
ince from Tsingtau to Tsinanfu, a station on the 
trunk-line from Shanghai to Peking. The Germans 
proved themselves rapid workers, transforming the 
squalid Chinese seaport of Tsingtau into a modern 
city, with paved streets and electric-lights and sub- 
stantial buildings, and constructing the railway to 
Tsinanfu, a distance of 256 miles, in a surprisingly 
short time. By 1914, therefore, the whole peninsula 
of Shantung was pretty thoroughly under German 
domination. 

Within a fortnight after the outbreak of the World 
War Japan sent an ultimatum to Germany demand- 
ing the unconditional surrender of the entire leased 
territory of Kiauchau, "with a view to the eventual 
restoration of the same to China." No reply being 
received from the German Government, Japan de- 
clared war on August 23, 1914, and the harbor of 
Kiauchau was blockaded by a Japanese squadron. A 
few days later a Japanese expeditionary force landed 
on the coast of Shantung and, with the cooperation of 
a contingent of British and Indian troops from Wei- 
haiwei, captured the forts defending the harbor and 



230 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

the city on November 6, 1914. After the triumphal 
entry of the allied forces into Tsin^au, Great Britain, 
having done her part in aiding Japan to oust the Ger- 
mans, withdrew her troops and abstained from inter- 
fering with the administration of the leased territory, 
which was now completely occupied by the Japanese, 
who also proceeded to take over and operate the rail- 
way from Tsingtau to Tsinanfu. 

Now it should be kept in mind, in considering the 
Shantung controversy, that at this time China was 
neutral, for she did not enter the war until three years 
later. According to international law, "the territory 
of neutral powers is inviolable." And Kiauchau was 
indisputably Chinese territory, having only been 
leased to Germany. A nation may lease a portion of 
its territory, just as an individual may lease a build- 
ing, but the territory, like the building, remains the 
property of the lessor. Hence, when Japan and 
Great Britain attacked and captured Kiauchau they 
were, strictly speaking, violating Chinese neutrality. 
As it was common knowledge, however, that Germany 
was fitting out raiders in Kiauchau harbor for the 
purpose of preying on allied commerce, and it was 
obvious that China did not herself possess sufficient 
strength to reoccupy Kiauchau and intern the Ger- 
man garrison,^ in the judgment of most fair-minded 

^ I am informed by Dr. J. C. Ferguson, the Adviser to the President 
of China, that the Chinese Government would have taken steps to 
reoccupy Kiauchau and intern the Gennan garrison had Japan not 
objected. E. A. P. 



CHINA 231 

men, Japan was fully justified in capturing the Ger- 
man forts on the ground of self -protection. If, after 
the capitulation of the garrison, Japan had contented 
herself with dismantling the forts and had then re- 
stored the leased territory to China, there would have 
been no Shantung question. Japan, however, took 
the position that by her capture of Kiauchau she 
automatically succeeded Germany as lessee and that 
she need not restore the territory to China, unless she 
saw fit to do so, until the expiration of the original 
lease in 1997. As though to still further show their 
contempt for Chinese neutrality, a Japanese army 
pushed inland as far as Tsinanfu, the terminus of the 
railway from Tsingtau and two hundred miles beyond 
the limits of the leased territory, requisitioning with- 
out compensation cattle, horses, carts, boats, grain, 
and provisions from the peaceful Chinese inhabitants 
of the country through which it passed and threaten- 
ing with severe punishment any one who disobeyed the 
orders of the Japanese high command. All this, mark 
you, in a region which had never been leased to or 
occupied by the Germans and which was as essentially 
Chinese as Peking itself. 

The Chinese Government protested against Japan's 
actions with unexpected vigor, demanding the restora- 
tion of Kiauchau on the ground that the lease was not 
transferable and the immediate evacuation of the por- 
tion of Shantung occupied by Japanese troops on the 
ground that such occupation constituted an unjusti- 



232 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

liable invasion of a neutral country. Japan replied 
that the territory along the line of the Tsingtau-Tsin- 
anfu railway had been occupied as "a military neces- 
sity," but that it was her intention eventually to with- 
draw her troops from this region and to restore Kiau- 
chau to China — under certain conditions. 

These conditions were made known to China in a 
Japanese note presented to the government at Peking 
in May, 1915: 

"When, after the termination of the present war, 
the leased territory of Kiauchau Bay is completely 
left to the free disposal of Japan, the Japanese Gov- 
ernment will restore said leased territory to China 
under the following conditions : 

"1. The whole of Kiauchau Bay to be opened as a 
commercial port. 

"2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of 
Japan to be established at a place designated by the 
Japanese Government. 

"3. If the foreign powers desire it, an international 
settlement may be established. 

"4. As regards the disposal to be made of the build- 
ings and properties of Germany, and the conditions 
and procedure relating thereto, the Japanese Gov- 
ernment and the Chinese Government shall arrange 
the matter by mutual agreement before the restora- 
tion." 

This constituted Japan's idea of keeping the pledge, 
as made in her ultimatum to Germany, to restore 



CHINA 233 

Kiauchau to China, but it is obvious that the operation 
of the four conditions attached to the offer would at 
the same time transfer to her, in effect, all the rights, 
privileges, interests, and advantages formerly enjoyed 
by the Germans. China's acceptance of these condi- 
tions not only would have given Japan effective con- 
trol of the Kiauchau territory, even though the Rising 
Sun flag did not actually fly over it, but of the railways 
of the province and the rich iron and coal districts 
through which they pass. Under such circumstances 
it would be an easy matter for Japan to bring the 
whole province of Shantung within her sphere of in- 
fluence, thence penetrating the adjacent provinces 
and finally realizing her ambition of dominating the 
whole of that rich and populous littoral which stretches 
from Port Arthur to Canton. It was not the transfer 
of a few concessions or a few square miles of territory 
which aroused the apprehension and the resentment 
of China. It required no great discernment on the 
part of the Chinese to recognize that, with Japan al- 
ready impregnably intrenched in Korea, in Man- 
churia, and on the Kwantung peninsula, the establish- 
ment of Japanese domination in Shantung would 
complete a slip-noose about the capital itself, enabling 
Japan to choke the republic into submission whenever 
she saw fit. 

When, therefore, the representatives of China, one 
of the Allies since 1917, took their seats at the Peace 
Conference at the close of the war, they demanded di- 



284 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

rect and unconditional restoration of Kiauchau hy 
Germany, instead of through the agency of Japan, 
basing their argument on the ground that China 
should enjoy the same rights as the other Allies, and 
that, moreover, there was nothing to be gained by 
taking two steps to make the transfer, when it could 
be effected by one. It is not my intention to enter into 
an account of the furious controversy precipitated at 
Paris by China's resolute stand on the Shantung ques- 
tion, a controversy which came perilously near to 
wrecking the Peace Conference. The Japanese dele- 
gates not only refused to accept the arguments of the 
Chinese, but were infuriated that the case should have 
been brought before the Conference at all, strong 
pressure being brought by Tokio upon the govern- 
ment at Peking to recall its representatives at Paris 
forthwith. When, late in April, 1919, the question of 
Kiauchau was brought before the Council of Four for 
final decision the Italian delegation had withdrawn 
from the Conference, owing to the dispute over 
Fiume, and Japan, taking advantage of the delicate 
situation which had thus been created, threatened to 
follow Italy's example should the matter of Kiauchau 
not be decided to her satisfaction. In all likelihood 
Japan's withdrawal would have resulted in the break- 
up of the Conference, a catastrophe which even a man 
so iron-willed as President Wilson did not dare to risk. 
Persuaded, therefore, by the verbal assurances of the 
Japanese, that Kiauchau and the rest of the Shantung 



CHINA 235 

peninsula would be voluntarily restored in full sov- 
ereignty to China, he reluctantly agreed to the inser- 
tion in the Treaty of Peace of the much-criticized 
Articles 156 and 157. They read: 

Article 156. Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all 
her rights, title, and privileges — particularly those con- 
cerning the territory of Kiaochow, railways, mines, and 
submarine cables — which she acquired in virtue of the 
Treaty concluded by her with China on March 6, 1898, and 
of all other arrangements relative to the Province of Shan- 
tung. All German rights in the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Rail- 
way, including its branch lines, together with its subsidiary 
property of all kinds, stations, shops, fixed and rolling 
stock, mines, plant and material for the exploitation of the 
mines, are and remain acquired by Japan, together with all 
her rights and privileges attaching thereto. The German 
State submarine cables from Tsingtao to Shanghai and 
from Tsingtao to Chefoo, with all the rights, privileges, and 
properties attaching thereto, are similarly acquired by 
Japan free and clear of all charges and encumbrances. 

Article 157. The movable and immovable property 
owned by the German State in the territory of Kiaochow, 
as well as all the rights which Germany might claim in con- 
sequence of the works or improvements made or of the ex- 
penses incurred by her directly or indirectly in connexion 
with this territory, are and remain acquired by Japan, free 
and qlear of all charges and encumbrances. 

In order to defend their country's rights and at the 
same time obviate an open breach with the Allies, the 
Chinese delegates, while protesting these articles, of- 
fered to sign the treaty provided they were permitted 
to make a reservation regarding the clause relating to 
Shantung. Informed that no reservation would be 
permitted, the Chinese delegation reluctantly with- 



236 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

drew from the Conference. It has been held by some 
that they would have placed their country in a stronger 
position had they signed the treaty, trusting to Japan 
to redeem her promises to restore Shantung. But 
the truth of the matter was that the Chinese did not 
trust Japan — and with good reason. For Japan had 
made promises to China on other occasions — notably 
in the case of Manchuria — and those promises had not 
been kept. With nations, as with individuals, prom- 
ises count for little if sincerity is lacking. 

This outline of the systematic spoliation of China 
would be incomplete without some mention of the 
Lao Hsi Kai incident, which, though it involved a 
comparatively insignificant amount of territory, pro- 
vides a glaring example of the rapacity, cynicism, and 
injustice which have characterized certain European 
nations in their treatment of China. Lao Hsi Kai is 
the name of a district in the heart of Tientsin, the 
greatest seaport of North China. Tientsin is only 
about two hours by rail from Peking and is a trade 
center of immense importance, with about one million 
inhabitants. In it Great Britain, France, Italy, and 
Japan have concessions. 

On the night of October 19, 1916, a force of French 
soldiery, led by the French charge d'affaires, who had 
come down from Peking for the purpose, without the 
slightest warning suddenly took possession of the Lao 



CHINA 237 

Hsi Kai district, consisting of 333 acres of wharfage, 
streets, warehouses, shops, and dwellings in one of 
the busiest parts of Tientsin. They arrested and im- 
prisoned the Chinese soldiers on duty in the district, 
substituted the tricolor for the flag of China, and in 
the name of France formally annexed this territory to 
the overseas dominions of the republic. And this, 
mark you, at a time when France was engaged in a 
life-and-death struggle with Germany, which had 
done precisely the same thing, only on a larger scale, 
in Belgium. The French did not seize Lao Hsi Kai 
as a punitive measure, or for strategic purposes, or 
from military necessity, or in payment of unsatisfied 
claims. They seized it because they wanted it 
and because they knew that China was powerless 
to resist them. They could not even offer the 
excuse that they took it in order to obtain the same 
advantages as other nations, for they already pos- 
sessed one of the most valuable and extensive con- 
cessions in the city. When I questioned an official 
of the French Legation as to the reason for the seizure 
he naively explained that France had been asking for 
Lao Hsi Kai for fifteen years, but that the Chinese 
authorities had met her demands with procrastination 
and evasion, whereupon she had decided to help her- 
self to the territory in question. To my way of 
thinking, France's theft of Lao Hsi Kai was on the 
same moral plane as stealing pennies from a cripple. 



238 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

As things stand to-day, fully three quarters of all 
the territory nominally included within the Chinese 
Republic is under foreign influence, if not actually un- 
der foreign control. Tibet is to all intents and purposes 
a British protectorate, the government at Peking 
exercising over it only a vicarious rule, and Britain 
likewise considers the teeming valley of the Yangtze, 
potentially the greatest market in all Asia, as within 
her recognized sphere of interest. Hong Kong, Kow- 
loon, and Weihaiwei bristle with British bayonets and 
British guns. France has appropriated for her sphere 
of interest the great, rich province of Yunnan and on 
the coast of Kwantung Province has intrenched her- 
self at Kwang-chau-wan. The flag of Japan flies over 
the former German leasehold of Kiauchau and over 
the former Russian territory on the Kwantung penin- 
sula, while Japanese influence, in the form of Japa- 
nese railways, banks, traders, and gendarmes, has been 
extended over the whole of Manchuria and the fringes 
of Mongolia. Small wonder that the American con- 
cession-hunter, studying a map of the republic to dis- 
cover some region where he could operate without en- 
croaching on territory preempted by other nations, 
finally exclaimed, "But where in hell is China?" 



lY 

At the opening of the year 1915 Europe found 
itself in unparalleled turmoil. The triumphant 



CHINA 239 

legions of Germany had overrun Belgium and 
had pushed deep into France and Russia. The 
Alhes were fighting with their backs to the 
wall. Paris was in imminent danger, the Channel 
ports were threatened, the sea-borne commerce of 
Britain was being slowly throttled by the submarine 
campaign. America, huge, inert, unprepared, was 
apathetically looking on. China, with her incalculable 
wealth in trade and natural resources, was isolated, 
forgotten, helpless, without a friend on whom she 
could count for assistance or support. In this situa- 
tion Japan, whose settled policy had long had as its 
object the domination of China and the hegemony of 
Eastern Asia,^ saw her golden opportunity. And 
that opportunity she was quick to seize. On the 
eighteenth of January, then, when Western ears were 
deaf to everything save the cannon-roll in Flanders, 
the Japanese minister at Peking presented to the 
Chinese Government the famous Twenty-One De- 
mands. 

Because they afford concrete, indisputable evidence 
of the sinister and predatory character of Japanese 
policy at that time ; because they so clearly explain the 
universal hatred and distrust which the people of 
China have for Japan; and because they constitute 
the most colossal blunder ever committed by the 

^This is not the policy of the present government of Japan. One 
of the highest officials of the Empire said to me in December, 19^1, 
"The greatest blessing that could come to Japan would be a prosperous 
and well-governed China." E. A. P. 



240 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

Tokyo government, I feel justified, despite the many 
times they have been quoted, in reproducing them in 
fuU: 



THE OEIGINAL TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS, AS PRESENTED TO THE 
CHINESE GOVERNMENT JANUARY 18, 1915 



The Japanese government and the Chinese government, 
being desirous of maintaining the general peace in Eastern 
Asia and further strengthening the friendly relations and 
good neighborhood existing between the two nations, agree 
to the following articles: 

Article I. The Chinese government engages to give full 
assent to all matters upon which the Japanese government 
may hereafter agree with the German government relating 
to the disposition of all rights, interests, and concessions 
which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, pos- 
sesses in relation to the province of Shantung. 

Article II. The Chinese government engages that within 
the province of Shantung, and along its coast, no territory 
or island will be ceded or leased to a third power under any 
pretext. 

Article III. The Chinese government consents to Japan's 
building a railway from Chefoo or Lungkou to join the 
Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway. 

Article IV. The Chinese government engages, in the in- 
terest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open 
by herself as soon as possible certain important cities and 
towns in the province of Shantung as commercial ports. 
What places shall be opened are to be jointly decided upon 
in a separate agreement. 

II 

The Japanese government and the Chinese government, 
since the Chinese government has always acknowledged the 




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CHINA 241 

special position enjoyed by Japan in south Manchuria and 
eastern inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles : 

Article I. The two contracting parties mutually agree 
that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the 
term of lease of the South Manchurian Railway and the 
Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to the period of 
ninety-nine years. 

Article II. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and 
eastern inner Mongolia shall have the right to lease or own 
land required either for erecting suitable buildings for trade 
and manufacture or for farming. 

Article III. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and 
travel in south Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia and 
to engage in business and in manufacture of any kind what- 
soever. 

Article IV. The Chinese government agrees to grant to 
Japanese subjects the right of opening the mines in south 
Manchuria and eastern Mongolia. As regards what mines 
are to be opened, they shall be decided upon jointly. 

Article V. The Chinese government agrees that in respect 
of the (two) cases mentioned herein below the Japanese 
government's consent shall be first obtained before such 
action is taken : 

(a) Whenever permission is granted to the subject of 
a third power for the purpose of building a railway in 
south Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia. 

(b) Whenever a loan is to be made with a third power 
pledging the local taxes of south Manchuria and eastern 
inner Mongolia. 

Article VI. The Chinese government agrees that if the 
Chinese government employs political, financial, or military 
advisers or instructors in south Manchuria or eastern Mon- 
golia, the Japanese government shall first be consulted. 

Article VII. The Chinese government agrees that the 
control and management of the Kirin-Changchun Railway ^ 
shall be handed over to the Japanese government for a term 

*This relates to a branch line running from Changchun, the terminus 
of the South Manchuria Railway, to Kirin, capital of the province of 
jthe same name. The line is important because it taps the Manchurian 
coal-fields. 



242 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

of ninety-nine years dating from the signing of this agree- 
ment. 



in 

The Japanese government and the Chinese government, 
seeing that Japanese financiers and the Hanyehping Com- 
pany ^ have close relations with each other at present, and 
desiring that the common interests of the two nations shall 
be advanced, agree to the following articles: 

Article I. The two contracting parties mutually agree 
that when the opportune moment arrives the Hanyehping 
Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations, 
and they further agree that, without the previous consent of 
Japan, China shall not by her own act dispose of the rights 
and property of whatsoever nature of the said company nor 
cause the said company to dispose freely of the same. 

Article II. The Chinese government agrees that all mines 
in the neighborhood of those owned by the Hanyehping 
Company shall not be permitted, without the consent of the 
said company, to be worked by other persons outside of 

*The Hanyehping Company is a combination of three concerns — the 
Hang Yang Steel & Iron Works, the Tayeh Mines, and the Pinghsiang 
Collieries. Its mills are at Hang Yang, one of the most important com- 
mercial centers in the upper Yangtze valley. The company was orig- 
inally purely a Chinese property, but in 1912 the whole property was 
paortgaged to the Yokohama Specie Bank as security for a loan. As 
a condition of the loan it is provided that the auditor and certain tech- 
nical experts employed by the company shall be Japanese and that the 
total output of the Tayeh mines must be sold to the Japanese Govern- 
ment Iron Works at rates to be fixed biennially, but much below 
paarket prices. The bank has also acquired the preferential right to 
advance further loans. The mines in Tayeh, according to a Japanese 
ofScial report, are almost inexhaustible and will produce 1,000,000 tons 
annually for 700 years, the quality of the ore being as good as that 
produced in Germany or the United States. In the districts surround- 
ing the Tayeh n^nes there are many other mines — copper, lead, and 
zinc — which are not the property of the Hanyehping Company. It will 
be noted that in Article II Japan demands that these mines shall not 
be exploited without the consent of the company, which, being con- 
trolled by the Yokohama Specie Bank, really means that they shall not 
be exploited without the consent of Japan. This group of demands is 
significant in that it illustrates Japan's intention to enter and control 
a region in the valley of the Yangtze which Great Britain has always 
considered within her own sphere of interest. 



CHINA 243 

the said company ; and further agrees that if it is desired to 
carry out any undertaking, which, it is apprehended, may 
directly or indirectly affect the interests of the said com- 
pany, the consent of the said company shall first be obtained. 



IV 

The Japanese government and the Chinese government, 
with the object of effectively preserving the territorial in- 
tegrity of China, agree to the following special article : 

The Chinese government engages not to cede or lease to a 
third power any harbor or bay or island along the coast of 
China. 



Article I. The Chinese central government shall employ 
influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial, and 
military affairs. 

Article II. Japanese hospitals, churches, and schools in 
the interior of China shall be granted the right of owning 
land. 

Article III. Inasmuch as the Japanese government and 
the Chinese government have had many cases of dispute 
between Japanese and Chinese police which caused no little 
misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the 
police departments of important places (in China) shall be 
jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese, or that the 
police departments of these places shall employ numerous 
Japanese, so that they may at the same time help to plan 
for the improvement of the Chinese police service. 

Article IV. China shall purchase from Japan a fixed 
amount of the munitions of war (say, 50 per cent or more) 
that are needed by the Chinese government, or there shall 
be established in China a Sino- Japanese jointly worked 
arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be employed and 
Japanese material to be purchased. 

Article V. China agrees to grant to Japan the right of 



244 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

constructing a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang 
and Nanchang, another line between Nanchang and Hang- 
chow, and another between Nanchang and Chaochou.^ 

Article VI. If China needs foreign capital to work mines, 
build railways, and construct harbor-works (including 
dockyards) in the province of Fukien, Japan shall be first 
consulted. 

Article VII. China agrees that Japanese subjects shall 
have the right of missionary propaganda in Buddhist China. 

It requires no profound knowledge of diplomacy 
to recognize the sweeping and peculiarly sinister na- 
ture of these demands. Their acceptance in their 
original form would have been tantamount to an 
admission by the Peking government that China was 
a Japanese protectorate. The article demanding that 
the police departments of important cities in China 
be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese 
was as humiliating to Chinese pride, as flagrant an 
infringement of Chinese sovereignty, as the clause 
in the ultimatum presented by Austro-Hungary to 
Serbia in the spring of 1914 demanding that Austria 
be given joint control of the Serbian police system. 
China's acceptance of the original Twenty-One De- 
mands would have given Japan paramount influence 
in many branches of the Chinese Government; it 
would have placed the Chinese army and its materiel 
under the control of the Japanese General Staff; it 
would have transformed the occupied territory of 

^ These cities are in the provinces of Hupeh and Kiangsi. Such a 
railway would have enabled Japan to obtain control of one of the most 
populous and important districts in all China. 



CHINA 245 

Kiauchau into a wedge which would eventually have 
opened the whole of Shantung to Japanese penetra- 
tion; it would have added the maritime province of 
Fukien to the Japanese spheres of interest; and it 
would have permitted a small army of Japanese secret 
agents, under the guise of missionaries and school- 
teachers, to penetrate far into the hinterland of China, 
where it would have been a simple matter for them 
to have created "incidents" which would provide 
Japan with excuses for still further aggression. 

The publication of the Demands aroused a storm 
of indignation and protest which swept China from 
Yunnan to the Great Wall. Mass-meetings and 
demonstrations were held everywhere. Even the 
warring cliques and factions were unanimous in in- 
sisting that the Demands must be rejected. Thus 
bolstered up, the feeble and vacillating administra- 
tion at Peking became so obstinate in its refusal to 
consider the Fifth Group of the Demands that the 
Japanese Government, apparently realizing that by 
its greed it had outreached itself, caused them to be 
withdrawn. It is worthy of remark in this connec- 
tion that when Japan notified the Western Powers 
of her demands on China, Japanese diplomacy exe- 
cuted a characteristic manceuver by omitting all men- 
tion of the obnoxious Fifth Group, and when the 
Powers were presented by China with a complete 
copy of the Demands, as they had been presented to 
President Yuan Shih-kai, the authenticity of the 



246 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

Fifth Group was denied by the Japanese Foreign 
Office. Concerning this unblushing attempt at de- 
ception as eminent a Japanese as Baron Hayashi, 
later Japanese Ambassador to England, is quoted 
as having said : 

"When Viscount Kato sent China a note contain- 
ing five groups, and then sent to England what pur- 
ported to be a copy of his note to China, and that copy 
only contained four of the groups and omitted the 
fifth altogether, which was directly a breach of the 
agreement contained in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
he did something which I can no more explain than 
you can. Outside of the question of probity involved, 
his action was unbelievably foolish." ^ 

As the Peking government remained obdurate 
even after the withdrawal of Group V, being par- 
ticularly opposed to acceptance of the articles con- 
firming Japan in her possession of Kiauchau, Japan, 
on May 7, 1915, presented China with an ultimatum. 
The attitude of Tokio in regard to the restoration of 
the territory captured from Germany was unequiv- 
ocally expressed in the paragraph which read : '"The 
Imperial Japanese Government ^ in taking Kiauchau, 
made immense sacrifices in blood and money. There- 
fore, after taking the place , there is not the least 
obligation . . . to return the place to ChinaJ" 

For four months China had held off Japan by de- 
lay and evasion, hoping against hope that aid would 

*"The Far East Unveiled," by Frederick Coleman. 



CHINA 247 

be forthcoming from Europe or America. But no 
help came, and Japan having consented to withdraw 
the obnoxious Fifth Group (or, more accurately, to 
treat its provisions in "Notes to be Exchanged") and 
having somewhat modified the other four groups, 
Peking finally gave way and on May 9 the agree- 
ment was signed. 

Two days later, however, tardy help arrived from 
the United States in the form of identical notes ad- 
dressed by the United States Government to China 
and to Japan. The note to Japan read: 

In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which 
have taken place and which are now pending between the 
Government of Japan and the Government of China and of 
the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, 
the Government of the United States has the honor to notify 
the Government of the Japanese Empire that it cannot 
recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been 
entered into or which may be entered into between the 
Governments of Japan and China impairing the treaty 
rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the 
political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, 
or the International policy relative to China commonly 
known as the Open Door policy. 

The firm tone of the American note served to tem- 
porarily check Japanese aggression, but its salutary 
effect was largely undone by a note which was ex- 
changed on November 15, 1917, between Viscount 
Ishii, who had been sent by his government on a spe- 
cial mission to the United States, and the American 
Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing. This note con- 



248 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

stitutes what is commonly known as the Lansing- 
Ishii Agreement. It says: 

The Governments of Japan and of the United States 
recognize that territorial propinquity creates special rela- 
tions between countries, and consequently the United States 
recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, par- 
ticularly in that part to which her possessions are con- 
tiguous. 

The territorial sovereignty of China nevertheless remains 
unimpaired, and the Government of the United States has 
every confidence in the repeated assurance of the Imperial 
Japanese Government that, while geographical position gives 
Japan such special interests, it has no desire to discriminate 
against the trade of other nations or to disregard the com- 
mercial rights heretofore granted by China in the treaties 
with other nations. 

The Governments of Japan and the United States deny 
that they have any purpose of infringing in any way the 
independence or territorial integrity of China, and they 
declare furthermore that they always adhere to the principle 
of the so-called "open door," or equal opportunity of com- 
merce and industry in China,. 

Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed 
to the acquisition by any Government of any special rights 
or privileges that would affect the independence or terri- 
torial integrity of China, or that would deny to the subjects 
or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal 
opportunity in the commerce and industry of China. 

Though the Lansing-Ishii Agreement reiterated 
the principle of the Open Door, it was in one point 
substantially different from preceding notes ex- 
changed between the United States and Japan (par- 
ticularly, the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1909) 
in that it recognized that Japan possessed "special 



CHINA 249 

interests" in China. Whatever may have been Presi- 
dent Wilson's intentions in the matter, whatever men- 
tal reservations Mr. Lansing may have made in dis- 
cussing the wording with Viscount Ishii, the effect 
of the agreement, once it was published, was to re- 
verse America's traditional policy toward China. By 
recognizing special rights for one country, Mr. Lan- 
sing abandoned the principle of equal rights for all. 
The commitment was an evil one, and no one has 
ever explained why it was made. It was virtually 
repudiated, however, by Mr. Hughes shortly after 
he became secretary of state in 1921, when he reaf- 
firmed the poHcy of the Open Door. 



China, as you will see by referring to the map, is 
crisscrossed by a network of railways, completed, 
under construction, or in contemplation. Sentimental 
persons have referred to these railways as "paths 
of progress," but they might more fittingly be de- 
scribed as bonds of servitude. For it should be under- 
stood that railways in China, unlike those in other 
countries, are not purely commercial enterprises. In 
most countries the construction of a railway means 
the acquirement of a right-of-way, the laying of rails, 
the building of stations and workshops, and the op- 
eration of trains — nothing more. But not so in China. 



250 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

There, at least until very recently, railway building 
has been primarily a political enterprise, the railways 
themselves having been utilized by the foreign na- 
tions which supplied the funds for their construction 
as instruments for military aggression and political 
coercion. In the majority of cases the railways of 
China are financed by foreign or other institutions 
with the approval and support of their respective 
governments and subject to their control. Chinese 
railway concessions, moreover, have frequently car- 
ried with them extraordinary commercial and pohtical 
privileges, and monopolies such as the right of ex- 
ploiting the mines and forests in the territory trav- 
ersed by the railway ; maintaining armed forces along 
the line, ostensibly for its protection against bandits; 
and in some cases (notably, in Shantung) the estab- 
lishment of civil administrative centers. Such rail- 
ways, it will be realized, are far more of a liability 
than an asset to a country as weak and disorganized 
as China. 

The most important of these "political" railways 
are: 

1. The Chinese Eastern Railway, with a total mile- 
age, including branches, of 1275 miles, which runs 
from Manchouli (Manchuria), on the Siberian-Chi- 
nese frontier, straight across Manchuria, via Harbin 
(whence a section runs southward to Changchun) to 
Suifenho (Pogranitchnaia) , on the border of the Rus- 



CHINA 251 

sian Maritime Province. This line is of immense 
commercial and strategic importance in that it forms 
a "cut-off" for the Trans-Siberian system, shortening 
the distance between Moscow and Vladivostok by 
several hundred miles. It effects junctions at Man- 
chouli with the Trans-Siberian to Europe, at Suifenho 
with the continuation of the Trans-Siberian to Vladi- 
vostok, and at Changchun with the South Manchuria 
Railway to Mukden. It forms, in short, a Chinese 
section of the Trans-Siberian route from Europe to 
the Pacific. Built by a Russian syndicate, with the 
full power of control originally vested in the Russian 
minister of finance, it has been occupied by Japanese 
troops since the collapse of the Russian constitutional 
government, and is to-day under the control of Japan. 
2. The South Manchuria Railway, with a total 
mileage of 697 miles, which runs from Changchun 
(the southern terminus of the Chinese Eastern Rail- 
way) to Mukden, where it splits into three sections: 
one running southwest to Newchwang, where it con- 
nects with the Chinese Government Railways for 
Peking ; another section running in a southerly direc- 
tion, down the Kwantung peninsula, to Dalny, where 
it connects with the short branch line to Port Arthur ; 
and the third section running southeast to Antung, 
where it links up with the Korean system. Prior to 
the Russo-Japanese War it was part of the Chinese 
Eastern Railway and was controlled by Russia, 
but by the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth the 



252 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

section running from Mukden to Changchun, 
as well as the branches from Mukden to Antung 
and Mukden to Port Arthur, was transferred by 
Russia to Japan. Under the terms of the agreement 
between Russia and China the latter had the right 
to redeem this line thirty-six years after it was opened 
to traffic, but after its transfer to Japan the Japanese 
Government forced Peking to extend the term for 
redemption to ninety-nine years, so that China can- 
not obtain possession of the property until 2002. 

3. The Shantung (Tsingtau-Tsinanfu) Railway. 
This line, of which about 300 miles has been opened 
to traffic, was built by German capitalists upon Ger- 
many's acquirement of the lease of Kiauchau Bay, 
at the extremity of the Shantung peninsula. Start- 
ing from Tsingtau, it runs westward across the prov- 
ince of Shantung to Tsinanfu, on the Yellow River, 
where it effects a junction with the Pukow-Tientsin 
Railway, which forms a section of the trunk-line from 
Shanghai to Peking. This railway, together with the 
accompanying concessions to exploit the mines within 
ten miles of the line and to prospect for minerals in 
certain specified areas outside the railway zone, was 
transferred by Germany to Japan under the pro- 
visions of the Treaty of Versailles. 

4. The Yunnan Railway. This line, which is an 
extension of France's system in Indo-China, runs 
on French territory from Haiphong to Laokay, and 



CHINA 253 

on Chinese territory from Laokay to Yunnanfu, the 
capital and chief city of Yunnan, the southernmost 
and one of the richest provinces of the republic. Its 
total mileage is 533 miles, of which slightly more than 
half is within the borders of China. This concession, 
like those for the Manchurian and the Shantung sys- 
tems, carries with it mining and other valuable priv- 
ileges. 

All the above-mentioned railway concessions are im- 
mune from any interference by the Chinese Govern- 
ment until the dates fixed for their redemption, and 
all of them were granted under pressure from the 
powers concerned, who demanded them not with the 
motive of developing the country, but for the pur- 
pose of strengthening their positions in certain parts 
of it, so that they might the more readily transform 
their spheres of influence into colonial possessions in 
the event of China being partitioned. 

Thanks to these railway holdings and the conces- 
sions which accompany them, Japan is to-day to all 
intents and purposes, mistress of Manchuria and of 
Shantung. In Yunnan French influence is predomi- 
nant, though it is only fair to say that they have not 
utilized their railway concession to undermine Chinese 
sovereignty in the south as the Japanese have done 
in the north. The railways of Middle China, par- 
ticularly those in the valley of the Yangtze, are, gen- 
erally speaking, under British financial control, 



254 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

though here again it must be admitted that Great 
Britain has rarely utilized them to advance her politi- 
cal designs. 

In the railway loans signed prior to 1908 China 
consented to the lending banks exercising a large 
measure of supervision in regard to construction and 
expenditure. In every case the lending banks in- 
sisted on selecting the chief engineer, who was charged 
not only with the construction of the Hne but with its 
operation after it was built. Hence, though these 
lines are nominally the property of the Chinese Gov- 
ernment, China is not in full control of them and, if 
she wishes to take any measures not provided for in 
the original agreements, she has first to obtain the per- 
mission of the corporations representing the investors. 
In the railway loans floated since 1908, however, 
foreign control, though by no means eliminated, is 
greatly diminished, though even in the later agree- 
ments it is stipulated that the chief engineers shall be 
foreigners and that expenditures shall be controlled 
by auditors appointed by the lending banks. 

Ever since China floated her first foreign loan she 
has been a happy hunting-ground for "the powers 
that prey." English, French, Russian, German, Aus- 
trian, Dutch, Swiss, Belgian, and Japanese investors 
and concession-hunters jostled and snarled at each 
other in their attempts to reach the Chinese trough. 
At one period there was such a scramble among the 
Treaty Powers to lend money to China that there 



CHINA 255 

were not enough loans to go round, The almost in- 
credible selfishness which characterized the attitude 
of the European nations toward China is strikingly 
set forth by Miss Ellen LaMotte in "Peking Dust" : 

When a European Power finds a piece of rich, juicy ter- 
ritory which has not already been appropriated by some one 
else, it simply proclaims it a sphere of influence, notifies 
the Chinese government to that eff*ect, and forces it — as 
often as not by threats of one kind and another — to ratify 
the transaction by a treaty. After that China cannot 
even build a railway in that sphere without the permission 
of the ruling Power ; she cannot dismiss or appoint officials ; 
even the police are, as likely as not, officered by Europeans. 
Do you appreciate that in 1916, when the European war was 
at its height, England, France, and Russia lodged protests 
with the Chinese Government on the ground that the railway 
loan which it had recently contracted with American bank- 
ers for the construction of a railway from Fengchen to 
Ninghsi trespassed upon the preferential rights of those 
Powers to build railways.'' In this aff^air France also acted 
for Belgium. Think of it t China needing a railway, an 
American firm willing to build it, and England, France, 
Russia, and even poor little Belgium forbidding her to build 
it, although they were themselves unable to help her finan- 
cially ! Such incidents would be ludicrous, were they not 
so tragic. 

Now if China is to be saved, such conditions cannot 
be permitted to continue. A stop must be put to 
the jealous rivalries of those foreign nations who, 
through the instrumentality of loans, have been cal- 
lously exploiting the country for their own selfish 
ends. The realization by the foreign banking 
groups that if China was not to be irretrievably 



256 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

wrecked these abuses must be abolished and interna^ 
tional cooperation substituted for international com- 
petition resulted in the signing of the Consortium on 
October 15, 1920. The Consortium is an agreement 
to which the banking groups of the United States, 
Great Britain, France, and Japan are parties, whose 
declared purpose is to assist China in developing her 
railways and public utilities. As each banking group 
signed with the approval of its government, the Con- 
sortium, though in some respects a private contract, 
is, in effect, an international agreement. 

The framers of the Consortium recognized the ob- 
stacles in the path of rehabilitating China. First 
of all, there was China's deep-seated distrust of 
the foreigner — ^the result of years of coercion, 
intrigue, injustice, and oppression — coupled with the 
fear that the Consortium would prove to be only a 
stepping-stone to some form of international control 
of China's finances. Then there was the fact 
that every politician in China, irrespective of 
party, violently opposed the Consortium because 
he saw in it a curtailment of lucrative oppor- 
tunities for graft. And finally, it was necessary to 
overcome the mutual jealousies and suspicions of the 
foreign capitahsts themselves. The Consortium be- 
came, therefore, an ordinance of mutual self-denial. 
Unselfishness and cooperation are at the bottom of 
the agreement. There is to be no further crowding 
or jostling at the Chinese trough. There is to be a 



CHINA 257 

common holding company, as it were, with each set 
of shareholders represented on the board of direct 
tors. In short, the Consortium applies the Open 
Door principle to the financial problems of the repub- 
lic. China is to be loaned money for her legitimate 
needs, but henceforth it is to be loaned wisely and dis- 
criminatingly, and steps will be taken to see that 
it is used for the purposes intended, instead of being 
diverted, as heretofore, into the pockets of the poll-- 
ticians and mihtary chieftains. The Consortium has 
been described as a financial league of nations whose 
decisions, based on justice and forbearance, are ex- 
pected to prevent China from being in the future a 
bone of warlike contention and which will at the same 
time guarantee her fair treatment from all. I might 
add, however, that the Chinese themselves are by no 
means as optimistic about the Consortium as are its 
American promoters. Nor is this at all surprising. 
Their previous experiences with foreign financiers 
have made them "gun-shy." 

If the foreign powers are really sincere in their 
protestations ( that they wish to set China upon her 
feet financially, if they are genuinely desirous of re- 
storing her self-respect, their first step is plain. She 
should be permitted to regulate her own customs 
duties. Do you realize, I wonder, that under existing 
conditions if China wishes to raise or lower the duty 
on a single imported article, she must first obtain the 
permission of thirteen nations ? And if those nations 



258 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

that do not produce the article in question consent to 
having the duty raised on that item, those nations that 
do produce that article may be counted upon to refuse 
their consent. The United States and Great Britain, 
for example, would probably interpose no objections 
to the Chinese Government raising the duties on im- 
ported wines, for the reason that they are not wine- 
producing countries and therefore their exports would 
not be affected, whereas France and Italy, both of 
which export great quantities of wine, might be ex- 
pected to offer the most strenuous objections. On 
the other hand, if China desired to raise the duty on 
breadstuff s, France and Italy, not being grain-grow- 
ing countries, might give their assent, while the 
United States and Great Britain, with their vast 
grain-fields, would almost certainly oppose such a 
change in the tariff. 

As a result of this selfish attitude on the part of 
the treaty states, China, with its three hundred mil- 
lions of people, rich as she is or as she might become, 
enjoys a wholly inadequate revenue, for she is per- 
mitted to levy only a nominal tariff — five per cent, 
ad valorem. She has no encouragement, therefore, 
to develop her industries, for the treaty states will 
not permit her to erect a tariff wall for their protec- 
tion. Instead, they allow her just enough revenue 
to return to them in the form of Boxer indemnities 
and interest on their loans. When all is said and 
done, the financial regeneration of China is not due 



CHINA 259 

nearly so much to the corruption and incompetency 
of her own officials as it is to the supreme selfishness 
of those foreign nations which have her in their power. 

The principal sources of revenue of the Chinese 
Government are the land tax, excise, li-kin, the salt 
duty, and the maritime customs. In order that you 
may understand why they do not produce sufficient 
revenue, it is necessary for me to briefly sketch the 
curious, and in some instances archaic, methods em- 
ployed in their collection. Let us take the land taxes 
first. These are usually collected by the magistrates, 
who, however, sometimes delegate their collection to 
the village elders. They are then forwarded to the 
provincial governors, or tuchuns, who, instead of pass- 
ing them on to the central government in Peking, in- 
variably retain them to defray the expenses of the 
provincial administration, the chief item in which is 
usually the upkeep of the large "personal" armies to 
which I have already made reference. Thus, though 
the land taxes of the republic produce a very consider- 
able sum, only an insignificant part of it reaches Pe- 
king for the use of the state. This is likewise true of 
the collection of the excise duties and of li-kin^ a sort 
of inland customs duty assessed on goods in transit 
and comparable in certain respects to the octroi 
charges levied by various European municipalities. 
From time to time the Peking government has made 
attempts to collect the internal revenues direct, but 



260 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

owing to its weakness in dealing with the provincial 
governors its tax-gatherers have usually returned to 
the capital empty-handed. To tell the truth, the of- 
ficials sent out from Peking usually receive about as 
much consideration in the provinces as United States 
internal revenue agents are accorded in the "moon- 
shine" districts of the South. 

The trade in salt is a government monopoly. Only 
licensed merchants are permitted to deal in it, and 
the importation of foreign salt is forbidden by the 
treaties with foreign nations. For the purpose of salt 
administration China is divided into some seven or 
eight zones, each of which has its own source of pro- 
duction. The boundaries of these zones are carefully 
defined and salt produced in one cannot be consigned 
to or sold in another. There are great variations in 
price between the various zones, but the customer is 
not permitted to buy his salt in the cheapest market. 
He can only buy from the licensed merchants in his 
own zone, who in turn are debarred from procuring 
supplies except at the depots in their respective dis- 
tricts. Conveyance from one zone to another is con- 
sidered as smuggling, and salt thus transported is 
liable to confiscation. Duty is levied under two heads, 
the first being a duty proper, payable on the issue of 
salt from the depot, the second being li-kin levied in 
transit or at the place of destination. As the 
total consumption of salt for all China is estimated 
at nearly 1,500,000 tons a year, it will be seen that 



CHINA 261 

the salt duties form a very important source of 
revenue.^ When China floated the Currency Re- 
form, Crisp, and Reorganization Loans in 1911-12-13, 
she pledged as security the revenues from the salt 
tax, the administration of which — known as the Salt 
Gabelle — was placed under a Chinese chief inspector 
and a foreign associate chief inspector (British), who 
are assisted by a numerous staff of foreigners. 

The Chinese Maritime Customs was organized at 
Shanghai in 1854. The Taiping rebels, who had over- 
run nearly the whole of China, then being in posses- 
sion of the native city, the collection of customs dues 
was placed in the hands of foreigners. This de- 
veloped into a permanent institution, the European 
staff being mainly British. But upon the proclama- 
tion of the republic a decree was issued, in conformity 
with the new national sentiment, appointing Chinese 
commissioners to administer the customs. As, how- 
ever, the whole of the customs revenue was (and 
still is) pledged to foreign bondholders and absorbed 
in the service of the several loans, the foreign powers 
interested felt that to take the customs adminis- 
tration out of the hands of Sir Robert Hart, who 
had been inspector-general since 1863, would seriously 
imperil the efficiency and integrity for which the 
service had become famous. The British Government 
promptly protested against the decree placing the 
customs under native supervision, pointing out that 

*The revenue from the salt tax in 1916 was about $38,000,000. 



262 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

the continuation of the estabhshed system had been 
stipulated in the loan agreements of 1896 and 1898. 
The original understanding, which provided that 
China should employ a Briton at the head of the serv- 
ice as long as the trade of Great Britain exceeds in 
aggregate that of any other treaty state, was there- 
upon reaffirmed/ 

The staff of the maritime customs now numbers 
about 7200, of whom nearly one fourth are foreigners. 
I It should be added that the foreign members of the 
! customs service have served China with the utmost loy- 
i alty, having shown no bias in favor of their own coun- 
tries. All the posts in the service, save only that of 
inspector-general, are open to candidates from all the 
treaty states, ranging in commercial importance from 
Great Britain to Peru. Barring the Salt Gabelle, 
the maritime customs is the one department of finance 
in China which is managed with honesty and effi- 
ciency, this being due to the fact that it is under for- 
eign control. It collects all the duties leviable under 
the treaties on the foreign trade of China, as well as 
all the duties on the coasting trade so far as carried 
on by vessels of foreign build, whether Chinese or 
foreign-owned. But it does not control the trade in 
native craft, the so-called junk trade, the duties on 
which are still collected by the officials of the native 
customs houses. 

* Sir Robert Hart died in 1911. He was succeeded as inspector-general 
by Sir Francis Aglen. 



CHINA 263 

So long as the loans and indemnities secured by 
mortgages on customs receipts remain unredeemed 
by China it will prove exceedingly difficult to induce 
the foreign powers, who are frankly distrustful of 
the Chinese in financial matters, to consent to restor- 
ing the administration of the customs to the Chinese 
themselves. During recent years, indeed, when the 
country has been almost constantly in turmoil, the 
customs receipts have not even been remitted to the 
Chinese Government, but have been deposited by the 
inspector-general in foreign banks in Shanghai, Can- 
ton, and Tientsin in order to meet the annual loan 
charges, the surplus then being remitted to Peking. 
Long and costly experience with sticky-fingered 
Chinese officials has taught the foreigner to take no 
chances. 

In concluding this brief survey of the cur;ioU)S 
and anomalous tariff arrangements which obtain in 
China, I repeat that, in my judgment, the prompt 
restoration to China of the right to fix her own tariffs 
is dictated by wisdom no less than by justice.^ The 
only argument that has been advanced in favor 
of retaining the existing five per cent, tariff is that, 
since the customs receipts have been mortgaged for 
indemnities and loans, an alteration in the schedules 
might conceivably result in diminishing the yield, 
instead of augmenting it, thereby endangering the 

* Measures to this effect were agreed to by the Powers represented 
at the Washington Conference of 1921-22. 



264 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

security of the foreign investors. But it seems to me 
that by permitting China to fix her own tariff she 
could be required to give a guarantee that the total 
revenues from the customs would not fall below 
the amount required to pay the principal and interest 
on the debts and loans thus secured. What I have 
said above should not be interpreted as meaning that 
I believe in doing away, at least for the present, with 
the existing customs administration. If China is well 
advised, she will pocket her pride and permit the di- 
rection of her customs to remain in the honest and 
efficient hands of the present administration until 
she has had time to build up an equally honest and 
efficient organization of her own. 



China is at present passing through a period of 
reconstruction not dissimilar to that experienced by 
the United States during the decade succeeding the 
close of the Civil War. Just as we struggled to free 
ourselves from the intrigue, corruption, and political 
chaos that so nearly overwhelmed the republic in the 
years that followed Appomattox, so China is strug- 
gling to-day. There is the same embittered, unrec- 
onciled South and the same poHtically dominant 
North. The "carpet-bag" rulers of the post-bellum 
South have their Chinese counterparts in the corrupt 



CHINA 265 

and tyrannical tuchuns; the brigands and demobilized 
soldiery who are terrorizing portions of China to-day 
correspond to the "bad men" and gun-fighters who 
terrorized our own West during reconstruction days. 
And the ruthless exploitation of China's natural re- 
sources by foreign financial groups finds a fairly close 
parallel in the exploitation of the Pacific Coast states 
by American railway interests. We, however, were 
permitted to manage our own affairs, to bring order 
out of chaos, harmony out of strife, without interfer- 
ence by foreign nations who sought to prolong the 
period of internal dissension in order to serve their 
own selfish ends. But not so in the case of China. She 
has not been left free to work out her own salvation. 
She has been systematically hampered by unjust re- 
strictions and limitations; she has been forced to ac- 
cept from foreign nations so-called "advice" which in 
reality has been dictation. Though in theory she is 
a sovereign state, an independent nation, she does not 
control her own finances, her own railways, her own 
tariff, her own customs, her own army, her own sea- 
ports, or large areas of her own territory. When all 
is said and done, China is, like Charles of Austria, an 
international prisoner. 

I have already explained how by means of conces- 
sions, leases, and other privileges extracted from 
China under duress Japan has made herself the vir- 
tual mistress of Manchuria and Shantung. I have 
traced the steps whereby Great Britain has attained 



266 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

commercial supremacy in the Valley of the Yangtze 
and political supremacy in Tibet. I have shown how 
France has brought within her sphere of influence the 
great province of Yunnan. I have made it clear 
how all three of these powers, by intrenching them- 
selves in the leased territories of Kwantung, 
Weihaiwei, Kiauchau, Kowloon, and Kwang-chau- 
wan, have subjected to the menace of their guns and 
fleets the whole coast of China. And I have outlined 
the procedure whereby the Great Powers, through in- 
demnities and loans, have obtained control of China's 
finances. But these, though the most important, are 
by no means the only infringements on the republic's 
sovereignty. Were you aware, for example, that a 
foreigner living in China is as much under the law of 
his own country as though he were within its borders? 
By virtue of the extraterritorial rights enjoyed by the 
treaty powers, he is beyond the reach of the Chinese 
law. The treaty with the United States explicitly 
states : 

Citizens of the United States (in China), either on 
shore or in any merchant vessel, who may insult, trou- 
ble, or wound the persons, or injure the property, of 
Chinese, or commit any improper act in China, shall 
be punished by the Consul or other public functionary 
thereto authorized, according to the laws of the United 
States. 

And there are other rights, powers, and privileges 
which the foreign nations have arrogated to them- 



CHINA 267 

selves for which there is now httle justification. The 
foreign legations in Peking, for example, are sur- 
rounded by ramparts, defended by artillery and ma- 
chine-guns, and garrisoned by troops — miniature 
fortresses, in fact, set down in the heart of China's 
capital. No Chinese may walk on that portion of the 
Tartar Wall which commands the legation quarter, 
and a somewhat similar prohibition is enforced on 
Shameen, the island on which is Canton's European 
settlement. Japan has introduced the pillar-boxes 
and postmen of the Imperial Japanese Post into 
every district of Peking, as well as in numerous other 
Chinese cities, and even the United States maintains 
at Tientsin and Shanghai its extraterritorialized 
post-offices which compete with the and underbid the 
Chinese postal service. For upward of one thousand 
miles China's greatest waterway, the Yangtze River, 
is patrolled by American and British gunboats; a 
battalion of American infantry is stationed in Tien- 
tsin; the Japanese maintain a garrison as far inland 
as Hankow; and a considerable part of the province 
of Shantung is under Japanese civil administration. 
In short, China is to-day a country under foreign 
occupation. 

Now it is obviously impracticable to abruptly abol- 
ish all of these powers and privileges, even if the con- 
sent of the foreign nations which are directly inter- 
ested could be obtained. Such a proceeding would 
not be in the best interest of the Chinese themselves. 



268 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

But there are certain things which should and must 
be done if the foreign powers are sincere in their pro- 
testations that they wish to rehabihtate China. If 
they are really desirous of making the Chinese Re- 
public an independent nation in fact as well as in 
name, one of their first steps should be the restora- 
tion of the territories which they have leased, or have 
otherwise alienated, in China proper^ — the Japanese 
withdrawing from Shantung, the British from Wei- 
haiwei and the Kowloon peninsula (opposite Hong 
Kong), the Portuguese from Macao, and the French 
from Kwang-chau-wan. Though abstract justice 
doubtless also demands the evacuation of Port Arthur 
and Dalny by Japan, and the evacuation of Hong 
Kong by Great Britain, I do not think that such 
action is likely to be realized for many years to come, 
if at all. The two powers in question have expended 
vast sums on these great strongholds, they play highly 
important parts in their respective schemes of national 
defense, and I can no more conceive of their consent- 
ing to abandon them than I can of the United States 
consenting to withdraw from the Canal Zone. 

The restoration of the leased territories should be 
followed by the abolition of all "spheres of influence" 
in China proper, and eventually, when political con- 
ditions justify it, in the outlying territories — Man- 
churia, Mongolia, and Tibet. But it will be time 
enough to discuss the renunciation by Great Britain 

* That is, the China of the Eighteen. Provinces. See Appendix. 



CHINA 269 

of her political predominancy in Tibet, and the sur- 
render by Japan of her "special interests" in Man- 
churia and Inner Mongolia, when China has shown 
herself capable of estabHshing and maintaining a 
stable and efficient central government, strong 
enough to properly administer those troubled regions. 
For Japan to withdraw her troops from Manchuria 
under existing conditions would merely add to the 
power of Chang Tso-lin and his fellow-bandits and 
increase the prevaihng unrest and disorder. 

The next step should be the unification of all rail- 
way concessions in the republic under a Chinese 
board patterned on the lines of the board of the 
United States Steel Corporation, but with the neces- 
sary foreign financial control. A large measure of 
fiscal independence should be restored to China by 
permitting her to fix her own tariffs, though, as I have 
already remarked, I should question the advisability, 
from the standpoint of China's own best interests, in 
doing away with the present international customs 
administration, at least for some years to come. 

The extraterritorial rights at present enjoyed by 
the treaty powers should be abolished as soon as China 
has modernized her prisons, reformed her civil and 
criminal codes, and organized a judiciary capable of 
enforcing those codes with impartiality and justice.* 

*The nations represented at the Washington Conference agreed, in 
December, 1921, to send a commission to China for the purpose of draw- 
ing up a plan for judicial reform as a preliminary to the abolition of 
extraterritorial privileges. 



270 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

'Not, in view of the development of aircraft and means 
of communication and of the fact that the capital is 
less than one hundred miles from the sea coast, does 
there appear to be any further necessity for the main- 
tenance of foreign troops in Peking. The postal 
services maintained in China by the United States, 
Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan should also 
come to an end. And finally, there should be com- 
plete abolition of all the shadowy claims, advisorships, 
and other petty but irritating encroachments on Chi- 
nese sovereignty which have grown out of concessions, 
leased territories, and railway rights. Thus reestab- 
lished in possession of her own house, China should 
be given an opportunity to set it in order without be- 
ing hampered by foreign interference. 

Now I am perfectly aware that certain of the meas- 
ures which I have outlined above for the restoration 
of China to the status of a sovereign state would fall 
far short of satisfying the Chinese and their friends. 
They insist that the powers must betake themselves 
from Chinese soil forthwith, bag and baggage. They 
strenuously object to any form of foreign political or 
financial control. They demand the restoration not 
only of the foreign-occupied territories in China 
proper, but likewise of Port Arthur, Dalny, and 
Hong Kong. Considering the question purely from 
the ethical viewpoint, there can be no denying that 
the Chinese are fully justified in these demands. The 
difiiculty lies in the fact that they are not possible of 



CHINA 271 

realization, while those which I have outlined, in all 
probability, are. And, when all is said and done, it 
is a question of practical poHtics that we are discuss- 
ing. Everything considered, it seems to me that 
for a hungry person even three quarters of a loaf is 
considerably better than none. 

But if China is to obtain even a portion of her 
demands, she must herself be prepared to initiate and 
carry through wide reforms, to make many changes 
in the conduct of her national affairs. Though she 
possesses to an altogether extraordinary degree the 
sympathy and liking of other peoples, she does not 
possess their confidence. She has disappointed and. 
irritated them too often. Her interminable internal 
dissensions, the weakness, inefficiency, and corruption 
which have characterized her various administrations, 
her dilatoriness in meeting her financial obligations, 
her failure to put down tyranny and brigandage — all 
these have weakened her position among the nations. 
So she must begin by wiping the slate clean. 
The North and South must sink their differ- 
ences and wholeheartedly unite in the establishment 
of an honest, efficient, and stable central govern- 
ment. The corrupt and tyrannical tuchuns must 
be stripped of their power and their armies dis- 
banded, the great sums required for their upkeep 
being devoted to the construction of roads throughout 
the country, the completion of the trunk-lines, and 
the amelioration of the peasantry. And lastly, the 



272 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

whole of China must be opened to foreigners for pur* 
poses of travel, residence, and commerce. 

If China will do these things, and if she and the for- 
eign powers will exercise mutual tolerance, forbear- 
ance, unselfishness, and charity in dealing with one 
another, I am convinced that the republic will become 
a respected and prosperous member of the family of 
nations in a much nearer future than most people sup- 
pose. If these things are not done, China will con- 
tinue in a state of chaos, a bone of international con- 
tention, a perpetual menace to the peace of the world. 
But she will never be conquered, her people will never 
be assimilated by those of some other nation. Make 
no mistake about that. For, when all is said and done, 
China is an anvil which, by mere passive resistance, 
will eventually wear out every hammer that beats 
upon it.^ 

* See Appendix for text of Chinese treaties ap4)roved by the Powers 
at the Washington Conference of 193^1-22. 




CHINESE RAILWAY GUARDS 
South Manchuria 





JAPANESE RAILWAY GUARD 
Shantung 




A FEAST GIVEN BY A BOY OF 13 YEARS AND HIS 12-yEAR-OLD WIFE 
ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE DEATH OF THEIR SON 



PART IV 
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 



WE are an inconsistent and contradictory peo- 
ple. Though we boast of being a world 
power, in reality our national horizons are Sandy 
Hook and the Golden Gate, the Great Lakes and the 
Rio Grande. Though the most altruistic motives 
which ever inspired a nation have led us to assume 
the white man's burden for fifteen millions of people 
in the Philippines, Guam, Samoa, Hawaii, Alaska, 
the Canal Zone, Haiti, Santo Domingo, the Virgin 
Islands, and Porto Rico, we know and care far less 
about their needs and their problems then we do 
about those of many countries in which we have only 
the most vicarious interest. Though our colonial 
responsibilities have gradually increased until they 
stretch from the Caribbean to the China Seas; 
though we are steadily expanding, for the protection 
of our position at Panama, over all the smaller states 
of the Central American seaboard, we have neither a 
colonial office nor a colonial policy. To paraphrase 

the lines of Kipling: 

273 



274 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

We think our country still 

Is Broadway and Beacon Hill. 

Nearly a quarter of a century has passed since 
George Dewey, his commodore's pennant flaunting 
from the Olympias masthead, blazed his way into 
Manila Bay, sunk the Spanish fleet, and gave to the 
United States a colonial empire. It would seem that 
that was ample time for the American people to 
become tolerably familiar with the politics, prob- 
lems, and potentialities of the great archipelago of 
which, through the fortunes of war, we unexpectedly 
found ourselves the guardians, yet the discouraging 
fact remains that, despite all that has been said and 
written on the subject, the average American knows 
far less about the Philippine Islands, over which 
floats the American flag, than he does about Mexico 
or Ireland or Germany or Russia. It is to be pre- 
sumed that you who read these pages possess intelH- 
gence and information above the average, yet how 
many of you, I wonder, have other than the haziest 
conception of what the Philippines are like? You 
conceive them, no doubt, — ^when you think of them 
at all, — as jungle-covered, palm-fringed islands set 
down in a turquoise sea beneath a merciless sun. You 
think of the natives as reformed head-hunters dwell- 
ing in huts of bamboo thatched with nipa and living 
on dog-meat, for such was the impression you ob- 
tained from the Igorot villages at the St. Louis and 
San Francisco expositions. You know, of course, 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 275 

that Manila is in certain respects an up-to-date city 
— you have gathered this from the pictures in the 
Sunday supplements and the magazines — ^but you 
also assume that it is cursed with almost unendurable 
heat, because the people in the pictures are wearing 
white suits and straw hats. You are aware that the 
chief products of the islands are Manila hemp, popu- 
larly associated with executions, and cocoanut-oil, 
which is used for beautifying the complexion, and you 
have heard stories to the effect that the Sultan of 
Sulu presents pearls of great price to those who visit 
him. Were you asked to enumerate a few well- 
known Filipinos, you would almost certainly name 
Emilio Aguinaldo and you might add Manuel 
Quezon. That, with a few other odds and ends of 
information, constitute the sum total of the average 
American's knowledge of the Philippine Islands. 

Perhaps you did not realize, however, that the 
land area of the archipelago is considerably greater 
than that of England, Scotland, and Ireland put to- 
gether and that its population is larger than that of 
the state of New York. Were you aware that the 
distance from Cape Bojeador, in northern Luzon, to 
Tawi Tawi, in the Sulu group, is equal to the entire 
width of the United States from Canada to the Gulf 
of Mexico? Your imagination doubtless pictures a 
group of low-lying islands, like those you have read 
of in South Sea stories, covered with dense and steam- 
ing jungles, so it may be something of a revelation 



276 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

to learn that the Phihppines have no less than half 
a dozen mountains which are higher than any peaks in 
the United States east of the Rockies, that they have 
at least three rivers which are as long as the Hudson, 
and that two thirds of their surface is covered not 
with steaming jungle, but with splendid forests in 
which hard woods abound, some of the mountains 
being clothed with pines. You think of the Philip- 
pines being in the tropics, as they are, yet I imagine 
that you will be surprised to learn that the average 
maximum summer heat of Manila is considerably 
lower than that of New York. If you have read the 
accounts of the voyages of the early explorers you are 
aware that Cebu was a flourishing city when the only 
settlement on Manhattan Island was an Indian vil- 
lage, and that Manila had been founded for half a 
century when the Pilgrims set foot on the Plymouth 
shore. Nor do I need to remind you that the Fil- 
ipinos are the only Christian race in Asia. And 
finally, did you ever pause to think that the nation 
which holds the Philippines is the traffic policeman at 
the Broadway and Forty-Second Street of the 
world's commerce, for the archipelago lies squarely 
athwart every trade route of the Farther East, our 
great naval base at Cavite being only sixteen hours 
by a fast destroyer from Hong Kong, fifty hours from 
Singapore, and about the same from Nagasaki? 

The average American's lack of knowledge about 
the largest and richest of our insular possessions is 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 277 

due to two causes — indifference and misinformation. 
Each year thousands of American tourists visit Japan 
and the China Coast, yet comparatively few of them 
take the time or trouble to visit Manila, which can be 
reached from Hong Kong as quickly and as easily 
as New Orleans can be reached from New York, in 
order to see for themselves the miracles that have 
been wrought in those islands by their countrymen. 
The president of a great motion-picture corporation, 
in whose interests I recently went to the Far East, 
urged me to waste no time in the Philippines. "The 
American public is not interested in them," he as- 
sured me, "and there isn't much to see there, any- 
way." Some months ago an American weekly whose 
circulation runs into the millions published an article 
on the political situation in the islands by a journalist 
who based his statements on the superficial informa- 
tion gathered during the brief period the vessel on 
which he was traveling remained at Manila. And a 
high official of the insular administration told me that 
his aunt — by no means an unintelligent or uneducated 
woman — asked him during one of his periodical visits 
home how often he ran over to Havana ! 

I am perfectly well aware that certain of the Ameri- 
can, and probably all of the Filipino officials who by 
their hospitality and thoughtfulness made my journey 
through the archipelago almost a triumphal progress 
so far as entertainments, comforts, and traveling ar- 
rangements were concerned will accuse me of ingrati- 



278 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

tude when they read this book. They entertained me 
with a lavishness which I have seen equalled in few 
countries and surpassed in none; they provided me 
with motor cars and launches and canoes and saddle- 
horses and military escorts. Over their railways I 
was permitted to travel only by special train, and, 
thanks to the courtesy of the then governor-general, 
Francis Burton Harrison, and of the Honorable 
Manuel Quezon, president of the Philippine Senate, 
there was placed at my disposal a government vessel, 
the coastguard cutter Negros, on which I made a 
cruise of nearly six thousand miles. Not for one in- 
stant do I think that these exceptional facilities for 
observation were afforded me in an attempt to pur- 
chase my opinion, but rather because the insular gov- 
ernment desired me to see the islands under the most 
comfortable conditions, hoping, no doubt, that I 
would form a favorable impression of what it had 
accomplished and would pass on my opinions to my 
readers in the United States. But it seems to me 
that a writer's first duty is to keep faith with those 
who read his writings and whose opinions are pre- 
sumably molded to a considerable extent by what 
he tells them. So if in the following pages I do not 
always agree with the opinions or approve of the 
policies of those who so lavishly entertained me; if I 
do not indorse all of the claims that are made by the 
Filipinos and the American officials of the recent 
Democratic administration, it is not because I am un- 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 279 

grateful or unappreciative, but because I am trying 
to paint for you a truthful picture, uncolored by politi- 
cal partisanship or racial prejudice or personal bias, 
of conditions as I found them in the Philippines. 



n 

You will pardon me, I trust, if I recall 
to your minds certain geographic facts in or- 
der that you may have a substantial foundation on 
which to build an intelligent opinion of the problem 
which confronts us in the Philippines. To begin with, 
the Philippine Archipelago, which consists of some- 
thing over three thousand islands, large and small, 
could be enclosed, roughly speaking, in an isosceles 
triangle with a base line of six hundred miles and the 
other two sides of twelve hundred miles each. This 
triangle lies between the Pacific Ocean and the China 
Sea in the same latitude as Central America. Form- 
ing the apex of the triangle is the island of Luzon, 
which is about the size of Ohio. The lower right- 
hand corner of the triangle is formed by another great 
island, Mindanao, whose area corresponds to that of 
Indiana. Sprinkled about between these dominating 
islands are the lesser islands of Samar, Negros, 
Panay, Palawan, and Mindoro, each about the size 
of Connecticut, and Leyte, Cebu, Bohol, and Masbata, 
each of which is somewhat larger than Rhode Island. 



280 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

Outside the southern boundary of the triangle — out- 
side it in more senses than one — is the Sulu Archi- 
pelago, of which Jolo, on the island of Sulu, is the 
provincial capital and the principal town. 

Now in considering the question of the Philippines 
one should never lose sight of the fact that the Fili- 
pinos are not a people. This assertion, I might add, 
directly contradicts Mr. Maximo M. Kalaw, a bril- 
liant young Filipino writer, who says in one of his 
books, "One fact must be conceded in studying the 
Philippine question: the Filipinos are a people, like 
the Cubans or the Irish or the French — a distinct 
political entity, with a consciousness of kind and with 
national feehngs and aspirations." With this con- 
tention most ethnologists flatly disagree. The Fili- 
pinos belong, it is true, to the great Malay race, as do 
the natives of the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, 
and Borneo; just as the Irish belong to the Celtic race, 
the French to the Latin race, and the Cubans to the 
Latin and African races. But that does not make 
them a people in the generally accepted sense of the 
word. As Mr. A. R. Colquhoun in "The Mastery of 
the Pacific" says: "No Malay nation has ever emerged 
from the hordes of that race, which is spread over 
the islands of the Pacific. Wherever they are found 
they have certain marked characteristics and of these 
the most remarkable is their lack of that spirit which 
goes to form a homogeneous people, to weld them to- 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 281 

gether. The Malay is always a provincial; more, he 
rarely rises outside the interests of his own town or 
village." The truth is that the Filipinos, instead of 
being a people, are a congeries of peoples which have 
come to the Philippines at various periods in succes- 
sive waves of immigration. Although, as the result 
of four centuries of white man's rule, they have grad- 
ually come to resemble one another more and more 
and to have more and more in common, they are still 
as distinct in their genealogies, their languages, and 
their characteristics as the Chinooks, the Zunis, the 
Iroquois, and the Sioux. That they possess certain 
national characteristics and a certain homogeneity of 
population which may eventually weld them into a 
people I do not attempt to deny, but that day has not 
yet arrived. 

There are many methods of classifying the races 
of mankind and their subdivisions, but that which 
measures them by their speech is sanctioned by long 
usage and by logic. Now one of the first things that 
impressed the early explorers, as well as the mission- 
aries who came after them, was the amazing multiplic- 
ity of languages among the inhabitants of the Philip- 
pines. And what was true in Magellan's time is 
equally true to-day, the only common medium of 
communication between the various peoples being the 
alien tongues which they have learned from their 
Spanish and American rulers, there being, in fact, 



282 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

more sharply distinct dialects than there are tribes in 
the islands/ Though English is the official language, 
being a compulsory subject in the schools, the pro- 
ceedings of both the Philippine Senate and House of 
Representatives are conducted in Spanish. Ability 
to read and write English or Spanish or a native 
language entitles a male citizen of the Phihppines 
who is twenty-one or more years of age to vote. 
Yet out of the total of more than two mil- 
lion Filipinos of voting age in the islands in 
1919, barely one third possessed this qualification. 
Though the Philippines were ruled from Madrid for 
more than three hundred and seventy-five years, the 
use of Spanish never became common, a knowledge of 
that tongue being limited to the educated minority. 
This was probably due in considerable measure, how- 
ever, to the fact that the Spaniards rather discouraged 
the natives from learning Spanish, doubtless because 
they feared that a common medium of communication 
would tend to unite the Filipinos against them. That 
fear never troubled the Americans, however, for they 
began teaching English to the natives from the be- 
ginning of the occupation. It is a striking commen- 
tary on the efficacy of our educational methods that 
after less than a quarter of a century of American 
rule English is far more widely spoken than Spanish 
ever was. When it comes into comparatively general 

^ There are forty-three ethnographic groups or tribes in the archipelago 
and eighty-seven distinct dialects are spoken. 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 283 

use, as it will if the politicians in Washington and 
Manila permit the present educational system to be 
adhered to, one of the chief obstacles in the way of 
welding the Filipinos into a homogeneous people will 
have disappeared. 

The practical difficulties resulting from this multi- 
plicity of tongues are legion. Here is a typical ex- 
ample. When, during the Aguinaldo revolt of 1898, 
a number of insurrectionary leaders met at Gerona, in 
Tarlac Province, Luzon, to elect municipal officers, 
the revolutionary decrees had to be read in Tagalog, 
in Ilocano, in Pampanga, and in Pangasinan, all of 
which languages were spoken in the town. And Jus- 
tice Johnson of the Philippine Supreme Court tells of 
the trial of seven men charged with a murder, at which 
it was necessary to read the complaint in four different 
dialects. Imagine, if you please, what would be the 
obstacle to self-government in the British Isles, which 
in area very nearly correspond to the Philippines, if 
the English could not make themselves understood 
by the Welsh, if the Welsh were unable to converse 
with the Scotch, if the Scotch spoke a different tongue 
from the Irish, and if the languages of all four were 
wholly unintelligible to the inhabitants of the Isle 
of Man, the only common medium of communication 
being French or German, with which only the edu- 
cated classes were familiar. 

There is another reason than the lingual one why 
the inhabitants of the Philippines cannot truthfully be 



284 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

called a people. I refer to the barriers of mutual 
dislike and prejudice which have separated the vari- 
ous island races ever since the dawn of their recorded 
history. Political power in the Philippines is at pres- 
ent about equally divided between the Visayans, most 
of whom live in the Visaya group, in the center of the 
archipelago, and comprise more than forty per cent, 
of the total population, and the Tagalogs, who dwell 
mainly in central Luzon and have less than half the 
numerical strength of their southern neighbors. The 
only other element which really counts politically is 
the Ilocanos, also from Luzon, who, though they 
form only about twenty per cent, of the total popula- 
tion, are quite capable of holding their own. Though 
the Tagalogs, who are preeminently politicians, in 
which respect they might aptly be compared to the 
French-Canadians, have heretofore been the dominat- 
ing Filipino people of the islands, their political su- 
premacy has been successfully challenged in recent 
years by the Visayans. The differences of the two 
chief racio-political groups have been successfully har- 
monized of late, however, through the tact, ability, and 
vision of their respective leaders — the Honorable 
Manuel Quezon, President of the Senate, who is a 
Tagalog, and Senor Osmena, Speaker of the House 
of Representatives, who is a Visayan. 

Of all the Christian races, the Tagalogs are the most 
intelligent, the most progressive, and, it is usually 
conceded, the least reliable. The Visayans, though in 




S g 

5 s 



'-'^'^ 




THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 285 

many respects less capable, are generally more docile 
and law-abiding. The Ilocanos have a well-deserved 
reputation for industry and for real ability which 
both of the others lack. These three peoples, which 
between them control the governmental machinery of 
the islands, are at heart about as mutually friendly 
as the South Irish and the Ulstermen, though it must 
be admitted, in all fairness, that they have to a great 
extent buried their animosities for political reasons. 
But whether these mutual animosities would be per- 
mitted to remain buried, were the islanders granted 
complete independence, is quite another question. 

The Visayans, the Tagalogs, and the Ilocanos, to- 
gether with the Bicols, the Pangasinans, the Caga- 
yans, and the Zambalans, comprise the seven princi- 
pal Christian tribes commonly referred to as Filipinos 
and form approximately seven eighths of the total 
population of the islands. In addition to the racial 
divisions just enumerated, there are some twenty- 
seven non-Christian or pagan tribes, such as the Igo- 
rots, the Ifugaos, and the Kalingas, all from the 
mountainous districts of northern Luzon and all, until 
quite recently, addicted to the exciting pastime of 
head-hunting; and the Mandayas and Monobos, two 
large tribes inhabiting Mindanao. Another of the 
pagan tribes is the Negritos, black dwarfs, numbering 
only some twenty-five thousand, who are the aborig- 
ines and the original owners of the Philippines. The 
Negritos had been in undisturbed possession of the 



286 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

islands for centuries when there came a stronger and 
more advanced race, the Igorots, who conquered the 
aborigines and appropriated their lands, precisely as 
we appropriated the lands of the Indians. Later came 
the wave of Malays we now know as Filipinos and 
took from the Igorots what they had gained. Though 
several of the pagan tribes have attained the same 
level of civilization as the Christians, the latter, never- 
theless, treat them socially and politically with undis- 
guised contempt, superciliously referring to them 
as "wild men." Finally we find, far to the south in 
the Sulu Archipelago, something over a quarter of a 
million Moros, intensely warlike and fanatical Mo- 
hammedans whom the Christian Filipinos profess to 
despise, but of whose fighting quahties they have in 
reality an inherited and well-grounded Tear. 

Even more significant, however, than the differ- 
ences which separate the Christians, the Mohamme- 
dans, and the pagans, or the dissensions which disunite 
the Tagalogs, the Ilocanos, and the Visayans, are 
those which divide the individuals themselves. I refer 
to the covert but none the less existent antagonism 
of the great brown mass of the people for the mestizos, 
or half-castes. For it must be kept in mind that very 
few of the political leaders are of pure, or anywhere 
near pure, Malayan blood. One has only to trace 
their ancestry back a little way to find indubitable 
evidence of the admixture of European or Mongolian 
blood. Of the three men who are generally conceded 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 287 

to be the ablest politicians in the islands and who 
hold the most responsible positions open to Filipinos, 
one is reputed to be at least half Spanish, another 
three fourths Spanish, and a third half Chinese. The 
dominance of the mestizos in insular affairs is un- 
doubtedly due in part to the advantages of education 
and travel which they owe to the wealth and influence 
of their fathers, but I am convinced that an even 
greater factor in gaining their present ascendancy is 
the alien blood — particularly the European blood — 
which courses in their veins. Whatever may be the 
cause, nothing is more certain than that until the na- 
tives put aside their petty rivalries and dissensions 
and develop a national consciousness, until they sup- 
plant indolence by energy, until they acquire the 
courage to assert themselves, the mestizos will remain 
in the saddle. As things stand at present the mestizos, 
some of whom are men of undeniable ability, are the 
only element in the islands to whom we could con- 
ceivably turn over the reins of power. What most 
Americans fail to understand is this : Were we, upon 
evacuating the islands, to intrust the machinery of 
government to the little group of professional poli- 
ticians who at present control it (and who are the 
only natives in any degree qualified by education and 
experience to control it), the Filipinos themselves 
would be no nearer independence than they are to-day, 
for we merely would be supplanting the present form 
of government by an oligarchy. 



288 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 



III 

Nothing is more unwise, generally speaking, 
than to indulge in generalizations about a people. 
Yet the Filipinos, taken as a whole, possess cer- 
tain characteristics which are so outstanding that 
they are admitted by their enemies and their friends. 
Were I asked to enumerate their desirable qualities 
which most impressed me I should name without hesi- 
tation their boundless hospitality, their personal clean- 
liness, their dignity and self-respect, their good na- 
ture, their innate courtesy and their consideration for 
strangers, their love of children, their mental activity, 
their devotion to their country, and their consuming 
passion for education. 'No matter how poor a Filipino 
may be, no matter how scanty his food and how 
wretched his dwelling, he may always be relied upon 
to offer a stranger the best that his house affords. 
American soldiers repeatedly have told me of the hos- 
pitality shown them in remote Filipino villages in 
which they chanced to find themselves at nightfall, the 
natives frequently sleeping out of doors in order that 
their guests might have shelter. In no country which I 
know — and I can claim familiarity with something 
over a hundred — have I met with such universal cour- 
tesy as in the Philippines, the native character com- 
bining the politeness of the Latin with the easy com- 
plaisance of the Malay. They are passionately de- 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 289 

voted to their children and will make any sacrifice in 
order to educate them, a quality which offers great en- 
couragement for their future. The family bonds 
among the Filipinos are much closer than with us. 
In fact, a Filipino will make no decision without first 
consulting with his family. This love of family is 
carried to an extreme, however, in the so-called pa- 
riente system, which is almost universal in the islands ; 
that is, when a man begins to make money, or when 
he obtains an even moderately profitable position, he 
is expected as a matter of course to support all those 
members of his family and of his wife's family who 
cannot support themselves, even to first and second 
cousins. It is no infrequent occurrence, indeed, for 
his poorer relatives to move to his home, bag and bag- 
gage, and proceed to make it their own, a burden 
which he assumes without complaint. This is family 
affection carried to the nth degree, but it has the ob- 
vious disadvantage of inflicting a penalty on any ef- 
fort to better one's condition. "Why should I work 
any harder than I do?" argues the Filipino peasant. 
"Were I to make any more money, I should be ex- 
pected to support my mother-in-law and my cousins 
and my uncles and my aunts." 

Though the Filipinos still suffer among foreigners 
from the evil reputation which they gained as a result 
of their cruel and inhuman treatment of Spanish and 
American captives, and though they certainly are 
callous of the pain suffered by others, they are not 



290 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

treacherous under ordinary circumstances. If they 
are jealous and eager for revenge, it is because these 
quahties are inherent in the Malay character. If they 
are prone to settle their differences with knives instead 
of with their fists, it is because they have been for 
centuries under the rule of Latins instead of Anglo- 
Saxons. When well disciplined and under the leader- 
ship of American officers, they make faithful and de- 
pendable soldiers, as has been proved on a hundred 
occasions by the Philippine Scouts and the Philippine 
Constabulary. 

Notwithstanding the assertion often made by for- 
eigners that the Filipinos are indolent, fond of ease, 
and dislike toil exceedingly, those who know them 
best assure me that under proper hygienic conditions 
they make willing, industrious, and faithful laborers. 
In those cases where they have displayed a lack of 
energy and industry it has usually been found upon 
investigation that their apparent indolence was due 
to the fact that their vitality had been sapped by the 
unhygienic conditions under which they were living 
— a statement which applies with equal force to many 
of the "poor whites" of our South. Moreover the 
Filipinos are almost invariably courteous and cheer- 
ful, qualities which are not characteristic of all Orien- 
tal races. 

Like all Malay peoples, they are much addicted to 
gambling and cock-fighting, which are their national 
pastimes, though it is a healthy sign that they are now 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 291 

rivaled in the popular esteem by baseball and boxing, 
which were introduced by our soldiers in the early 
days of the American occupation and which have 
grown steadily in popularity ever since. Indeed, there 
is scarcely a barrio in the islands which does not have 
its baseball team and its local boxing talent, the towns- 
people "rooting" for their representatives with all the 
enthusiasm shown by "fans" in the United States. 
The Olympic Stadium in Manila, where the important 
boxing contests are held, can accommodate thirty-five 
hundred persons and is invariably packed to the 
point of suffocation when matches between well- 
known fighters are pulled off. The fighters are 
usually recruited from the cochero class, though news- 
boys and even golf caddies have at times won honors 
in the ring. The better boxers possess ample cour- 
age and considerable science, usually being well able 
to hold their own against pugilists of their own weight 
from the Pacific Coast and Australia. Filipinos being 
almost universally of slight stature, the native boxers 
are classified as welter-weights, feather-weights, ban- 
tam-weights, fly-weights, paper-weights, and vacuum- 
weights, the last class comprising boxers weighing less 
than sixty pounds, though the sporting press occasion- 
ally refers, perhaps facetiously, to mosquito-weights. 
Cock-fighting is as popular in the Philippines as 
baseball is in the United States, every town and ham- 
let having its cockpits and its fighting birds. The 
chief feature of cock-fighting is the gambling con- 



292 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

nected with it, for as the birds are armed with four- 
inch spurs of razor sharpness, very httle sport attaches 
to the contest, one or both birds usually being killed 
within a few minutes after they enter the pit. The 
townspeople are inordinately proud of their local 
fighting-cocks, boasting of their prowess as a Boston- 
ian brags of the "Braves" or a New Yorker of the 
"Giants" and always being ready to back them to the 
limit of their pocketbooks. 

An overwhelming majority of the Filipinos are 
farmers. But though the American Government has 
made every effort to improve agricultural conditions 
in the islands by sending out experts and machinery, 
by the establishment of agricultural schools and farm 
bureaus, and by the free distribution of seeds, the 
Filipino peasant farmer has not made the prog- 
ress which might be looked for in nearly four 
centuries of white man's rule. Though rice is 
the bread of the people and is grown in great 
quantities, the peasants still prepare the land for 
planting with an implement which can be called a plow 
only by courtesy — a sort of pointed wooden snag, 
sometimes tipped with iron and sometimes not, drawn 
by a carabao whose movements are as leisurely as 
those of its owner. In order to give it a start over the 
weeds which would otherwise strangle it, rice is first 
planted in seed-beds and, when partly grown, is 
transplanted by hand, it being by no means uncom- 




A vast series of terraces, as steep as a church roof, which in places ascend the mountain- 
sides for more than 3000 feet. 




These are among the most extraordinary examples of hydraulic engineering in 
existence, being far more remarkable than the celebrated "hanging gardens" of 
Babylon. 
RICE TERRACES BUILT BY THE IFUGAOES IN THE MOUNTAIN 
PROVINCE, LUZON 




FILIPINOS THRESHING RICE WITH THEIR FEET 
Biilacan Province 




PLOWING AND HARROWING THE ZACATE FIELDS 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 293 

mon to see scores of women and children squatting on 
their heels in the shallow water of the paddy-fields 
and working to the music of a small string band with 
which they keep time, so that the faster the music 
plays the faster they work. Mr. Dean C. Worcester, 
acknowledgedly one of the foremost authorities on the 
Philippines, states that orchestras which have the rep- 
utation of maintaining a rapid tempo are in great 
demand during the planting season because of the in- 
creased amount of rice set. Imagine the agricultural 
prodigies that might be performed with the coopera- 
tion of an American jazz band! When harvest time 
comes around the grain is usually separated from the 
chaff by the family and the neighbors of the rice- 
growers, who put in several pleasant and not over- 
strenuous days leaning against a long rail, set loosely 
in supports so that it will revolve, smoking, gossiping, 
and singing as they thresh out the grain with their 
feet. 

What I have said above refers, of course, only to the 
small peasant farmers who form the bulk of the 
agricultural population. The larger landowners, on 
the contrary, have eagerly availed themselves of the 
agricultural devices introduced by the Americans, the 
primitive Malay methods having been entirely sup- 
planted on the large plantations by steel plows, trac- 
tors, and threshing-machines. The fact remains, how- 
ever, that modern agricultural methods are still the 



294 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

exception instead of the rule, so that the Philippines, 
which should be one of the great rice-exporting coun- 
tries of the world, are compelled to import it. 

To see rice-growing in its most picturesque and 
interesting form one must journey to the country 
of the Ifugaos in Central Luzon. These people, who 
up to the time of the American occupation were in- 
veterate head-hunters, are under a heavy agricultural 
handicap by reason of living in a region as mountain- 
ous as Switzerland. Yet on slopes as steep as a 
church roof they cultivate their rice on a vast series 
of terraces, which are held in position by stone re- 
taining walls laid without mortar or cement of any 
kind and which in places ascend the mountainsides for 
more than three thousand feet. It will give you some 
idea of the sort of masonry required to withstand the 
weather conditions when I mention that in this region 
thirty-eight inches of rain has fallen in twenty-four 
hours and seventy-two inches in five days. The rice 
terraces of the Ifugaos are among the most extraordi- 
nary examples of primitive hydraulic engineering in 
existence, being, when the climatic and physical con- 
ditions are taken into consideration, far more re- 
markable than the celebrated "hanging gardens" of 
Babylon. 

IV 

Now that the trail of our narrative has led us into 
the mountains, suppose that we pause long enough 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 295 

for me to tell you something about those singular 
and little-known peoples — the Igorots, the Kalingas, 
and the Ifugaos — who inhabit them. There are many- 
degrees of civilization among these peoples, perhaps 
their distinguishing difference being that in their per- 
sonal habits the Igorots are disgustingly filthy, while 
the Kalingas and Ifugaos are, everything considered, 
surprisingly clean. Comparatively speaking, the 
Igorots living in the vicinity of Baguio, the beautiful 
summer capital of the Philippines, are highly civilized, 
often dwelling in substantially built houses and eager- 
ly availing themselves of the educational opportunities 
afforded by the provincial government. One of the 
battalions of Philippine Scouts stationed at Camp 
John Hay when I was there was composed entirely 
of Igorots, and they were as smart and well-disciplined 
a body of native soldiery as I have ever seen. Officers 
who have served with them are loud in their praises 
of their courage, discipline, and loyalty. But an 
hour's ride on horseback into the surrounding moun- 
tains brings you into the country of the real wild 
man. Here the men wear nothing except a rag, 
known as a "gee-string," twisted about their loins; 
the women cover a portion of their nakedness with 
an apron of cloth made from the bark of a tree. 
Though head-hunting has been "officially" abolished 
these dozen years, the wilder spirits still surrepti- 
tiously indulge in this savage sport when a safe oppor- 
tunity offers, their success in the pursuit being evi- 



296 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

denced by the number of lines tattooed on their faces, 
which have precisely the same significance as the 
notches which the "bad men" of the old West were 
wont to file on their revolver barrels. 

The Igorots live in flimsy huts thatched with nipa 
leaves, many of which contain a trophy room for 
skulls. They are extremely superstitious and live in 
constant fear of the spirits of the dead. Their favorite 
food is dog-meat, it being no uncommon thing for an 
Igorot to walk a hundred miles in order to attend the 
dog-market which is held at Baguio every Sunday 
morning. Here are brought hundreds of dogs — 
usually underfed and mangy mongrels — which are 
bought or stolen by the dealers in the villages of the 
plain. A dog will bring anywhere from three to eight 
pesos, according to his size and condition, and the 
prospective purchasers inspect them as critically as an 
American housewife inspects the turkey which she is 
buying for the Thanksgiving dinner. The process 
of buying a dog often takes the better part of a day, 
the Igorot raising his offer and the dealer dropping 
his price centavo by centavo. I was told by con- 
stabulary officers — I cannot personally vouch for the 
accuracy of this statement — that the Igorot, after 
leading his purchase back to his home in the moun- 
tains, starves the wretched animal for a week or more. 
When it is sufficiently famished to devour anything 
that is offered it, the Igorot feeds it to repletion with 
great quantities of rice, together with plenty of water, 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 297 

and then slowly beats it to death with a bamboo club 
for the purpose of making the meat more tender. 

Once while on a riding trip through the mountain 
country my attention was attracted by the deep, 
low roll of tom-toms, coming, I discovered, from an 
Igorot village whose huts clung precariously to the 
precipitous slope half a mile below. Descending the 
steep and narrow trail which led to the village, I came 
upon a caniau, or feast, in full blast. Two husky 
Igorots, naked except for their gtee-strings, were 
swinging the carcass of what evidently had been a 
large yellow dog over a fire, while at one side women 
were cutting up the body of another animal which had 
already been roasted. Squatting in the doorway of 
a hut were two musicians, one of whom was beating 
monotonously on a drum made from a hollow log 
with a skin stretched across the end, the other now 
and again striking a resounding blow upon a large 
metal tom-tom. Lying about in a drunken stupor 
on the grass were several members of the tribe who 
had been overcome by the enormous quantities of fiery 
rice liquor, called tapwy, which they had consumed. 
It was a scene which would have satisfied the most 
avid sensation- seeker. Yet the educated Filipinos 
who entertained me so delightfully in Manila assured 
me over and over again that the Igorots had been 
completely civilized and were no longer a problem. 
It is the barest justice to add, however, that the prob- 
lem presented by the wild tribes is being rapidly 



298 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

solved by the steady spread of education. The young 
Igorots whom I saw attending an agricultural school 
in the Trinidad Valley impressed me as being fully as 
intelligent and alert as most American youngsters of 
the same age. 

The Igorots practice the curious custom of smoking 
their dead, though I gathered that this mummifying 
process is confined, as a rule, to the wealthy. The 
body of the dead man is lashed in a sitting position in 
a sort of skeleton armchair beneath which is kindled 
a fire, or rather a smudge, of green branches, the pro- 
cedure being much the same as that employed by an 
American farmer in smoking a ham. The body is 
generally smoked for about four weeks, at the end 
of which period it is as dry and shriveled as the Phar- 
aohs who sleep under the glass cases in the Cairo 
Museum. It is then conveyed by relatives and friends 
to the tribal burial cave, usually hidden away in the 
recesses of the mountains, where it is set against the 
wall in a sitting posture at the end of a long line of 
other departed Igorots. Though the Bureau of 
Science in Manila is said to possess a remarkable col- 
lection of photographs of this curious custom, its of- 
ficials would neither sell me copies nor permit me to 
see them. The picture of the burial cave which is 
reproduced herewith I obtained, though not without 
some difficulty, from an enterprising Japanese pho- 
tographer in Baguio. 

The Filipinos assert with considerable truth that 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 299 

the publication of such photographs gives the for- 
eigner an exaggerated notion of the importance of 
the wild tribes, which, they contend, play as insig- 
nificant a role in the Philippines as the Indians do in 
the United States. This statement is hardly exact, 
however, as there are about four times as many non- 
Christians in the islands as there are Indians in this 
country. 

"But you have pictures of the Igorots?" I asked the 
courteous Filipino official who was in charge of the 
photographic section of the Bureau of Science. 

"Certainly we have them," was the answer. "In 
fact, we have the largest and finest collection in 
existence. But some months ago we received orders 
that no more prints from them were to be sold to 
foreigners, and last week the album containing the 
Igorot pictures was removed from this bureau to the 
office of the Secretary of the Interior." 

Now I can entirely sympathize with the sensitive- 
ness of the civilized and cultured Filipinos, who nat- 
urally resent being confused by strangers with the sav- 
age hillmen, but I believe that in attempting to pre- 
vent the publication of photographs of their uncivil- 
ized countrymen they are pursuing an unwise and 
short-sighted policy. When you tell a traveler who is 
of an inquiring turn of mind that there is something 
hidden in the mountains which it is thought wise for 
him not to see, something of which he must not even be 
shown pictures, his curiosity is immediately aroused 



300 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

and he determines to find out what it is that is being so 
sedulously concealed from him. Imagine the fantastic 
rumors that would quickly gain currency among for- 
eigners were the American Government to forbid the 
publication of the official photographs, taken by the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, of the Hopi snake dances, 
which are fully as revolting as many of the Igorot 
customs. The Fihpinos are a young and sensitive 
people; they are sincerely endeavoring to gain the 
respect of the world, and they are making remarkable 
progress, but their task would be lighter if they would 
approach it with the sense of humor possessed by a 
quick-witted young woman from Sioux City who was 
visiting at an Enghsh country house. 

"So you 're from Sioux City?" remarked the Eng- 
lishman who was her dinner-partner, screwing a 
monocle into his eye and surveying her with undis- 
guised curiosity. *'I say, though, you speak jolly 
good English, you know. Hardly a trace of Indian 
accent — yes, really." 

"That 's easily explained," she replied dryly, 
though with a twinkle of amusement in her eyes. "You 
see, we had an English missionary in our tribe." 

Now in justice to the Filipinos I ought to explain 
before proceeding that some of the pictures I have 
chosen to illustrate this chapter are not characteristic 
of present-day conditions in the Philippines. But 
they are unusual and they are interesting; that is why 
I have used them. Had I so desired, I could have 




ROASTING A DOG AT AN IGOROT OANIAU 
IN THE MOUNTAINS OF LUZON 




AN IGOROT BURIAL-CAVE 



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FRUIT-BATS IN FLIGHT, LAGANGILANG 







?fia^-a ,-v-V,>1?'..* i:«t-'*;' 



BOOBIES ON TUBBATAJA BEEF 
Sulu Archipelago 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 301 

used a picture of a Manila hotel which would attract 
attention in Atlantic City; a club which would do 
credit to any city in the United States; a town in 
Mindanao which is the most beautifully kept munici- 
pality, bar none, that I have ever seen ; a cocoanut-oil 
factory which is said to be paying its stockholders one 
hundred per cent, annually on their investments; a 
mountain highway in Luzon which for sheer audacity 
of engineering has no equal, even in the Alps; and 
schools, hospitals, and other public buildings ad in- 
finitum. Of course the Filipinos will deprecate my 
choice of illustrations. When I was writing a book on 
the Far West some years ago I experienced great diffi- 
culty in obtaining pictures of cow-punchers, pack- 
trains, and Indians. The citizens of that bustling 
region, filled with civic pride, insisted that I confine 
myself to pictures of apple orchards, alfalfa fields, 
and artesian wells. So the Filipinos cannot be blamed 
so much, after all. 



We now come to one of the gravest, if not 
indeed, the gravest of the numerous problems 
which go to make up the Philippine Question — ^the 
Moro. Though these warlike Mohammedans of the 
south embrace five distinct tribes — Sulu, Yankan, 
Samal, Magindanao, and Tarao — ^they may be con- 
sidered, for the purpose of this article, as one people. 



302 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

They were the last of the Malays to migrate to the 
Philippines, having at one period overrun the islands 
as far north as Manila, just as the Moors — from 
whom, by the way, the Moros derive their name — over- 
ran Spain. Like the Moors, too, they have never been 
completely subjugated. Though they comprise less 
than one third of the total non- Christian population — 
there are only about three hundred thousand of them 
— ^their relative numerical insignificance is far 
from being a criterion of their military strength and 
ability. Not only have the Filipinos been unable to 
protect themselves against these bloodthirsty fanatics, 
but the Spaniards for nearly two centuries and a half 
were unable to give them adequate protection, the 
shores of northern Luzon being dotted to-day with 
the forts which were built for defence against them. 
The bulk of the Moro population is found within 
the boundaries of the recently created Department of 
Mindanao and Sulu, though a few thousand of them 
inhabit the southern districts of Palawan. Until very 
recently their chief pursuits were piracy, brigandage, 
murder, and arson, in which they still indulge when a 
safe and favorable opportunity offers, though of late, 
thanks to the patience and tact of the American offi- 
cials, they have made surprising progress in agricul- 
ture. An official of the Philippine Bureau of Educa- 
tion named Warner, who spent seven years on Siasi, 
one of the islands of the Sulu group, where he was the 
only white man, teaching its Moro inhabitants modern 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 303 

methods of agriculture, told me that the Moros possess 
a much higher type of intelligence than the Filipinos 
and assimilate new ideas far more quickly. As he 
had spent four years among the Visayans before go- 
ing to Moroland, he was eminently qualified to com- 
pare the two races. He added that they have a highly 
developed sense of humor; that they are quick to ap- 
preciate subtle stories, which the Tagalogs and Visa- 
yans are not, and that they are much readier to accept 
advice on agricultural and economic matters than the 
Christian Filipinos. In this he is corroborated by Mr. 
Dean C. Worcester, who says, "The Moros exempHfy 
what may be considered the highest stage of civiliza- 
tion to which Malays have ever attained unaided." 

Though the Moros are cruel, haughty, and often 
treacherous, they are at the same time exceedingly 
courteous, observing their own code of manners 
rigidly. They are inordinately fond of brilliant colors, 
blacken their lips and teeth with betel-nut, and are 
justly proud of their skill with their characteristic 
weapons — the serpentine-bladed Malay kris and the 
terrible Moro harong. The latter is a knife with an 
exceptionally broad and heavy blade which the Moro 
carries slung over his left shoulder in a scabbard con- 
sisting of two thin pieces of board held together with 
string. When he goes into action he wastes no time 
in freeing the weapon from his sheath, but sweeps it 
down, sheath and all, on the head of his enemy, the 
razor-sharp blade cutting the strings of the scabbard 



304 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

as it whistles through the air. The Moros are fine 
horsemen and fearless sailors. Mounted on their wiry 
island ponies, they hunt the native stags over incred- 
ibly rough country, down jnountainsides, through 
jungles, and across swamps, tiring them out and kill- 
ing them with spears. Those who have ridden in the 
first flight of the Quorn and the Pytchley would find 
themselves hard put to it to keep pace with the field 
in a hunt in Moroland. In their slim vintas, dugouts 
equipped with double outriggers, they jeer at the 
roughest seas, it being for this reason virtually im- 
possible to suppress the opium-smuggling and gun- 
running which are being carried on unceasingly by the 
Moros, as much, I imagine, from love of danger and 
excitement as for gain. 

Though they proudly profess themselves followers 
of the prophet, theirs is not the Mohammedanism one 
finds in Turkey or North Africa, but a brand of 
religion peculiarly their own. They neither pray 
five times a day nor observe the fasting month of 
Ramadan, duties enjoined on all true believers. The 
Koran is read to them in Arabic, a language of which 
they know nothing, and occasionally the priests and 
chiefs, who are often identical, assemble in the flimsy, 
gaudily painted wooden structures which are the Moro 
equivalents of mosques and pray for the entire com- 
munity. Yet many of the wealthy Moros have made 
the long hadj to the holy places, half the world away, 




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THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 305 

and wear about their turbans the white scarf which is 
the emblem of a hadji from one end of Islam to the 
other. It was curious to see how quickly the demeanor 
of the datos with whom I talked changed from sul- 
lenness to eagerness when they learned that I had re- 
cently been in Constantinople and had seen the Com- 
mander of the Faithful. The Sultan of Sulu, who 
dined with me aboard the Negros at Sandakan — 
where he had gone to coUect his monthly subsidy from 
the British North Borneo Company — ^told me that he 
still regarded the Sultan of Turkey as the head of 
Islam; but the Dato of Dansalan, the most powerful 
chieftain in the Lake Lanao district of Mindanao, 
asserted that he and his followers had accepted the 
spiritual leadership of the King of Hedjaz, who fulfills 
the most important of the koranic qualifications for 
the khalifate by being in actual possession of the holy 
cities of Mecca and Medina. It struck me, however, 
that their knowledge of Islamic political and theologi- 
cal questions was no more profound than the average 
Roman Catholic's comprehension of the policy of the 
Holy See. Though the datos and priests doubtless 
keep in touch to a certain extent with the affairs of 
Islam, I am convinced that to the rank and file of the 
Moros Mohammedanism is a meaningless shibboleth 
about which they know httle and care less. 

The Filipinos are afraid of the Moros and they have 
the best of reasons to be, for the Moro is not only a 



306 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

desperate fighter, a dangerous and resourceful enemy, 
but he goes into battle with the conviction that he is 
assured of gaining Paradise if he kills a Christian. 
The Filipino, on the contrary, is not inspired by any 
such fanatic willingness to sacrifice himself; he much 
prefers the comfort and safety of his native village to 
a martyr's crown. The fighting record of the Moros 
is written large in the history of the Philippines. Not 
only did they successfully defy for two centuries and a 
half the best troops that Spain could bring against 
them, but it was only by turning Moroland into an 
armed camp that we ourselves were able to subjugate 
them. Let me add, parenthetically, that the Moros 
took no part in the Filipino insurrection against the 
United States, being deaf to the appeals made to them 
by Aguinaldo. The guerrilla warfare which they 
waged against us for several years was due to much 
the same reasons which inspired the various outbreaks 
among the Indians. Though the Filipinos are not 
lacking in courage under ordinary circumstances, 
those of our army officers who are familiar with both 
peoples are unanimous in asserting their conviction 
that they could never impose their rule on the Moros 
or that they could even keep them at home. A strik- 
ing example of what can be accomplished with these 
savage warriors when properly disciplined and well 
led is provided by the Moro battalions of the Philip- 
pine Scouts, which compare very favorably with the 
Pathans and Ghurkas, the best native troops in 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 807 

Britain's Indian army, and are greatly superior, in my 
estimation, to Egyptian or Senegalese soldiery. 

Let the Moro be ruled with justice and unyielding 
firamess, and, though he will still be far from making 
an ideal citizen, he will not be a troublesome one. I 
can see no reason, indeed, why he should not become 
as amenable to law and order as has the American 
Indian. But I am convinced from what I have seen 
and heard of both races that Filipino rule in Moroland 
would be neither just nor firm, first, because the Fili- 
pinos hate the Moros too bitterly to give them a square 
deal ; and secondly, because they are in too great fear 
of them to rule them with the necessary firmness. 
Despite the fact that the Moros fought us desper- 
ately for years, they have become, of all the peoples 
in the archipelago except the Igorots and the Macca- 
bebes, our staunchest friends. They still occasionally 
indulge in outbursts of lawlessness, it is true, just as 
a party of cow-punchers occasionally shoots up a cat- 
tle town, but such affairs are wholly without political 
significance. That their suspicion and distrust of 
Americans has been replaced by confidence and liking 
is largely due to the extraordinary tact and ability in 
handling them displayed by two men: Mr. Frank 
Carpenter, Governor of the Department of Mindanao 
and Sulu, and Mr. P. W. Rogers, formerly Governor 
of Jolo. As long as the Moros are permitted to con- 
tinue under American rule they will remain as peace- 
able as their naturally turbulent natures permit, but 



308 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

once attempt to replace the American troops and offi- 
cials with Filipinos and there will be an outburst that 
will shake the archipelago. 

The Filipino officials at Manila complacently assert 
that the Moros are now completely disarmed, and 
therefore powerless. In order that this assertion 
might not be open to question they cabled Governor 
Rogers that the magnificent collection of blade 
weapons which he had borrowed from the local chief- 
tains must not be included in the Moro exhibit at the 
1920 Manila Exposition. As a matter of fact, the 
Moros are very far from being disarmed, and no one 
knows it better than the Filipino officials. British 
officials with whom I talked in North Borneo told me 
that arms and ammunition in small quantities are con- 
stantly being run across the Sulu Sea from the Dutch 
islands, and that there is scarcely a Moro warrior in 
the archipelago who does not have a rifle and a store 
of cartridges cached in some secret hiding-place 
against the day when the hated Filipinos attempt to 
assert their authority over them. I discussed the ques- 
tion of disarmament with Governor Rogers, who told 
me that there were blade weapons in every house and 
probably considerable quantities of firearms concealed 
in the jungle, and that the official who attempted to 
deprive the Moros of them would precipitate an in- 
surrection which would threaten the peace of the entire 
archipelago. Several of the datos and panglimas with 
whom I talked frankly asserted that, though the 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 309 

Moros are intensely loyal to the United States, they 
will resist any attempt to impose Filipino rule upon 
them as long as they have any powers of resistance 
left. I cannot be too emphatic in asserting that, in the 
event of our eventually granting independence to the 
Filipinos, were we to withdraw our protection from 
the Moros and hand them over against their wills to 
the tender mercies of their northern neighbors, we 
would be guilty of a most shameful breach of faith 
and would almost certainly precipitate a bloody and 
interminable civil war. The specious arguments of 
the independistas to the contrary, the Moros are not 
Filipinos. They are a different breed, speaking a 
different tongue, following different customs, prac- 
tising a different faith. The Sulu Archipelago, in 
which the bulk of them dwell, is a geographical entity, 
as distinct from the Philippine Islands as the Bahamas 
are from the Greater Antilles. And they distrust 
and detest the Filipinos with a vehemence which I 
have never seen equalled. For us to attempt to coerce 
the Moros into submission to Filipino rule would be as 
unjustifiable as for the British Government to coerce 
the people of Ulster into accepting the rule of the Dail 
Eireann. 



VI 

Since the American occupation in 1898 the Phil- 
ippines have had four distinct forms of govern- 



310 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

merit. The first was the mihtary government, which 
lasted from August, 1898 until February, 1900 — "the 
days of the Empire," as this period is proudly re- 
ferred to by the older Americans. Next came 
the government of the Philippine Commission, 
which ruled the archipelago for upward of seven years. 
This was followed by a dual government, composed 
of the Phihppine Commission and a Philippine as- 
sembly elected by popular vote, the two bodies bear- 
ing much the same relation to each other as the upper 
and lower houses of Congress. This was supplanted 
in 1916, under the provisions of the so-called Jones 
Bill, by a form of government that is to all intents and 
purposes completely autonomous, since when Ameri- 
can sovereignty has meant little more to the Filipinos 
than the governor-general and the flag. 

Though the present Philippine Government is pat- 
terned in the main on that of the United States, it is 
characterized by a distinct tendency toward paternal- 
ism and the Enghsh system of parliamentary respon- 
sibility. The governor-general, who is the chief execu- 
tive; the vice-governor, who is also the secretary of 
public instruction ; the auditor, and the deputy auditor 
are appointed by the President of the United States 
and are always Americans. The governor-general 
exercises control through the secretaries of the 
six executive departments — Public Instruction, In- 
terior, Justice, Commerce and Communications, Fi- 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 311 

nance, Agriculture and Natural Resources — who 
form his cabinet and all of whom, except the first, are 
Filipinos. Through the auditor the government at 
Washington keeps, or is supposed to keep, a guiding 
and restraining hand on the finances of the islands, 
though recent events, about which I shall speak fur- 
ther on, suggest that neither guidance nor restraint 
was exercised to any appreciable extent during the 
last administration. 

The legislative functions of the insular government 
are vested in the Philippine Legislature, consisting 
of a Senate and a House of Representatives, their 
members being elected by those Christian Filipinos 
who can qualify as voters. The non-Christian tribes, 
being regarded as "backward" peoples, remain unen- 
franchised, but the governor-general appoints, without 
confirmation, senators and representatives for the dis- 
trict which includes all the non-Christian peoples, in- 
cluding the Moros. The legislature exercises com- 
plete legislative powers, though the power of veto 
inheres to the governor-general and, of course, to the 
government at Washington. The Christian provinces 
are governed by provincial governors and provincial 
boards, the members of which are elected by the quali- 
fied voters of their respective provinces. The Moun- 
tain Province, in which the bulk of the Igorots dwell, 
and the recently created Department of Mindanao 
and Sulu, which contains most of the Moro popula- 



312 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

tion, are governed under special acts of the Philippine 
Legislature in accordance with the specific provisions 
of the Jones Bill. 

The judiciary consists of justice of the peace courts 
in the various municipalities, courts of first instance 
in the various provinces, and the Supreme Court of 
the Philippine Islands, the decisions of the latter 
being subject to review in certain cases by the Su- 
preme Court of the United States. The justices of the 
peace and of the courts of first instance are appointed 
by the governor-general with the approval of the 
Philippine Senate. The nine members of the su- 
preme court are appointed by the President of the 
United States, five of them being Americans and 
four, including the chief justice, Filipinos. It will 
be seen, therefore, that, though the Filipinos enjoy 
virtually complete autonomy so far as their domestic 
affairs are concerned, the government at Washington, 
through the American governor-general, the Amer- 
ican auditor, and the American majority on the su- 
preme bench, retains control of the executive, finan- 
cial, and judicial branches of the insular government. 
In short, the government at Washington occupies 
much the same position toward the Manila govern- 
ment that a guardian occupies toward a minor ward. 
As long as the ward behaves himself the guardian is 
content to let him run his own affairs, but he is in a 
position to make his authority felt if the youth shows 
a disposition to kick over the traces. 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 313 

Though the Filipinos were granted a steadily in- 
creasing measure of autonomy during the Roosevelt 
and Taft administrations, certain departments of the 
insular government, particularly those concerned with 
public health, public security, and public instruc- 
tion, were kept under American control by retaining 
Americans in most of the higher positions. But the 
return to power of the Democratic party in 1913 was 
the signal for a complete reversal of American policy 
toward the PhiUppines. When Francis Burton Har- 
rison arrived at Manila in that year he apparently 
bore a mandate from President Wilson to lose no 
time in taking the reins of government out of Amer- 
ican hands. This he proceeded to do with a thor- 
oughness and despatch which filled the Americans in 
the islands with dismay and the Filipinos with exulta- 
tion. Those best acquainted with the character and 
limitations of the Filipino viewed the wholesale dis- 
missal of trained and tried American officials with 
grave misgivings, believing it to be unwise, prema- 
ture, and as inimical to the best interests of the 
United States as to those of the Filipinos them- 
selves. 

The impression appears to prevail that the "Fil- 
ipinization" of the Philippine Government — by 
which is meant the replacement of American officials 
by natives — began with the Harrison administration. 
As a matter of fact, it began with the establishment 
of the Philippine Commission in 1900 and made 



314 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

steady progress under the administrations of Taft 
and Forbes. But whereas Messrs. Taft and Forbes 
did their Filipinizing from the bottom up, cautiously 
feeling their way and at first putting natives only in 
the lower positions, the Democratic administration 
recklessly jumped in and proceeded to Filipinize the 
highest and most responsible positions in the gov- 
ernment, appointing Filipinos with little or no expe- 
rience as judges, bureau chiefs, and secretaries of de- 
partments, many of these appointments being based 
on the political influence of the appointees instead of 
on merit, as had been the invariable rule theretofore. 
That, together with the substitution of a popularly 
elected senate for the appointed commission which 
had hitherto taken the place of an upper house, may 
be said to comprise the principal measures of Filipin- 
ization under the administration of Woodrow Wilson. 
When the Democratic party came into power in 1913 
it was generally admitted by experienced foreign ob- 
servers that the Philippines had the best colonial gov- 
ernment in the world. The Democrats had eight 
years in which to put their theories to the test. What 
has been the result? Owing to improper financial 
transactions the credit of the insular government has 
been seriously impaired; the gold reserve has been 
almost wiped out, so that to-day the currency of the 
islands is practically a fiat currency ; the rate of taxa- 
tion has been sharply advanced; standards of effi- 
ciency in every branch have declined; the foreign 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 315 

trade of the islands has fallen off;^ uncertainty and 
discontent exist everywhere. It is only fair to say, 
however, that whatever mistakes have been made, 
they have not been sufficient to arrest the steady rate 
of progress in the islands. 

Now in justice to Mr. Harrison it should be said 
that the partisan policy which he executed did not 
originate with him. Nor, for that matter, did it orig- 
inate with President Wilson. It originated in the 
early days of the American occupation, when the 
politicians in Washington used the Philippine Ques- 
tion for purely partisan purposes instead of attempt- 
ing to solve it according to the best traditions of Amer- 
ican statesmanship. From the very outset, it is true, 
the Democratic party has advocated eventual inde- 
pendence for the Filipinos, but it was a Republican 
president, William McKinley, who stole the Demo- 
cratic thunder by specifically declaring, "The Phil- 
ippines are not ours to exploit, but to develop, to civ- 
ilize, to educate, to train in the science of self-gov- 
ernment." It was the first phrase of that sentence, 
"The Philippines are not ours," which, by raising 
false hopes in Filipino breasts, started the uncertainty 
and discontent which have prevailed in the islands to 
this day. I believe that we would have saved our- 
selves much embarrassment and anxiety, and that the 

* Compared to the peak of prosperity attained during the period 
immediately following the war, there is, of course, a marked falling off 
in Philippine trade, but it is an encouraging sign that there is less 
business depression in the Philippines than in any other tropical country. 



316 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

Filipinos would now be a contented and prosperous 
people, had we had the moral courage to adopt and 
unfalteringly follow the declaration of policy issued 
by General Otis, the commander of the American 
forces during the Filipino insurrection: "Honor, 
justice, and friendship forbid the exploitation of the 
islands. The purpose of the American Government 
is the welfare and advancement of the Filipino peo- 
ple." What a pity that the politicians did not let 
it go at that. 

In the opinion of competent and unprejudiced ob- 
servers, vehement denials of the Filipinos to the con- 
trary, the dismissal en masse of Americans under the 
Harrison regime has seriously lowered the standards 
of efficiency which formerly prevailed in the various 
branches of the insular government. Though the 
portfolio of public instruction could not be trans- 
ferred under the law to native hands, the American 
vice-governor who held it conscientiously followed the 
orders of his superiors to Filipinize his department as 
thoroughly as possible. As a result, American teach- 
ers have been almost entirely supplanted by natives in 
the lower and intermediate grades and higher educa- 
tion was rapidly being turned over to the latter when 
the Democratic administration came to an end. There 
are now upward of eleven thousand Filipino teachers 
and less than four hundred American ones in the 
islands, though truth compels me to add that in its 
dying days the Harrison regime, presumably alarmed 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 317 

at the steady deterioration of the educational system, 
attempted to obtain additional teachers from the 
United States. One of the regrettable results of the 
Filipinization of the schools — regrettable from the 
American point of view, at least — is the movement 
which has as its object the substitution of Spanish for 
English in their curricula. This tendency may be 
checked, however, when the young Filipinos, who are 
being sent in steadily increasing numbers to the 
United States to be educated, begin to make them- 
selves felt in the public life of the Philippines. I am 
not sufficiently familiar with educational conditions 
in the islands to discuss them intelligently, but my 
observations convinced me that, though the whole- 
sale elimination of American teachers has unques- 
tionably resulted in a marked lowering of educational 
standards, the native teachers, considering their lim- 
itations, are doing exceedingly well. 

One of the most important accomplishments of the 
Philippine Commission was the estabhshment in Ma- 
nila of the great Bureau of Science for the purpose of 
coordinating in one building and under one head all 
the agencies of scientific research, such as geology, 
zoology, botany, mineralogy, ethnology, forestry, and 
medicine. Upon its completion its founders were able 
to say with justifiable pride that the opportunities 
for tropical research offered at Manila were unequaled 
anywhere in the world. Yet this remarkable institu- 
tion, at one time the best staffed, the most completely 



318 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

equipped, and the most efficient of its kind in exist- 
ence, is now a veritable morgue, its once busy cor- 
ridors being almost deserted and much of its delicate 
and costly apparatus remaining unused and covered 
with dust. Before the policy of Filipinization assumed 
its later dimensions the Bureau of Science boasted a 
staff of truly remarkable men, many of them with 
world-wide reputations, who were employed solely on 
the strength of their scientific qualifications and re- 
gardless of their nationality. But to-day, as a result 
of the policy of filling every lucrative post with a Fil- 
ipino, only two foreigners remain — an American and 
an Austrian. 

Far-reaching in its ultimate effect on the progress 
of the islanders as the Filipinization of the educa- 
tional system is bound to prove, equally serious and 
far more immediate developments are certain to re- 
sult from the Filipinization of the Health Service. Its 
director. Dr. J. B. Long, resigned in January, 1919, 
despite the remonstrances of the governor-general, 
because he asserted that his organization was falling 
to pieces as a result of the wholesale replacement of 
experienced Americans by unqualified Filipinos, so 
that he could no longer assure responsibility for the 
maintenance of public health in the archipelago. 
When the Americans landed in the Philippines in 
1898, smallpox and cholera stalked almost unchecked 
throughout the islands, and that scourge of the East, 
bubonic plague, was always hovering at the gate. 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 319 

But with the establishment of the Health Service, fol- 
lowed by the rigid enforcement of sanitary and pre- 
ventive measures, all three of these diseases were 
stamped out, making the Philippines the healthiest 
tropical country in the world. But within the past 
three years, due, so it was claimed by those American 
medical men with whom I talked, to the impaired effi- 
ciency of the Filipinized Health Service, both cholera 
and smallpox have again made their appearance. The 
statistics also show that there has been a steady in- 
crease in recent years in preventable diseases, espe- 
cially malaria, beriberi, tuberculosis, and typhoid. As 
the Quarantine Service fortunately remains under 
American control, there has been no plague in the 
islands for upward of fifteen years. 

Much the same state of affairs exists (October, 
1921) in the Bureau of Public Lands. Due to the in- 
efficiency of this bureau the land-title situation in the 
Philippines is a serious one, and, if the abuses are not 
corrected, will inevitably lead to dangerous discon- 
tent. When I was in the Lake Lanao district of Min- 
danao the local government land agent was on the eve 
of returning to the United States with his wife and 
three children, after nearly a decade of faithful and 
meritorious service, because his place was wanted for 
a Filipino. Yet that man, by the exercise of unremit- 
ting patience, tact, energy, and courage, had brought 
the savage and predatory Moros of his district from 
the hunting stage of existence, where he had found 



320 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

them, through the grazing stage and well into the ag- 
ricultural stage. And he realized, just as all the other 
Americans in his district realized, that much, if not 
all, of the progress which he had made during those 
years of bitter struggle would be lost because of the 
hostility of the Moros for any Filipino who might suc- 
ceed him. 

Public order is maintained throughout the archi- 
pelago by the police forces of the various municipali- 
ties and by the Philippine Constabulary, an organiza- 
tion which has long had an enviable reputation for 
discipline and efficiency. The constabulary, which 
was raised and trained by officers of the American 
army, consists at present of about three hundred and 
sixty officers and nearly six thousand men. At the 
height of its efficiency the force had three hundred 
and seventy-five American officers, most of whom had 
gone to the islands with volunteer regiments in 1898, 
but as a result of the Filipinization of the commis- 
sioned personnel only twenty Americans remain. 
Though the present chief of constabulary, Brigadier- 
General Crame, is for political purposes a Filipino, 
he is by blood and training far more European than 
Asiatic, being three quarters Spanish and having re- 
ceived his mihtary education in Spain, He has dis- 
played such marked energy in the pursuit and punish- 
ment of malefactors, and is said to have in his secret 
files so much information which might prove highly 
embarrassing to certain powerful politicos, that he is 



s'^: 






A MORO DATO 
Jolo, Sulu Archipelago 




X 



A MORO ENLISTED 

MAN 
Philippine Constabulary 



AN IPUGAO SOLDIKR 
Philippine Constabulary 

(Note gee-string and 

anklets) 




THE FAMOUS "ZIGZAG" ON THE BENGUET ROAD 

This leads from Manila to Baguio, the summer capital. This road, which cost 

upward of three million dollars, is unequaled for sheer audacity of engineering, 
even in the Alps. 




THE PASIG RIVER, MANILA 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 321 

credited with having remarked that he would leave the 
islands the day the American flag was hauled down, 
because it would not be safe for him to remain. 

I might mention in this connection that an Amer- 
ican general who has seen many years of service in 
the Philippines recently remarked to me that, in the 
event of the United States withdrawing from the is- 
lands, it would be little short of criminal for us not 
to take some measures which would insure the safety 
and well-being of the httle tribe of Maccabebes, only 
a few thousand strong, who have so faithfully served 
us as native scouts from the very beginning of our 
occupation. He led me to believe that, were satis- 
factory guarantees for their safety not exacted, the 
Maccabebes would be in danger of meeting the same 
fate which befell the leading Moro dato, of the Lake 
Lanao district, who was assassinated in the summer 
of 1921 because, according to rumor, he had urged 
upon the Wood-Forbes Mission the necessity of keep- 
ing the Moro islands under American rule, thereby 
arousing the deadly enmity of the Filipinos. But 
this is a digression. 

No nation was ever more faithfully served by its 
pubHc servants than the Philippines have been served 
by the American officers of the constabulary. They 
have given their best years and the best that was in 
them to the service of the Filipinos. Most of the hand- 
ful of Americans remaining in the force have worn 
its scarlet-trimmed khaki for close on two decades; 



322 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

several of them bear on their breasts the bit of star- 
spangled crimson ribbon — "the red badge of courage" 
— ^which signifies that the wearer has won the Philip- 
pine Medal of Honor; one of them irretrievably 
ruined his health while caring for native refugees 
during the eruption of Taal Volcano; others carry 
on their bodies the scars of bullet, spear, and knife 
wounds which they received while making safe for 
the Filipinos the savage-infested islands of Mindanao 
and "dark and bloody Samar." 

Yet, though the Filipinos owe to these men a debt 
which they can never hope to repay, injustice and 
ingratitude have been their portion. For the 
politicians in Manila, quick to recognize how ef- 
fective a weapon the constabulary might prove in 
partisan hands, eagerly seized upon the policy of 
universal Filipinization as a pretext for getting rid 
of the American officers. The politicians succeeded 
in forcing out most of the American officers in the 
lower grades by the enactment of a bill cutting off 
their fogies, that is, their progressive increases in 
pay for long service. The officers of the constabulary 
have never been highly paid, and thus deprived of 
their fogies there was small incentive for young and 
ambitious men to remain in the service. But when 
all except a score of senior officers who were too old 
to embark on new careers had been forced out of the 
service, the fogies were restored in order that the Fil- 
ipino officers might have the benefit of them. Just as 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 323 

military men of experience predicted, the Filipiniza- 
tion of the constabulary, combined with the demoraliz- 
ing effect of political influence, has resulted in a con- 
siderable lowering of the force's discipline, efficiency, 
and morale, for the enlisted men, particularly those 
recruited from the non-Christian tribes, will not ac- 
cord to their Filipino officers the same measure of re- 
spect, the same imquestioning obedience, which they 
gave to their American superiors. 



VII 

But by far the most serious consequence of the pol- 
icy pursued by the Wilson administration has been 
the complete breakdown of the insular finances and 
the resulting impairment of Philippine credit. 
Though the story of the financial disaster which has 
overtaken the insular government is a long and com- 
plicated one, involving many technical details, I will 
endeavor to compress it into tabloid dimensions. 

The currency of the Philippines consists of silver 
and paper, the latter comprising treasury certificates 
and notes of the Philippine National Bank. Until 
recently this paper currency was kept at par by a gold 
reserve, which amounted to $41,500,000 at the begin- 
ning of 1919. This reserve, which represented about 
97 per cent, of the outstanding paper currency, was 
deposited in fifteen different banks in the United 



324 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

States. But in 1916 the Philippine Legislature 
passed an act establishing the Philippine National 
Bank and not long thereafter, and without legal au- 
thority, this reserve fund was transferred from the 
fifteen depositories to the New York agency of the 
new bank, to be kept there to the credit of the bank 
instead of the government. In other words, the Fili- 
pino politicians wanted the money where they could 
get at it with the greatest possible ease. Exactly what 
happened after that transfer took place has not yet 
been satisfactorily explained, but the indisputable fact 
remains that the reserve fund which in 1919 amounted 
to $41,500,000 had by 1921 dwindled to about $2,000,- 
000. In short, approximately 95 per cent, of the 
gold reserve which secured the currency of the is- 
lands disappeared in two years. In consequence, there 
being virtually no funds in New York with which to 
honor Philippine drafts, the Philippine Government 
was forced to issue an order suspending the sale of 
bills of exchange on New York. As was to be ex- 
pected this resulted in tying up the import trade of 
the islands and demoralizing business generally. 

The first question that is asked, naturally, is what 
has become of the $39,000,000 which are missing? 
Where has this great sum gone? A large part of it 
appears to have gone in what may be described, for 
want of a better term, as political investments. It 
is known that the Philippine National Bank made 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 325 

large loans to both Filipinos and Americans in sums 
running into millions of pesos without security of 
any kind except the borrowers' political affiliations. / 
Some of these loans are good ; most of them are not. 
In other cases money was loaned to an individual to 
finance a private enterprise, the enterprise itself be- 
ing accepted as security for the loan. The enter- 
prise failed, and the bank was left with some hand- 
somely engraved stock certificates and a sheaf of 
notes. In these and other ways not yet disclosed many 
millions have disappeared.^ But whatever the meth- 
ods employed by the looters, the fact remains that 
the currency reserve has been all but wiped out and 
that now there is nothing behind the paper money 
of the islands except the credit of the Philippine Gov- 
ernment, or, to be exact, the credit of the Govern- 
ment of the United States. No matter, therefore, 
how loudly the Filipinos may proclaim their suc- 
cess in administering certain other departments of 
the government — ^claims which, as I have already 
shown, are by no means substantiated by the facts — 
they are compelled to admit their failure in the field 
of national finance. This being so, it might be prof- 
itable for the Filipinos to ponder the fact that, 
had the independence which they have so insistently 
demanded been given them, their country would be 

^The insular auditor estimates that the losses wiU reach the total of 

$22,500,000. 



326 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

facing bankruptcy to-day. And there would be no 
rich and indulgent Uncle Sam standing in the back- 
ground, hand in pocket, ready to help them out. 

The propaganda so zealously disseminated by the 
bureau which the Philippine Government maintains 
in Washington at a cost of one million pesos a year 
has given many foreigners the impression that the 
business of the islands is mainly in Filipino hands. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. The facts 
are that fully 85 per cent, of the local trade is in 
the hands of the Chinese, while the wholesale and 
foreign business is nearly all in American and Brit- 
ish hands, though the Japanese interests in certain 
sections of the archipelago are increasing at a rate 
which is causing the government some apprehension. 

Americans living in the Philippines will tell you 
that the insular government is rotten to the core with 
corruption. They will tell you that the treasury and 
the national bank have been looted — which would ap- 
pear to be true — and that the politicos and their 
friends have suddenly and mysteriously come into 
possession of great fortunes. They will assure you 
that the government pay-rolls have been padded, that 
government labor and vast quantities of government 
materials have been used for private purposes, that 
it is impossible to obtain a building permit or to pass 
goods through the customs without having recourse 
to bribery, that graft and chicanery are to be found 
everywhere, that nepotism and political favoritism 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 327 

are universal. Of the truth of these accusations I 
do not feel that I am competent to judge. That much 
corruption and more incompetency exist is hardly 
open to question. That certain of the political lead- 
ers have scandalously abused their power is admitted 
by every one who will tell the truth and who has real 
knowledge of the situation. But I do not think 
that conditions are as black as the Americans have 
painted them, any more than I believe that they are 
as rosy as the Fihpinos claim. The truth lies some- 
where between these extremes. Viewing the experi- 
ment of Filipino self-government as it has been es- 
sayed under the provisions of the Jones Bill as im- 
partially as I am able, I think that the scales incline 
more to the side of failure than of success. 

During the eight years of the Wilson administra- 
tion the government at Washington took the view 
that Americans who engaged in business outside the 
United States, whether in Mexico, or Central Amer- 
ica, or the Philippines, did so at their own risk. It 
assumed by some inexplicable process of reasoning 
that these men were adventurers, conmiercial fihbus- 
ters, and it took the attitude that in case of trouble, 
they need not look to their own government for sup- 
port or protection. Contrast this attitude, if you 
please, with that of the British Government, which 
regards those of its nationals engaged in legitimate 
business overseas as outposts of trade, as commercial 
empire-builders, and recognizes their services to the 



328 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

nation with honors and rewards. Perhaps that ex- 
plains why after more than two decades of American 
sovereignty the British investment in the Phihppines 
is nearly double the American investment. For the 
Englishman can invest his capital in the Philippines 
with the comforting knowledge that as long as he 
behaves himself he has his government solidly behind 
him — and the Filipino knows it, too, and treats him 
accordingly. Is it too much to expect, then, that 
the American residing and doing business in a land 
which was freed from tyranny by the sacrifice of 
American lives, which was purchased with American 
dollars, which is guarded by the American navy, 
which has been made safe by the American army, 
whose credit is guaranteed by the American treas- 
ury, whose schools and hospitals and railways are 
due to American initiative and enterprise, whose sea- 
gates are guarded against disease by American quar- 
antine surgeons, whose industries have been devel- 
oped by American capital, and over which flies the 
American flag — is it too much to expect, I repeat, 
that the American resident should be accorded the 
same measure of representation and protection en- 
joyed by an Englishman or a Mexican or a Jap- 
anese? 

It was to obtain for Americans the same rights en- 
joyed by citizens of other countries that two-and- 
twenty years after Commodore Dewey took posses- 
sion of the archipelago in the name of the United 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 329 

States there was organized in Manila the American 
Chamber of Commerce of the PhiHppine Islands. 
This organization, to quote its own words, "repre- 
sents every phase of American business and interest 
in the Philippines and is taking the place of a lega- 
tion to the citizens of the United States residing in 
the Philippine territory, irrespective of whether they 
are members of the organization or not. It purposes 
to be heard on every subject affecting the business 
or political life of the community. It purposes in all 
matters: first, to suggest a remedy; second, to ask 
for its application; third, to demand its application; 
and fourth, to fight for its apphcation if other proc- 
esses are not successful." There you have the Bill 
of Rights of the Americans in the Phihppines. 



VIII 

Though the bitterest opponents of American rule 
in the Philippines cannot charge us with having ex- 
ploited the natives for our own profit — and we are 
the only nation having colonial possessions of which 
this can truthfully be said — in our social relations 
with the natives we are no whit different from other 
ruling white races. The Englishman in India is no 
more supercilious or condescending in his attitude 
toward the brown-skinned peoples of the peninsula 
than the Americans in the Philippines are toward 



330 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

the Filipinos. In the islands the white men and the 
brown are separated by a social chasm as deep and 
impassable as that which separates army officers and 
enlisted men. In certain respects we have carried 
this social discrimination to even greater lengths than 
have the English, for whereas the Khedivial Club, 
Cairo's most exclusive organization, has as many 
Egyptian as European members, no Filipino can be 
elected to a Manila club, no matter how high his 
official position. It did not take our various gov- 
ernor-generals long to learn that it was the part of 
wisdom not to mix Americans and Filipinos, except at 
large official functions when entertaining at the 
Palace of Malacanan. The American who marries 
a Fihpina is promptly ostracized. She may be a 
graduate of Bryn Mawr or Vassar or Wellesley, she 
may be beautiful and cultured and charming, but no 
matter — she is not white. 

As the result of many years spent in Oriental coun- 
tries I can understand, even if I do not entirely sym- 
pathize with, the white man's point of view on this 
question. I must confess, however, that it amuses 
me to see the wives and daughters of men who were 
originally small-town merchants or mechanics, or 
who first went out to the islands as enlisted men in 
the army of occupation, treating with condescension 
Filipinos who have in their veins the proudest blood 
of Spain. But, mind you, I do not subscribe to the 
social creed of former Governor-General Harrison, 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 331 

who said in his farewell address, "I want you to re- 
member that in all but face and race I am a Fil- 
ipino," any more than I approve of the American 
soldier's sentiment toward "the little brown brother" 
as inelegantly expressed in the once-famous army 
song: "He may be a brother of William H. Taft, 
but he ain't no brother of mine." Viewing this deli- 
cate and difficult question purely from the political 
angle, it seems to me that were the Americans in the 
Philippines to lower in some degree the social bar- 
rier which they have raised between themselves and 
the natives, were they to draw the color line a shade 
less sharply, it would go far toward soothing the 
wounded pride of the Filipinos and reconciling them 
to American rule without entailing any sacrifice of 
that prestige which is the fetich of the colonizing 
white man. 

Another source of Filipino resentment is to be 
found in the lack of ordinary tact which characterizes 
the attitude of American residents toward the natives. 
Mr. Nathaniel Peffer, himself a keen observer and 
for many years a resident in the East, quotes a Fil- 
ipino educated in the United States as saying: 
"Don't give us independence if you don't want to. 
The decision is yours to make and we must resign 
ourselves to it if it is unfavorable. We can even 
sympathize with some of the reasons why independ- 
ence would be unwise now. But stop harping on our 
'unfitness.' It is that we hear all the time, and not 



332 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

some of the other reasons. We have come to hate 
that word. All its associations are rasping to us. It 
suggests a savage people come up for judgment be- 
fore supermen." With that attitude most fair- 
minded Americans will heartily sympathize. For an 
educated and self-respecting Filipino to be told over 
and over again that he is "unfitted" for self-govern- 
ment (no matter how true the statement may be) is 
as exasperating and as difficult to refute as the charge 
that a man is "temperamentally unsuited" to hold a 
certain position. Until we can school ourselves to 
exercise greater tact and courtesy in our relations 
with the Filipinos, until we can broaden our horizons 
sufficiently to look at things from their viewpoint as 
well as our own, until we can forget whether a man 
is born east or west of Suez and gage our attitude 
toward him by his brains instead of his blood, by his 
character instead of his complexion, we shall never 
win from the Filipinos that confidence and liking 
which are indispensable to successful colonial admin- 
istration. 



IX 

The Philippine Question naturally resolves itself 
into two distinct problems. First, how would the 
granting of independence to the Philippines affect 
our own constantly increasing interest in the Far 
East? And second, would independence be best for 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 333 

the Filipinos themselves? The Filipinos assert, and 
with truth, that the former is a purely selfish consid- 
eration, but the lessons of the World War have taught 
us that national considerations, selfish though they 
may be, cannot safely be disregarded. England has 
not remained in military occupation of Egypt for 
forty years through any desire to exploit the Egyp- 
tians or because she has been financially benefited by 
her hold on the Valley of the Nile — on the contrary, 
the occupation of Egypt has added enormously to 
the burdens borne by the British taxpayer — ^but be- 
cause in controlling Egypt she insures the safety of 
the Suez Canal, which is the gateway through which 
passes Britain's enormous commerce with the Farther 
East. Our own position in the Philippines is some- 
what analogous to England's position in Egypt. 
Within fifteen hours of the China Coast, within fifty 
hours of Japan and of the Straits of Malacca, the 
archipelago forms a commercial gateway to the whole 
of eastern Asia and to the great, rich islands of Ma- 
laysia. Glance for a moment at the map and note the 
amazing strategic value of the Philippines from the 
point of view of American world commerce. Just 
across the China Sea lie the great ports of Haiphong, 
Hong Kong, Canton, Shanghai, Tsingtau, Cheefoo, 
Tientsin, through which pour the imports of the four 
hundred millions of people in Indo-China and China. 
And as surely as darkness follows the day, as smoke 
goes upward, our commerce with the Orient, now 



334 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

growing by leaps and bounds, in a considerable meas- 
ure at least, will be won away from us by those nations 
which are better situated geographically to push their 
commercial interests — England through Hong Kong 
and Tientsin, France through Haiphong and her con- 
cessions in Yunnan, Japan through Korea, Siberia, 
Manchuria, and the Shantung Peninsula — if our flag 
comes down in the Philippines. 

I consider it unlikely in the extreme that we will 
ever be forced to resort to arms in defense of our 
interests in the Pacific, but that does not mean that 
there is no possibility of such a contingency arising. 
As this possibility, however remote it may seem, al- 
ways exists, let me direct your attention to the im- 
mense strategic advantages afforded us by the 
Philippines, which are within easy striking distance of 
every Asiatic port between Yokohama and Singa- 
pore and lie squarely athwart every trade route be- 
tween the Far East and Europe, Australia, South 
America, and Mexico. With a powerful fleet having 
its base in Subic Bay, we could not only guarantee the 
Paciflc Coast, the Hawaiian Islands, and the Canal 
against enemy attack, but we would hold the com- 
merce of the Pacific at our mercy. Deprived of the 
Philippines as a base of operations in any struggle in 
which we might become involved in the Pacific, we 
would be forced to fight on the defensive, which, as 
most naval experts agree, is usually doubtful strat- 
egy. 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 335 



"The Philippines are more trouble than they are 
worth. Let's get rid of them" has long been the 
slogan of many uninformed Americans. Permit me 
to call the attention of those who hold this view to 
the fact that the Philippines are not costing the Amer- 
ican taxpayer a single penny, the insular finances for 
several years past having shown a surplus instead of 
a deficit. In making this statement I do not con- 
sider, of course, the cost of maintaining our naval 
and military forces in the islands, for it is to be 
assumed that, should we grant the Filipinos independ- 
ence, these forces would not be disbanded, but would 
merely be ordered to other stations, so that the ex- 
pense of their maintenance, if anything, would be 
increased. The Philippines, as I have attempted to 
show you, constitute America's military and commer- 
cial outpost in the Orient. In view of the present 
condition of world affairs, whether it would be high 
patriotism, good business, sound strategy, to abandon 
such an outpost, with the possibility that it might fall 
into unfriendly hands, is a question which the Amer- 
ican people must decide for themselves. 

In considering the question of whether independ- 
ence would be best for the Filipinos themselves, it 
must be kept in mind that very few educated Filipinos 



336 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

expect, or really want, complete autonomy. What 
they seek, rather, is a form of independence which 
will insure them unrestricted freedom of action and 
absolute security without anxiety or expense, in short, 
a protectorate. While vociferously demanding the 
profits of the business, they are unwilling to assume 
the risks ; yet there is a general failure to appreciate 
the fact that independence under the protection of 
another nation is not true independence. The fact 
that their legislative measures are subject to the veto 
of the American governor-general, that their finances 
are under the supervision of an American auditor, 
that a few, a very few positions in the Constabulary, 
the Health Service, and the Department of Public 
Instruction are still held by Americans, makes the 
Filipinos — or, to be precise, the native politicians and 
office-seekers — almost childishly resentful, yet they 
instantly would become panic-stricken were we to 
announce that we proposed to cut them adrift and to 
withdraw immediately from the islands, taking our 
troops, our warships, and our financial credit with 
us. Though I am convinced from my conversations 
with a large number of intelligent and thoughtful 
Filipinos, who appeared to have the best interests 
of their country genuinely at heart, that they would 
view with the gravest misgivings a complete sev- 
erance of relations with the United States, the poHt- 
ical leaders have harped so long on the theme of 
^"^la independencia" that the great ignorant mass of 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 337 

the people have come to believe that only in absolute 
independence will they find happiness and national 
salvation. 

In order to understand the political situation in 
the Philippines it should be kept in mind that the 
Filipinos have no political parties as we have in the 
United States, because there is no question of suffi- 
cient importance to divide public opinion. As a re- 
sult, the only political factions are the "ins" and the 
"outs," and both of them, lacking any other issue, 
such as taxation, or the tariff, or the League of Na- 
tions, clamor for independence, though not one Fil- 
ipino in a hundred has other than the haziest ideas 
of what independence, with all that it implies, would 
mean. The average Filipino's conception of inde- 
pendence is well illustrated by a story which was told 
me in Manila. A provincial political boss who had 
been a candidate for the governorship of a province, 
but had met with overwhelming defeat at the polls, 
burst into his party headquarters shortly after the 
results of the election had been announced, livid with 
rage. 

"I'm for independence!" he bellowed. "I'm for 
independence instantly! If only these cursed Amer- 
icanos were out of here, I 'd come into town with a 
thousand of my bolo men and wipe out the gang that 
defeated me and make myself governor, votes or no 
votes. It 's all the fault of these damned interfering 
Americanos. They 're always insisting on law and 



338 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

order — always talking about the decision of the bal- 
lot-box. If we could get rid of them, we'd decide 
things with the bolo instead of the ballot. To hell 
with Americano rule! \Viva la independenciar 

Now that man, opera bouffe as he may seem, rep- 
resents the sentiments of a by no means inconsider- 
able number of Filipino politicians. These men, in 
order to attain their selfish ends, would prefer to see 
the Philippines saddled with the brand of "independ- 
ence" that Mexico knew under the rule of Carranza, 
or that Russia is enjoying under Lenine and Trotsky, 
to the reign of decency, security, and justice which 
Lord Cromer gave to the Egyptians. As a matter 
of fact, the Filipinos are already as free as the peo- 
ples of Canada, South Africa, and Australia, enjoy- 
ing what unprejudiced foreign observers have de- 
clared to be the most just and advanced system of 
government in the world. But to these facts they 
wilfully close their eyes, stubbornly insisting that 
they must have independence in name as well as in 
substance. 

The American Chamber of Commerce of the Phil- 
ippines has advocated that the archipelago be given 
a territorial form of government, such as was enjoyed 
for many years by Arizona, New Mexico, and Okla- 
homa, and that under the name of the "Territory of 
Malaya" it be added to the Union. This would doubt- 
less solve many of the present problems, but it is a 
solution which the leaders of the independence agita- 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 339 

tion would almost certainly reject. What they de- 
mand is an absolute severance of every tie which binds 
the Philippines to the United States. They insist on 
being turned loose, a free and sovereign people, to 
lead their own lives and to work out their own destiny. 
With this demand I can sympathize. The love of free- 
dom is inherent in every human being. Yet it would 
involve several questions requiring earnest considera- 
tion. To begin with, the United States paid Spain 
twenty million dollars for the Philippines. Do the 
Filipinos propose, in the event of being given their in- 
dependence, to refund this sum? A sordid sugges- 
tion, perhaps, but it is to be assumed that the pride of 
the Filipinos would scarcely permit them to ignore 
such an obligation. Again, the Filipinos are the only 
people on earth who enjoy the privilege of absolute 
free trade with the United States. Certain authorities 
claim that the surest way of strangling them would be 
to withdraw that privilege from them. But as a free 
and sovereign nation could the Filipinos advance any 
sound reason why their products should not be sub- 
ject to the same duties, upon entering the United 
States, as those of other foreign nations? The Fil- 
ipinos bitterly resent the suggestion of an American 
protectorate, so, in the event of their becoming in- 
volved in hostilities with another power, what excuse 
would they have for turning to us for protection? 
Let me remark here, for the benefit of such Filipinos 
as may read this book, that if they seriously believe 



340 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

that the American people, once our troops have been 
withdrawn and our flag hauled down, would ever 
consent to despatch a fleet or raise an army to defend 
the Philippines againt foreign aggression, then they 
are only deceiving themselves. I believe that I am 
expressing the sentiments of the great majority of 
the American people when I assert that if the Fil- 
ipinos insist on cutting themselves adrift, then they 
must be prepared to paddle their own canoe and need 
not look to the United States for assistance, either 
military or financial, if a storm comes. 

It is a deplorable fact that much of the unrest, 
uncertainty, and discontent which exist in the Phil- 
ippines to-day are directly traceable to certain Amer- 
ican politicians who, eager to obtain cheap publicity 
and to make political capital, or obsessed with altru- 
istic but utterly impracticable ideas, have espoused 
the cause of Filipino independence, regarding which 
few of them possess first-hand knowledge and which 
still fewer are qualified intelligently to discuss. What 
we need for a just and intelligent solution of the Phil- 
ippine Question are not the philippics of politicians 
or the appeals of impractical sentimentalists, but the 
reasoned advice of men with long experience in co- 
lonial administration, men of the stamp of Cromer 
and Milner, Smuts and Curzon, men who serve neither 
personal nor party interests. Until we raise the Phil- 
ippine Question from the slough of partisan politics 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 341 

to the plane of a great national problem, until we 
abolish our present system of selecting our colonial 
officials on the strength of their political records and 
affiliations instead of for their actual qualifications 
for the duties to be performed, until we adopt and 
adhere to a definite colonial policy, regardless of the 
political party which may be in power, until the gov- 
ernment at Washington will give heed to the disinter- 
ested men who, through long experience, know where- 
of they speak, the Philippines will not know enduring 
tranquillity or prosperity. The despatch of the Wood- 
Forbes Mission to investigate conditions on the spot 
and the appointment of General Wood as governor- 
general are steps in the right direction. If the Wash- 
ington Government will heed the suggestions made 
by this mission, if it will back up the new insular 
administration, much will be done toward dissipating 
the cloudiness and uncertainty which have enveloped 
the future of the islands.^ 

The conclusions and recommendations of the Wood- 
Forbes Mission are so clear, concise, and enlighten- 
ing that I quote them here : 

If the Filipinos could present more convincing 
proofs than they have yet done that they are really 
fitted for the independence which they covet; if they 
could show beyond all peradventure that they are 
prepared to take care of themselves without further 

*See Appendix. 



342 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS 

assistance or protection from the United States, then 
I believe the majority of the American people would 
say: "Here is your independence. Take it, and 
God be with you." But before that happy state of 
affairs can be realized we must ask ourselves in all 
seriousness certain questions. If we are to grant the 
Filipinos their independence, to which of the various 
races shall we intrust the machinery of government 
— to the Tagalogs, the Ilocanos, or the Visayans, to 
name only three of them? Then again, shall we hand 
over the reins of power to the great brown mass of 
people who are the real natives of the islands, or shall 
we give them to the little group of half-caste poli- 
ticians and agitators who are at present in the sad- 
dle ? Shall we deliver the pagan tribes — the Igorots, 
Ifugaos, Kalingas, Mandayas, Monobos, and the rest 
— to the Christian Filipinos, and if we do, what satis- 
factory guaranty can we obtain that their rights will 
be respected, that they will not be oppressed and 
exploited as they were before the American occupa- 
tion? Shall we attempt to coerce the Moros into 
submission to the rule of the Filipinos whom they 
despise and hate, and if we do coerce them and they 
revolt, as they almost certainly would do, shall we 
send troops to the islands to aid the Filipinos in sub- 
jugating them ? If the "Repubhc of the Philippines" 
should become, as the result of internal jealousies and 
dissensions, another Haiti, shall we intervene, as we 
did in Haiti, and restore order? Should Japan, or 



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 343 

China, or both, insist on the unrestricted admission 
of their nationals to the rich lands of the PhiHppines, 
— as the Japanese, at least, are reasonably certain to 
do, once American protection is withdrawn — and 
should the Filipinos refuse them such admission, shall 
we be prepared to back up the Filipinos in their re- 
fusal with fleets and armies, or shall we stand aloof 
and see the archipelago overrun by yellow men? 
And finally, if the independence of the young re- 
public were menaced by a covetous and warlike neigh- 
bor, would we be prepared to spend thousands of 
lives and billions of dollars in rescuing the Filipinos 
and setting them on their feet and starting them in 
business all over again? 

In asking these hypothetical questions nothing is 
further from my purpose than to embarrass the Fil- 
ipinos, whom I like, or to belittle their very real abil- 
ities, or to prejudice my readers against them. But 
whether embarrassing to the Filipinos or not, they are 
questions which the American people must answer, 
and answer satisfactorily, before they can conscien- 
tiously turn adrift the ten million "little brown broth- 
ers" whom they so light-heartedly adopted nearly a 
quarter of a century ago. 



APPENDIX A 



GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 



We find the people happy, peaceful, and in the main pros- 
perous, and keenly appreciative of the benefits of American 
rule. 

We find everywhere among the Christian Filipinos the 
desire for independence, generally under the protection of 
the United States. The non-Christians and Americans are 
for continuance of American control. 

We find a general failure to appreciate the fact that 
independence under the protection of another nation is not 
true independence. 

We find that the Government is not reasonably free from 
those underlying causes which result in the destruction of 
government. 

We find that a reasonable proportion of officials and 
employees are men of good character and ability, and 
reasonably faithful to the trust imposed upon them; but 
that the efficiency of the public services has fallen off, and 
that they are now relatively inefficient, due to lack of 
inspection and to the too rapid transfer of control to 
officials who have not had the necessary time for proper 
training. 

We find that many Filipinos have shown marked capacity 
for government service and that the young generation is 
full of promise; that the civil service laws have in the main 
been honestly administered, but there is a marked deteriora- 
tion due to the injection of politics. 

We find there is a disquieting lack of confidence in the 
administration of justice, to an extent which constitutes 
a menace to the stability of the government. 

We find that the people are not organized economically 

345 



346 APPENDIX 

nor from the standpoint of national defense to maintain an 
independent government. 

We find that the legislative chambers are conducted with 
dignity and decorum and are composed of representative 
men. 

We feel that the lack of success in certain departments 
should not be considered as proof of essential incapacity 
on the part of Filipinos, but rather as indicating lack of 
experience and opportunity, and especially lack of inspec- 
tion. 

We find that questions in regard to confirmation of 
appointments might at any time arise which would make a 
deadlock between the Governor General and the Philippine 
Senate. 

We feel that with all their many excellent qualities, the 
experience of the past eight years, during which they have 
had practical autonomy, has not been such as to justify 
the people of the United States relinquishing supervision 
of the Government of the Philippine Islands, withdrawing 
their army and navy, and leaving the islands a prey to any 
powerful nation coveting their rich soil and potential com- 
mercial advantages. 

In conclusion we are convinced that it would be a betrayal 
of the Philippine people, a misfortune to the American 
people, a distinct step backward in the path of progress, 
and a discreditable neglect of our national duty were we 
to withdraw from the islands and terminate our relation- 
ship there without giving the Filipinos the best chance pos- 
sible to have an orderly and permanently stable government. 



RECOMMENDATIONS 

1. We recommend that the present general status of the 
Philippine Islands continue until the people have had time 
to absorb and thoroughly master the powers already in 
their hands. 

2. We recommend that the responsible representative of 
the United States, the Governor General, have authority 



APPENDIX 347 

commensurate with the responsibilities of his position. In 
case of failure to secure the necessary corrective action by 
the Philippine Legislature, we recommend that Congress 
declare null and void legislation which has been enacted 
diminishing, limiting, or dividing the authority granted the 
Governor General under Act No. 240 of the Sixty-fourth 
Congress, known as the Jones bill. 

3. We recommend that in case of a deadlock between the 
Governor General and the Philippine Senate in the confirma- 
tion of appointments that the President of the United 
States be authorized to make and render the final decision. 

4. We recommend that under no circumstances should 
the American Government permit to be established in the 
Philippine Islands a situation which would leave the United 
States in a position of responsibility without authority. 

Leonard Wood, Chairman. 
W. Cameeon Forbes. 
October 8, 1921. 



APPENDIX B 

The text of the two treaties regarding China, approved 
at Washington, Feb. 4, 1922, by the Conference for the 
Limitation of Armament and Pacific and Far Eastern Ques- 
tions, follows. The one embodying the Root four points for 
the integrity of China and the open door reads : 

TREATY ON CHINESE INTEGRITY 

The United States of America, Belgiimii, the British Etht 
pire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Por- 
tugal: 

Desiring to adopt a policy designed to stabilize conditions 
in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of 
China, and to promote intercourse between China and the 
other powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity ; 

Have resolved to conclude a treaty for that purpose and 
to that end have appointed as their respective plenipoten- 
tiaries: 

[Here follow the names of the plenipotentiaries.] 

Who, having communicated to each other their fvU 
powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as 
follows : 

ARTICLE I 

The contracting powers, other than China, agree: 

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the 
territorial and administrative integrity of China. 

2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed oppor- 

348 



APPENDIX 349 

tunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effec- 
tive and stable Government. 

3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually 
establishing and maintaining the principle of equal oppor- 
tunity for the commerce and industry of all nations through- 
out the territory of China. 

4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in 
China in order to seek special rights or privileges which 
would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly 
States, and from countenancing action inimical to the se- 
curity of such States. 

ARTICLE II 

The contracting powers agree not to enter into any 
treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding, either 
with one another or individually or collectively with any 
power or powers which would infringe or impair the prin- 
ciples stated in Article I. 

ARTICLE III 

With a view to applying more effectually the principles of 
the open door or equality of opportunity in China for the 
trade and industry of all nations, the contracting powers, 
other than China, agree they will not seek, nor support their 
respective nations in seeking: 

(A) — Any arrangement which might purport to establish 
in favor of their interests any general superiority of rights 
with respect to commercial or economic development in any 
designated region in China ; 

(B) — Any such monopoly or preference as would deprive 
the nationals of any other power of the right of undertak- 
ing any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of partici- 
pating with the Chinese Government, or with any local 



350 APPENDIX 

authority, in any category of public enterprise, or which 
by reason of its scope, duration or geographical extent is 
calculated to frustrate the practical application of the prin- 
ciple of equal opportunity. 

It is understood that the foregoing stipulations of this 
article are not to be so construed as to prohibit the acqui- 
sition of such properties or rights as may be necessary to 
the conduct of a particular commercial, industrial or finan- 
cial undertaking or to the encouragement of invention and 
research. 

China undertakes to be guided by the principles stated in 
the foregoing stipulations of this article in dealing with 
applications for economic rights and privileges from Gov- 
ernments and nationals of all foreign countries, whether 
parties to the present treaty or not. 

ABTICIiE IV 

The contracting powers agree not to support any agree- 
ments by their respective nationals with each other, designed 
to create spheres of influence or to provide for the enjoy- 
ment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts 
of Chinese territory. 

ARTICI.E V 

China agrees that, throughout the whole of the railways 
in China, she will not exercise or permit unfair discrimina- 
tions of any kind. In particular there shall be no discrim- 
ination whatever, direct or indirect, in respect of charges 
or of facilities on the ground of the nationality of passen- 
gers or the countries from which or to which they are 
proceeding, or the origin or ownership of goods or the 
country from which or to which they are consigned, or the 
nationality or ownership of the ship or other means of con- 



APPENDIX 351 

veying such passengers or goods before or after their trans- 
port on the Chinese railways. 

The contracting powers, other than China, assume a cor- 
responding obligation in respect of any of the aforesaid 
railways over which they or their nationals are in a position 
to exercise any control in virtue of any concession, special 
agreement or otherwise. 

ARTICLE VI 

The contracting parties, other than China, agree fully to 
respect China's rights as a neutral in time of war to which 
China is not a party; and China declares that when she is a 
neutral she will observe the obligations of neutrality. 

ARTICLE vn 

The contracting powers agree that, whenever a situation 
arises which, in the opinion of any one of them, involves the 
application of the stipulations of the present treaty, and 
renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall 
be full and frank communication between the contracting 
powers concerned. 

ARTICLE vm 

Powers not signatory to the present treaty which have 
governments recognized by the signatory powers and which 
have treaty relations with China shall be invited to adhere 
to the present treaty. To this end the Government of the 
United States will make the necessary communications to 
non-signatory powers and will inform the contracting 
powers of the replies received. Adherence by any power 
shall become effective on receipt of notice thereof by the 
Government of the United States. 



352 APPENDIX 



ARTICLB DC 



The present treaty shall be ratified by the contracting 
powers in accordance with their respective constitutional 
methods and shall take effect on the date of the deposit of 
all the ratifications, which shall take place at Washington 
as soon as possible. The Government of the United States 
will transmit to the other contracting powers a certified 
copy of the process verbed of the deposit of ratifications. 

The present treaty, of which the English and French texts 
are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives 
of the Government of the United States, and duly certified 
copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to 
the other contracting powers. 

In faith whereof the above-named plenipotentiaries have 
signed the present treaty. 

Done at the City of Washington, the sixth day of Febru- 
ary, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two. 



TREATY ON CHINESE TARIFF 

The treaty relative to the Chinese tariff and cognate mat- 
ters reads: 

The United States of America, Belgium, British Empire^ 
China, France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands and Por- 
tugal: 

With a view to increasing the revenues of the Chinese 
Government, have resolved to conclude a treaty relating to 
the revision of the Chinese customs tariff and cognate mat-' 
ters, and to that end have appointed as their plenipoten- 
tiaries: 

[Here follow the names of the plenipotentiaries.] 

Who, having commMmcated to each other their fuU 



APPENDIX 353 

powers, found to he in good and due form, have agreed as 
follows : 

ARTICLE I 

The representatives of the contracting powers having 
adopted, on the 4th day of February, 1922, in the City of 
Washington, a resolution, which is appended as an annex to 
this article, with respect to the revision of Chinese customs 
duties, for the purpose of making such duties equivalent to 
an effective 5 per centum ad valorem, in accordance with 
existing treaties, concluded by China with other nations, the 
contracting powers hereby confirm the said resolution and 
undertake to accept the tariff rates fixed as a result of such 
revision. The said tariff rates shall become effective as soon 
as possible, but not earlier than two months after publica- 
tion thereof. 

ANNEX 

With a view to providing additional revenue to meet the 
needs of the Chinese Government, the powers represented at 
this conference, namely, the United States of America, Bel- 
gium, The British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands and Portugal, agree: 

That the customs schedule of duties on imports into 
China, adopted by the Tariff Revision Commission at Shang- 
hai on Dec, 19, 1918, shall forthwith be revised so that rates 
of duty shall be equivalent to 5 per cent, effective, as pro- 
vided for in the several commercial treaties to which China 
is a part. 

A revision commission shall meet at Shanghai, at the 
earliest practicable date, to effect this revision forthwith 
and on the general lines of the last revision. 

This commission shall be composed of representatives of 
the powers above named and of representatives of any addi- 



APPENDIX 355 

shall meet in China within three months after the coming 
into force of the present treaty on a day and at a place to 
be designated by the Chinese Government. 

ARTICLE III 

The special conference provided for in Article II shall 
consider the interim provisions to be applied prior to the 
abolition of likin and the fulfillment of the other conditions 
laid down in the articles of the treaties mentioned in Article 
II ; and it shall authorize the levying of a surtax on dutiable 
imports as from such date, for such purposes and subject 
to such conditions as it may determine. 

The surtax shall be at a uniform rate of 2^ per centum 
ad valorem, provided that in case of certain articles of 
luxury which, in the opinion of the special conference, can 
bear a greater increase without unduly impeding trade, the 
total surtax may be increased, but may not exceed 5 per 
centum ad valorem. 

ABTICIiE IV 

Following the immediate revision of the customs schedule 
of duties on imports into China, mentioned in Article I, 
there shall be a further revision thereof, to take effect at the 
expiration of four years following the completion of the 
aforesaid immediate revision, in order to insure that the 
customs duties shall correspond to the ad valorem rates 
fixed by the special conference provided in Article II. 

Following this further revision there shall be, for the same 
purpose, periodical revisions of the customs schedule of 
duties on imports into China every seven years, in lieu of the 
decennial revision authorized by existing treaties with China. 

In order to prevent delay, any revision made in pursuance 
of this article shall be effected in accord with rules to be 



356 APPENDIX 

prescribed by the special conference provided for in Article 
II. 

ARTICLE V 

In all matters relating to customs duties there shall be 
effective equality of treatment and of opportunity for all the 
contracting powers. 

ARTICLE VI 

The principle of uniformity in the rates of customs duties 
levied at all the land and maritime frontiers of China is 
hereby recognized. The special conference provided for in 
Article II shall make arrangements to give practical effect to 
this principle, and it is authorized to make equitable adjust- 
ments in those cases in which a customs privilege to be 
abolished was granted in return for some local economic 
advantage. 

In the meantime, any increase in the rates of customs 
duties resulting from tariff revision or any surtax hereafter 
imposed in pursuance of the present treaty, shall be levied 
at a uniform rate ad valorem at all land and maritime fron- 
tiers of China. 

ARTICLE vn 

The charge for transit passes shall be at the rate of 2^/2 
per centum ad valorem until the arrangements provided for 
by Article II come into force. 

ARTICLE VIII 

Powers not signatory to the present treaty, whose Gov- 
ernments are at present recognized by the signatory powers 
and whose present treaties with China provide for a tariff 
on imports and exports not to exceed 5 per centum ad va- 
lorem, shall be invited to adhere to the present treaty. 



APPENDIX 357 

The Government of the United States undertakes to make 
the necessary communications for this purpose and to in- 
form the Governments of the contracting powers of the re- 
plies received. Adherence by any power shall become ef- 
fective on receipt of notice thereof by the Government of the 
United States. 

ARTICLE IX 

The provisions of the present treaty shall override all 
stipulations of treaties between China and the respective 
contracting powers, which are inconsistent therewith, other 
than stipulations according most favored nation treatment. 

ARTICLE X 

The present treaty shall be ratified by the contracting 
powers in accord with their respective constitutional 
methods and shall take effect on the date of the deposit of 
all the ratifications, which shall take place at Washington as 
soon as possible. The Government of the United States will 
transmit to the other contracting powers a certified copy of 
the proces verbal of the deposit of ratifications. 

The present treaty, of which the English and French 
texts are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the ar- 
chives of the Government of the United States and duly cer- 
tified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Govern- 
ment to the other contracting powers. 

In faith whereof the above-named plenipotentiaries have 
signed the present treaty. 

Done at the City of Washington, the sixth day of Febru- 
ary, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two. 

SUPPLEMENT TO FAR EAST TREATY 

This resolution was adopted as a supplement to the gen- 
eral Far Eastern treaty : 



358 APPENDIX 

The United States of America, Belgium, the British Em- 
pire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and 
Portugal, 

Desiring to provide a procedure for dealing with questions 
that may arise in connection with the execution of the pro- 
visions of Articles III and V of the treaty to be signed at 
Washington on Feb. 6, 1922, with reference to their general 
policy, designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to 
safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote 
intercourse between China and the other powers upon the 
basis of equality of opportunity. 

Resolve, That there shall be established in China a board 
of reference to which any questions arising in connection 
with the execution of the aforesaid articles may be referred 
for investigation and report. 

The special conference, provided in Article II of the 
treaty to be signed at Washington on Feb. 6, 1922, with 
reference to the Chinese customs tariff, shall formulate for 
the approval of the powers concerned a detailed plan for 
the constitution of the board. 

DECLARATIONS BY AND ON CHINA 

The Chinese declaration regarding alienation of territory, 
also added to the Far Eastern treaty, was stated thus : 

China upon her part is prepared to give an undertaking 
not to alienate or lease any portion of her territory or lit- 
toral to any power. 

The Chinese delegation also announced an "undertaking" 
in connection with the tariff treaty, which stated that "the 
Chinese Government have no intention to effect any change 
which may disturb the present administration of the Chinese 
maritime customs." 



APPENDIX 359 

The resolution regarding the Chinese Eastern Railroad 
reads : 

Resolved, that the preservation of the Chinese Eastern 
Railway for those in interest requires that better protection 
be given the railway and the persons engaged in its opera- 
tion and use, a more careful selection of personnel to secure 
efficiency of service, and a more economical use of funds to 
prevent waste of the property; that the subject should be 
dealt with through the proper diplomatic channels. 

The powers in the Far Eastern Committee, other than 
China, added to this a supplementary resolution as follows : 

The powers other than China, in agreeing to the resolu- 
tion regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway, reserve the 
right to insist hereafter upon the responsibility of China for 
performance or non-performance of the obligations toward 
the foreign stockholders, bondholders, and creditors of the 
Chinese Eastern Railway Company, which the powers deem 
to result from the contracts under which the railroad was 
built, and the action of China thereunder, and the obligations 
which they deem to be in the nature of a trust, resulting 
from the exercise of power by the Chinese Government over 
the possession and administration of the railroad. 

TEXT OF SHANTUNG AGREEMENT 

The terms of settlement as agreed upon, Feb. 1, 1922, by 
the representatives of the Governments of Japan and China 
follow : 

I. THE FORMER GERMAN LEASED TERRITORY OF KIAO-CHAU 

1. Japan shall restore to China the former German leased 
territory of Kiao-Chau. 

2. The Governments of Japan and China shall each ap- 
point a commission with powers to make and carry out de- 
tailed arrangements relating to the transfer of the adminis- 



360 APPENDIX 

tration and of public property in the said territory and 
to settle other matters equally requiring adjustment. For 
such purposes the Japanese and Chinese commissions shall 
meet immediately upon the coming into force of the present 
agreement. 

3. The said transfer and adjustment shall be completed 
as soon as possible, and in any case not later than six 
months from the date of the coming into force of this agree- 
ment. 

4. The Japanese Government agrees to hand over to the 
Chinese Government, upon the transfer to China of the ad- 
ministration of the former German-leased territory of Kiao- 
Chau such archives, registers, plans, title-deeds and other 
documents, in the possession of Japan or certified copies 
thereof, as may be necessary for the said transfer, as well 
as those that may be useful for the administration by China, 
after such transfer, of that territory, and of the 50-kilome- 
ter zone around Kiao-Chau Bay. 

II. PUBLIC PROPERTIES 

1. The Government of Japan undertakes to transfer to 
the Government of China all public properties, including 
land, buildings, works or establishments in the leased terri- 
tory of Kiao-Chau, whether formerly possessed by the Ger- 
man authorities or purchased or constructed by the Japa- 
nese authorities during the Japanese administration of the 
said territory, save those indicated in this article (Para- 
graph 3) of this treaty. 

2. In the transfer of such public properties no compensa- 
tion will be claimed from the Government of China except 
(1) for those purchased or constructed by the Japanese 
authorities and also (2) for the improvement on or addi- 
tions to those formerly possessed by the German authorities. 



APPENDIX 361 

With regard to cases under these two categories, the Gov- 
ernment of China shall refund a fair and equitable propor- 
tion of the expenses actually incurred by the Government 
of Japan for such properties specified in (1) or such im- 
provements or additions specified in (2), having regard to 
the principle of depreciation. 

S. It is agreed that such public properties in the leased 
territory of Kiao-Chau as are required for the Japanese 
Consulate to be established in Tsing-tao shall be retained 
by the Government of Japan, and that those required more 
especially for the benefit of the Japanese community, in- 
cluding public schools, shrines and cemeteries, shall be left in 
the hands of the said community. 

Details of such matters shall be arranged by the joint 
commission provided for in an article of this treaty. 

in. JAPANESE TROOPS 

The Japanese troops, including gendarmes now stationed 
along the Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu Railway and its branches, 
shall be withdrawn as soon as the Chinese police or military 
force shall have been sent to take over the protection of the 
railway. 

The disposition of the Chinese police or military force and 
the withdrawal of the Japanese troops under the foregoing 
provisions may be effected in sections. The date of the com- 
pletion of such process for each section shall be arranged 
in advance between the competent authorities of Japan and 
China. The entire withdrawal of such Japanese troops 
shall be effected if possible within three months, and, in any 
case, not later than six months from the date of the signa- 
ture of the present agreement. 

The Japanese garrison at Tsing-tao shall be completely 
withdrawn, simultaneously, if possible, with the transfer of 



362 APPENDIX 

the administration of the leased territory of Kiao-Chau to 
China, and in any case not later than thirty days from the 
date of siich transfer. 

IV. THE MARITIME CUSTOMS 

1. It is agreed that upon the coming into force of the 
present treaty, the Customs House of Tsing-tao shall be 
made an integral part of the Chinese maritime customs. 

2. It is understood that the provisional agreement of 
Aug. 6, 1915, between Japan and China relative to the mari- 
time customs office at Tsing-tao will cease to be effective 
upon the coming into force of the present treaty. 

V. THE TSING-TAO-TSINANFU RAILWAY 

1. Japan shall transfer to China the Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu 
Railway and its branches, together with all the properties 
appurtenant thereto, including wharves, warehouses and 
other similar properties. 

China, on her part, undertakes to reimburse to Japan the 
actual value of the railway properties mentioned in the pre- 
ceding paragraph. The actual value to be so reimbursed 
shall consist of the sum of 53,406,141 gold marks (which is 
the assessed value of such portion of the said properties as 
was left behind by the Germans) or its equivalent, plus the 
amount which Japan, during her administration of the rail- 
way has actually expended for permanent Improvements on 
or additions to the said properties, less a suitable allowance 
for depreciation. It is understood that no charge will be 
made with respect to the wharves, warehouses and other 
similar properties mentioned in Paragraph 1 of this article, 
except for such permanent improvements on or additions to 
them as may have been made by Japan during her adminis- 
tration of the railway, less a suitable allowance for depre- 
ciation. 



APPENDIX 363 

The Government of Japan and the Government of China 
shall each appoint three Commissioners to form a joint rail- 
way commission, with powers to appraise the actual value 
of the railway properties on the basis defined in the pre- 
ceding paragraph, and to arrange the transfer of the said 
properties. 

Such transfer shall be completed as soon as possible, and, 
in any case, not later than nine months from the date of the 
coming into force of the present agreement. 

To effect the reimbursement under Paragraph 2 of this 
article, China shall, simultaneously with the completion of 
the transfer of the railway properties, deliver to Japan Chi- 
nese Government Treasury notes, secured on the properties 
and revenues of the railway, and running for a period of 
fifteen years, but redeemable at the option of China at the 
end of five years from the date of the delivery of the Treas- 
ury notes, or at any time thereafter upon six months' pre- 
vious notice. 

Pending the redemption of the said Treasury notes, the 
Chinese Government will select and appoint, for so long a 
period as the said notes remain unredeemed, a Japanese sub- 
ject to the post of traffic manager and another Japanese 
subject to the chief accountant jointly with the Chinese 
chief accountant with co-ordinate functions. These of- 
ficials shall all be under the direction, control and super- 
vision of the Chinese managing director, and removable for 
cause. 

Financial details of a technical character relating to the 
said Treasury notes, not provided for in this article, shall 
be determined in mutual accord between the Japanese and 
China authorities as soon as possible and, in any case, not 
later than six months from the date of the coming into force 
of the present agreement. 



364 APPENDIX 

VI. THE EXTENSIONS OF THE TSING-TAO-TSINANFU RAILWAY 

It is agreed that the concessions relating to the two ex- 
tensions of the Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu Railway, namely, the 
Tsinanfu-Shunteh and the Kaomi-Hsuchowfu lines, will be 
thrown open for the common activity of an international 
financial group, on terms to be arranged between the Chinese 
Government and the said group. 

VII. MINES 

The mines of Tsechuan, Fangtse and Chinlingchen, for 
which the mining rights were formerly granted by China to 
Germany, shall be handed to a company to be formed by a 
special charter of the Chinese Government, in which the 
Japanese commissions which are to be amount of the Chi- 
nese capital. The mode and terms of such arrangement shall 
be determined by the Chinese and Japanese commissions 
which are to be appointed for that purpose and which shall 
meet immediately upon the coming into force of the present 
agreement. 

Vni. OPENING OF THE FORMER GERMAN LEASED TERRITORY 

The Japanese Government declares that it has no inten- 
tion of seeking the establishment of an exclusive Japanese 
settlement or of an international settlement in Tsing-tao. 

The Chinese Government, on its part, declares that the 
entire area of the former German leased territory of Kiao- 
Chau will be opened to foreign trade, and that foreigners 
will be permitted freely to reside and to carry on commerce, 
industry and other lawful pursuits within such area. 

The vested rights lawfully and equitably acquired by 
foreign nationals in said area, whether under the German 
regime or during the Japanese militarj^ occupation, will be 
respected. 



APPENDIX 365 

All questions relating to the status or validity of such 
vested rights acquired by Japanese nationals shall be ar- 
ranged by the Sino-Japanese Joint Commission. 

rX. SALT INDUSTRY 

Whereas, the salt industry is a Government monopoly in 
China, it is agreed that the interests of Japanese companies 
of Japanese nationals actually engaged in the said industry 
along the coast of Kiao-Chau Bay are to be purchased by 
the Chinese Government on payment of fair compensation, 
and that exportation to Japan of a quantity of salt pro- 
duced by the said industry along the said coast is to be per- 
mitted on reasonable terms. Arrangements for the above 
purposes, including the transfer of said interests to the 
Chinese Government, shall be completed by the Chinese and 
Japanese commissions as soon as possible, and in any case 
not later than six months from date of the coming into force 
of the present agreement. 

X. SUBMARINE CABLES 

Japan declares that all the rights, title and privileges con- 
cerning former German submarine cable between Tsing-tao 
and Chefoo, and between Tsing-tao and Shanghai, are vested 
in China, with the exception of those portions of the said 
two cables which have been utilized by the Japanese Gov- 
ernment for the laying of a cable between Tsing-tao and 
Sasebo — it being understood that the question relating to 
tha landing and operation at Tsing-tao and the said Tsing- 
tao-Sasebo cable shall be arranged by the Chinese and Japa- 
nese commissions as subject to the terms of the existing con- 
tracts to which China is a party. 

XI. WIRELESS STATIONS 

The Japanese wireless stations at Tsing-tao and Tsinanfu 
shall be transferred to China upon the withdrawal of the 



366 APPENDIX 

Japanese troops at those two places, respectively, with fair 
compensation for the value of these stations. 

The details of such transfer and compensation shall be ar- 
ranged by the Chinese and Japanese commissions. 

ANNEXES 

I. PREFERENTIAL, RIGHTS 

Japan declares that she renounces all preferential rights 
with regard to foreign assistance in persons, capital and 
material, stipulated in the Sino-German Treaty of March 
6, 1898. 

II. PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 

Enterprises relating to electric light, telephone, stock 
yards, &c., shall be handed over to the Chinese Government, 
with the understanding that the stock yard, electric light 
and laundry enterprises are, in turn, to be handed over to 
the municipal government of Tsing-tao, which will form 
Chinese corporations in conformity with the Chinese com- 
pany law to manage them under municipal supervision and 
regulations. 

III. TELEPHONES 

1. The Japanese Government agrees to turn over to the 
Chinese Government the telephone enterprise in the former 
German leased territory of Kiao-Chau. 

2. As regards such telephone enterprise, the Chinese Gov- 
ernment will give due consideration to requests from the 
foreign community at Tsing-tao for such extensions and 
improvements as may be reasonably required by the general 
interests of the public. 

IV. PUBLIC WORKS 

The Chinese Government declares that in the management 
and maintenance of the public works in Tsing-tao, such as 



APPENDIX 367 

roads, waterworks, parks, drainage, sanitary equipment, &c., 
handed over to the Chinese Government by the Japanese 
Government, the foreign community in Tsing-tao shall have 
fair representation. 

V. MARITIME CUSTOMS 

The Cliinese Government declares that it will move the 
Inspector General of the Chinese maritime customs to per- 
mit the Japanese traders at Tsing-tao to communicate with 
the said customs in the Japanese language, and, in the se- 
lection of a suitable staff for the Tsing-tao customs, to give 
consideration within the limits of its established service regu- 
lations to the diverse needs of the trade of Tsing-tao. 

VI. THE TSING-TAO-TSINANFIT RAILWAY 

Should the joint railway commission fail to reach an 
agreement on any of the matter entrusted to its charge, the 
points at issue shall be taken up by the two Governments 
for discussion and adjustment by means of diplomacy. In 
the determination of such points the two Governments shall, 
if necessary, obtain recommendations of an expert or ex- 
perts of a third power or powers who shall be designated in 
mutual agreement with each other. 

VII. EXTENSION OF THE TSING-TAO-TSINANFU RAILWAY 

The Japanese Government has no intention of claiming 
that the option for the construction of the Chefoo-Weihsien 
Railway should be thrown open for the common activity of 
the International Financial Consortium if that railway is to 
be constructed with Chinese capital. 

Vin. OPENING OF THE FORMER LEASED TERRITORY 

The Chinese Government declares that, pending the enact- 
ment and general application of laws regulating the system 



368 APPENDIX 

of local self-government in China, the Chinese local authori- 
ties will ascertain the views of the foreign residents in the 
former German leased territory of Kiao-Chau in such mu- 
nicipal matters as may directly affect their welfare and 
interests. 

WEI-HAI-WEI RESTORED TO CHINA 

On February 1, 1922, the Hon. Arthur J. Balfour, senior 
British delegate, announced to the fifth plenary session of 
the Conference on Limitation of Armaments at Washington, 
D. C, that Great Britain proposed to hand back Wei-hai- 
wei to China. He spoke, in part, as follows : 

The second reason is one in which I speak for the British 
Empire delegation and for them alone. The result of the 
termination of this Shantung dispute is to hand back to 
the sovereignty of China a great port and a most important 
railway, the port giving access to and the railway giving 
communications within what I believe is the most thickly 
populated province of China. But there is another leased 
territory, other than those we have been discussing to-day, 
which is under lease to the British Government. I refer to 
Wei-hai-wei. 

Those who have followed the course of events in China 
during the last generation are aware that a most critical 
position arose when Russiia and Germany began to attempt 
to dominate more and more the Chinese Empire. It was 
when Russia seized Port Arthur that in order to bring 
some foreign equipoise to the assistance of China, to pre- 
vent the increase of such operations, the arrangement was 
come to between the Chinese Government and the British 
Government by which Wei-hai-wei was leased to Great 
Britain for a term of years under arrangements which left 
it possible to use that port as a defense against Russia, 



APPENDIX 369 

though impossible to use it as any great commercial center 
or as a rival to any existing commercial interests. 

The circumstances under which Wei-hai-wei thus came 
under the control of British have now not only provisionally 
changed, but they have altogether disappeared. The rest 
of Shantung province is now handed back under suitable 
conditions to the complete sovereignty of China. Under 
like suitable conditions I have to announce that Great 
Britain proposes to hand back Wei-hai-wei to the country 
within whose frontier it lies, I doubt not it has been used 
so far merely as a sanatorium or summer resort for the 
ships of war coming up from the tropical or more southern 
portions of the China station. I doubt not that it will be 
available for that innocent and healthful purpose in time 
to come. 

But the sovereignty will now be restored, as the sov- 
ereignty of China has been restored in other parts of the 
province, and we shall be largely guided in the arrangements 
that we will have to make and that we propose at once to 
initiate — we shall be largely guided in those arrangements 
by the course that the arrangement in regard to the Japa- 
nese lease in Shantung has come to this so happy and so 
satisfactory conclusion — a conclusion which has met with 
your universal approbation in this hall. 

When that is accomplished, this great province of China 
will again be what every Chinese citizen must desire that it 
should be, in the fullest sense an integral part of that great 
empire, and I rejoice to think that I am in a position to-day 
to add, if I may say so, this crowning word to the statement 
of policy made by your Chairman on behalf of the country, 
and responded to in such fehcitous terms by our Japanese 
and our Chinese colleagues. 



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Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxid 
Treatment Date: March 2003 



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111 Thomson Park Drive 
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